Background

The Battle of Midway, fought between 4 and 7 June 1942, stands as one of the pivotal battles in the Pacific Theater and turning point from which Japan would not recover. Six months on from Japan's raid on Pearl Harbor and a month after the Battle of the Coral Sea, the United States Navy won a decisive victory over the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN).

Two strategic factors contributed to the battle: the Japanese intended to establish a "barrier" to extend their defensive perimeter following the Doolittle air raid on Tokyo and aimed to entice American carriers into a trap to clear for further offensives. Conversely, American cryptographers' remarkable breakthroughs enabled the U.S. Navy to set an ambush of their own, tipping the scales before a single shot was fired.

As four pivotal days of combat ensued north of Midway Atoll, the battle saw four Japanese fleet carriers, previously part of the six-carrier force that assailed Pearl Harbor, sent to the ocean floor. The carriers Akagi, Kaga, Soryu, and Hiryu met their demise, along with the heavy cruiser Mikuma. Despite the loss of the carrier USS Yorktown and the destroyer USS Hammann, the United States retained the strategically crucial carriers USS Enterprise and USS Hornet—a significant balance in their favor.

The Battle

In the early hours of June 4, 1942, following the initial diversion by the Japanese on the Aleutian Islands, the U.S. launched a preemptive aerial sortie. A group of B-17 Flying Fortress bombers departed from Midway aiming to disrupt the Japanese invasion force led by Admiral Nobutake Kondo. Mistakenly identifying this entity as the primary fleet, the U.S. attack ultimately bore no significant fruit, marking the inaugural military engagement of the Battle of Midway. Subsequent attempts for aerial offense continued pre-dawn, with additional B-17s targeting the same Japanese fleet. These raids too fell short of their intended mark.

The Japanese, steadfast in their strategy, proceeded as planned with Nagumo ordering a squadron of 108 warplanes to initiate an assault on Midway Island. By 0700 hours, the Japanese aerial onslaught wrought considerable devastation on the island's infrastructure. However, crucially, the airstrip remained operational and anti-aircraft defenses intact. It was during Nagumo's contemplation of a second strike on Midway, noting the need for further bombardment to fully incapacitate the airbase, that U.S. planes from Midway counterattacked. These early counterstrikes, though valiant, failed to achieve any tangible results against the formidable Japanese carriers.

As the battle's tempo intensified, a critical development materialized. A Japanese reconnaissance aircraft spotted key elements of the U.S. Pacific Fleet to the east, including the critical asset, USS Yorktown. This sighting impelled Nagumo to pivot his strategy; he commanded his forces to immediately prepare for a naval engagement. Simultaneously, U.S. torpedo bombers, dispatched from USS Hornet and USS Enterprise, engaged the Japanese. A fierce aerial brawl ensued, with the unescorted Devastators being virtually obliterated by the adeptly piloted Japanese Zero fighters.

Around one hour after this skirmish, in a decisive moment of the battle, another sortie of U.S. bombers deployed from carrier decks struck with deadly precision. Three Japanese carriers — Akagi, Kaga, and Soryu — were catastrophically damaged by this wave, their decks enveloped in flames. The consequence of this sustained assault led to the last operational Japanese carrier, Hiryu, launching a desperate offensive against the Yorktown. Although Yorktown became incapacitated and was subsequently abandoned, it remained buoyant. The Hiryu's fate was sealed as U.S. dive-bombers, in a relentless pursuit of victory, delivered the coup-de-grace, incinerating it and thereby nullifying the Japanese carrier threat in this pivotal clash.

Top photo: Aerial photograph of Midway Atoll, looking just south of west across the southern side of the atoll, 24 November 1941. Eastern Island, then the site of Midway’s airfield, is in the foreground. Sand Island, location of most other base facilities, is across the entrance channel. Source: Franklin D. Roosevelt Library and Museum and U.S. National Archives. In the Public Domain.

Middle photo: U.S. Navy Torpedo Squadron 6 (VT-6) Douglas TBD-1 Devastator aircraft are prepared for launching aboard the aircraft carrier USS Enterprise (CV-6) at about 0730-0740 hrs, 4 June 1942. Eleven of the fourteen TBDs launched from Enterprise are visible. Three more TBDs and ten Grumman F4F-4 Wildcat fighters must still be pushed into position before launching can begin. The TBD in the left front is Number Two (BuNo 1512), flown by Ensign Severin L. Rombach and Aviation Radioman 2nd Class W.F. Glenn. Along with eight other VT-6 aircraft, this plane and its crew were lost attacking Japanese aircraft carriers somewhat more than two hours later. The heavy cruiser USS Pensacola (CA-24) is in the right distance and a destroyer is in plane guard position at left. Source: Naval History and Heritage Command under the digital ID 80-G-41686. In the Public Domain.

Bottom photo: U.S. Navy Douglas SBD-3 Dauntless dive bombers from Scouting Squadron 8 (VS-8) from the aircraft carrier USS Hornet (CV-8) approaching the burning Japanese heavy cruiser Mikuma to make the third set of attacks on her, during the Battle of Midway, 6 June 1942. Scouting Squadron 8 (VS-8), U.S. Navy. Record creator, Department of Defense. Department of the Navy. Naval Photographic Center. Source: U.S. National Archives and Records Administration. In the Public Domain.

Military historians, such as John Keegan, have extolled this confrontation as "the most stunning and decisive blow in the history of naval warfare," putting it on par with ancient and modern naval battles of monumental consequence.

Admiral Nimitz's critical advantage unfolded as U.S. cryptanalysts partially deciphered the Japanese Navy's JN-25b code. Since the early months of 1942, the Americans intercepted messages hinting at an impending operation targeting "AF." The precise location of "AF" was a puzzle until Commander Joseph Rochefort's team at Station HYPO ingeniously confirmed it as Midway. Captain Wilfred Holmes crafted a deception involving Midway's base reporting, via unencrypted radio, a malfunction in their water purification system. The Japanese response, complaining of water scarcity at "AF," intercepted within 24 hours, unwittingly exposed their intentions to U.S. codebreakers. Despite intercepting the message, Japanese radio operators disregarded the possibility of American deceit—a critical oversight. HYPO not only pinpointed the attack date to either June 4 or 5 but also provided Nimitz with the IJN's detailed order of battle.

Fortunately for the U.S., the Japanese delay in implementing a new codebook allowed American cryptanalysts additional time to decipher transmissions, only complicating their security when the new code was adopted on 24 May. By then, however, the vital intelligence had already been extracted. Consequently, the Americans commenced the Battle of Midway with comprehensive insight into Japanese movements. Nimitz understood that the Japanese had diluted their numerical superiority by distributing their vessels across four separate task groups, too distant to support one another effectively. This configuration left the Carrier Striking Force lacking in swift ships for escort, thereby reducing the anti-aircraft artillery available to shield their carriers. Nimitz's strategic calculus surmised that air power from his three carriers, combined with the aircraft stationed on Midway Island, roughly equated to the strength of Yamamoto's four carriers, especially since American air groups were notably larger than their Japanese counterparts. Contrarily, the Japanese, even as the conflict unfolded, were substantially in the dark about the true might and deployment of American forces.

The Japanese Approach and American Preparedness

The Japanese high command, responding to the Doolittle air raid, had laid plans to fortify their grasp over the Pacific. Aiming to conquer Midway, alongside plots to neutralize outposts such as Fiji and Samoa, the Japanese sought to extend their reach to even threaten Hawaii once more. However, underestimating American resolve and preparations ultimately precipitated their downfall.

U.S. cryptanalysts' success in determining the date and location of the impending attack allowed Admiral Nimitz to cunningly marshal his forces at Midway. The result was an ambush of the Japanese fleet that would prove not only tactically surprising but also strategically catastrophic for Japan.

The Outcome and Its Aftermath

In the wake of the battle, American forces, cognizant of the perils near Wake Island, prudently retreated. With Admiral Raymond Spruance's choice to withdraw to the east, he faced scrutiny for not pursuing the wounded Japanese forces more vehemently. Yet this tactical decision was undergirded by a myriad of factors: the pursuit would have been fraught with logistical and strategic hurdles. Low fuel reserves, depleted air groups, and the daunting presence of Yamamoto's fleet—including the formidable Yamato—argued against the prudence of such an aggressive follow-up.

The controversy surrounding Spruance's leadership underscores the complexity of wartime naval strategy. Detractors who assailed him for perceived timidity failed to appreciate the entirety of circumstances. Historian Samuel E. Morison and others have postulated that, contrary to expectations, further pursuit might have led to a Pyrrhic outcome for the U.S. Navy.

Upon return to Japan, the reality of this crippling defeat was kept from public knowledge, with the Japanese media declaring a misplaced victory. The Imperial Japanese Army too was left in the dark; only Emperor Hirohito and top military officials knew the full extent of what had been lost.

This veil of secrecy extended even to the treatment of wounded sailors, who were categorized as "secret patients" to contain the shockwaves of defeat. Flag officers and their staff were curiously shielded from reprisal, and Admiral Nagumo even went on to helm the carrier forces rebuild—possibly because his erroneous report of sinking two American carriers swayed judgment.

Legacy and Historical Significance

The Battle of Midway irrevocably altered the trajectory of the Pacific War. It showcased the growing prowess of American industry and military training, indicating that U.S. capabilities to replace losses far outstripped those of Japan. From this juncture, alongside the punishing Solomon Islands campaign, Japan found themselves on a path of attrition from which they would not recover.

Distinguished by its scale, the Midway confrontation is revered among naval engagements, heralded by strategic minds like Craig Symonds as an encounter standing alongside Salamis, Trafalgar, and Tsushima Strait. It epitomized the potency of intelligence and cryptanalysis in contemporary warfare and marked the beginning of an end to Japanese imperial ambitions in the Pacific.

Bibliography

Dull, Paul. A Battle History of the Imperial Japanese Navy: 1941-1945. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2007.

Fuchida, Mitsuo, and Masatake Okumiya. Midway: The Battle that Doomed Japan : the Japanese Navy's Story. Annapolis: Bluejacket Books, 2001.

Morison, Samuel E. The Two Ocean War: A Short History of the United States Navy in the Second World War. Boston: Little, Brown, 1963. 

Mercer, Charles E., Gordon W. Prange, Donald M. Goldstein, and Katherine V. Dillon. Miracle at Midway. New York: Putnam Publishing Group, 1982. 

Parshall, Jonathan, and Anthony Tully. Shattered Sword: The Untold Story of the Battle of Midway. Lincoln: Potomac Books, 2005. 

Spector, Ronald H. Eagle Against the Sun: The American War with Japan. New York: Vintage Books, 1985. 

Symonds, Craig L. World War II at Sea: A Global History. New York: Oxford University Press, 2018. 

Toll, Ian W. The Conquering Tide: War in the Pacific Islands, 1942-1944 (Vol. 2): War in the Pacific Islands, 1942–1944. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2015