King Leonidas of Sparta (r.489-480 BCE) and the “Stand of the 300” holds a special place in the annals of Western Civilization. At the end of the second decade of the Persian Wars (499-449 BCE) Leonidas stood with a select group of fellow Spartans hoplites and allied Greeks against the largest army ever assembled in Europe at this time in history, a multinational Persian host led by the Great King Xerxes (r.486-465) bent on adding the Greek peoples and their Aegean poleis or city states to the largest empire the world had ever seen. Panhellenic negotiations drew Sparta out of its normal isolationist stance, with Leonidas agreeing to lead a small land force to block the Persian advance at the strategically important Pass at Thermopylae, a mountainous chokepoint between the flat plains of Thessaly and Boeotia. The Spartan led coalition would hold the pass while a Panhellenic naval force held the nearby Strait of Artemisium as a joint force delaying action. It was a bold strategy against overwhelming odds, and one, according to the Greek historian Herodotus (c.484-425), where the Oracle at Delphi foretold either the death of a Spartan king or the fall of Sparta months before the engagement. Preferring the former as a son of Sparta and a king, Leonidas joined the Panhellenic defense of Greece and made this seven day march north from his home city state in the southern Peloponnesus to the mountains of central Greece, where he and his 300 strong Hippias (royal bodyguard) would die to the man in arguably the most celebrated “last stand” in military history. 

Forging Spartan Hoplites

The small Spartan force that set out northward in August of 480 (modern historians are still unsure concerning the precise date) were the best trained heavy infantry hoplites in the Greek world, renowned for their skill in the phalanx with thrusting spear (doru), double-edged side sword (xiphos), and large round shield (hoplon or aspis) in close-quarter combat. Leonidas and his bodyguard were products of the specialized Spartan military education called the Agoge, where sons began their state-sponsored education at the age of seven and trained for the next twelve years. The seven-year-olds were organized into classes of about sixty each called Ilae who would eat together, sleep together and compete against one another for the remainder of their education as “herds” or “packs” to establish internal pecking orders, as well as struggle against older, larger classmates and bully younger, smaller classmates to build character. The first decade of the boys education was divided into two stages, the Paides and the Paidskoi. During this time boys were instructed in the basics of reading and writing, as well as in the history and customs of Sparta. However, the real emphasis was on physical education, specifically skills that would showcase the skills of the youth and that were transferable to the military arts and performing well on the march, in camp, and in the phalanx.  At the age of eighteen the young adult Spartan entered the next stage of his education, the Hebontes, the most competitive aspect of the young Spartan’s education. Supervised military drill continued during these two years, with these young men serving as instructors for trainees in the Agoge and reserve units for the home garrison. The Spartan youths primary education ended at the age of twenty when he officially transitioned from his Ilae into his military mess hall and barracks (Syssition), where he would spend the next decade as a full-time active-duty Spartan hoplite.

This military education was the brainchild of Lycurgus, the semi-legendary Spartan king and lawgiver who lived most likely in the ninth century BCE. Lycurgus was the architect of Spartan society, including establishing a rigid oligarchical society co-ruled by dual kings (diarchy) made up from members of two ruling families, the Agiads and the Eurypontids. Traditionally, both kings had equal power to deal with issues concerning religious, judicial, and most importantly, military matters. By the time of Leonidas’ rule in the early fifth century BCE, much of religious and judicial power was shared with five annually elected Ephors (overseers). However, one of the dual kings was still responsible to function as a military commander when the army was away from Sparta, while the other was required to stay home to protect the city-state. The Athenian orator Isocrates (436-338 BCE) perhaps stated it best, referring to the Spartans as “subject to an oligarchy at home, and to a kingship on campaign.”

The Rise of Leonidas

Leonidas was heir to the Agiad throne through his relationship with his older half-brother King Cleomenes (r.519-490 BCE). During his three decade reign Cleomenes consolidated the power of Sparta in the Peloponnesus. He also marched on Athens and removed the tyrant Hippias in 510 but was forced to withdraw after the election of Cleisthenes whose reforms solidified Athens as a limited democracy for the next century. When the Greeks rebelled in western Anatolia against Persian rule in 499, he refused to send aid. However, when the Athenians did send twenty warships, it raised the ire of the Great Persian King Darius (r.522-486 BCE) who financed a punitive expedition against the polis in 490 which culminated in an unexpected Athenian victory at the battle of Marathon. Here, a Spartan relief army arrived one day too late to take part.  Herodotus tells us that this delay was due to religious observances, but other primary sources point to a Helot insurrection fermented by Cleomenes that delayed the march. His reign was shaped by a rivalry with his co-monarch, Demaratus (r.515-491 BCE), who he eventually dethroned, after which he was deposed by the Ephors and died under Spartan house arrest, presumably by suicide. His death without a male heir cleared the way for Leonidas to ascend the throne as the Agiad monarch in 489, with the Eurypontid Leotychidas II (r.491-476 BCE) as his co-ruler. Leonidas was around the age of fifty when he became king, and it was probably at this time when he married the young Gorgo, herself around the age of twenty. Gorgo was King Cleomenes’ daughter, only child, and sole heir. She was also the niece of Leonidas. Avunculate marriage was common in Sparta, and together they produced one son, Pleistarchus, who would himself ascend the throne as a minor under a regency after his father’s death at Thermopylae and rule until 459. Gorgo is remembered fondly by Herodotus, who remarked on her intelligence and good counsel to her husband during this pivotal stage of the Persian Wars. Modern historians believe that she may have traveled with Leonidas to other Greek city states in the years leading up to Thermopylae as Greece prepared for a second Persian invasion of Europe to complete what the first Persian invasion failed to do a decade earlier.

Top photo one: Greek hoplite and Persian warrior fighting each other. Depiction in ancient kylix. 5th c. BCE. National Archaeological Museum of Athens. Source: Wikimedia. In the Public Domain.

Top photo two: Statue of a hoplite (fifth century BCE), known as “Leonidas” at the Archaeological Museum of Sparta. Source: Wikimedia. In the Public Domain.

Top photo three: Map: Battle of Thermopylae and movements to Salamis, 480 BCE. Source: Wikimedia. In the Public Domain.

Xerxes’ Invasion of Europe

Darius’ humiliating defeat at Marathon haunted him for the rest of his life, time which he spent preparing for a second invasion of Greece.  However, a revolt in Egypt forced his attention away from the Aegean, while his death in 486 ended his dream of retribution altogether. Herodotus recounts Darius’ singular preoccupation with revenge, requiring one of his servants to say "Master, remember the Athenians" three times before his meal each day. His son and successor, Xerxes (r.486-465 BCE), crushed the Egyptian uprising and continued preparations for a second larger expedition against Greece in 480, but this time, the great Persian king commanded an invasion force unlike anything ever witnessed on European soil. Herodotus describes a total invasion force (combatants and logistical support) of 1.7 million troops aided by well over 1,200 triremes and 3,000 support ships of various sizes. These fantastical numbers are challenged by modern historians, who reduce the number in Xerxes’s army to between 80,000 and 250,000 troops and support personnel, supported by a navy of roughly 600 ships. Even taking the lowest estimate, this army would have been the largest army ever gathered in Europe by this time in recorded history.  The large Persian host (Herodotus identifies forty-six nations) march through friendly territory using the famous Royal Road to Sardis in western Anatolia, and then struck move north towards the Hellespont, shadowed by the assembled Persian navy, which guarded its western flank while providing logistical support to this army on the move.  After reaching the Hellespont, Xerxes ordered the construction of two pontoon bridges to move men and material across the fast moving current from Asia Minor to Europe, a feat of remarkable military engineering. This crossing was uncontested as this region of Thrace was already under Persian control.  Five supply depots were pre-positioned along the way in Thrace, Macedonia, and northern Greece, a process four years in the making and the testimony to the forethought put into Xerxes’ campaign. The Persian army paused at the port city of Therme (modern Thessaloniki), where Herodotus tells us the army was reorganized from national armies on the march into a mixed multinational fighting force in preparation for the upcoming campaign.

During the decade between Darius’ loss at Marathon and the Xerxes’ invasion of Europe, the Greeks prepared for the possibility of Persian retribution. Under their influential politician and general (strategos) Themistocles (c.524-460 BCE) Athens wisely used the proceeds from newly found silver mines on the island of Euboea to finance the building of a large navy, reinforcing the city state’s position as the greatest thalassocracy in the Aegean world. This navy would prove to be indispensable in the later Greek victory at the battle of Salamis in September 480. We know far less about Leonidas and his activities during these years, other than he was a man in his fifties who presumably was a very experienced military commander, although we have no details concerning any of his earlier campaigns before Thermopylae.  We do know, however, that a year before Thermopylae and Salamis delegations from across Greece, met at the Isthmus of Corinth near a sanctuary to Poseidon to prepare for the defense of Greece. Many of the participants from the Peloponnesus, one to make their stand at this narrow land bridge between their peninsula and mainland Greece, however, it was decided to move a military action farther north, with not only Spartan participation, but overall command of the Panhellenic forces in a unanimous decision.  In fact, this decision placed Spartan commanders on Athenian warships, even though the former had very little experience in naval warfare. With religious oaths sworn and joint land and sea forces committed, the Athenian Themistocles joined forces with a Spartan general (polemarch) named Euaenetus marched their combined army of 10,000 men in the spring of 480 to the most likely place to make a strategic stand against the invading Persian army, the Vale of Tempe, in an attempt to reassure the Thessalians their lands would be saved. Tempe is a gorge and strategic chokepoint between Mount Ossa and Mount Olympus. However, a careful reconnaissance of the area showed a defending army could easily be outflanked, so the Spartan and Athenian armies withdrew, an act that led to Thebes and many of its surrounding territories to “medize” (a reference to Media, a Greek name for Persia) or withdraw from the Panhellenic alliance and offer active aid to the invaders. With Thessaly out of the alliance it was decided that a more suitable location would be the Pass of Thermopylae farther south, with King Leonidas in command. 

Greek Defenders Assemble

With news of the advancing Persian army now on Greek soil, Leonidas and his Spartan troops marched north to Thermopylae to prepare a delaying action. The primary sources for the Greek army differ on the amount of soldiers present, with Herodotus and the later Greek historian Diodorus Siculus (first century BCE) giving slightly different accounts.  What we are certain of is Leonidas was protected by his royal bodyguard, the Hippias, a hand-picked unit of elite Spartan hoplites 300 strong. Interestingly, the composition of this bodyguard may have changed at the last minute, with the requirement that only Spartans with living sons could take part on this campaign, a direct nod to the inevitability of a poor tactical outcome. It should be noted that Sparta had somewhere around 8,000 eligible hoplites available for this expedition, but only chose to send a token force of 300 citizen-soldiers. Leonidas was also accompanied by 900 local soldiers, often referred to generally as Helots, but more likely were a mix of these slaves and native-born Perioikoi, a free class of Laconians who supplied soldiers to the Spartan state in times of war and specialized labor to the city-state as merchants (including blacksmiths and armorers). This Spartan contingent of 1,200 was joined by forces sent by other city states from the Peloponnesus, numbering perhaps 3,000 hoplites. Along the way, more soldiers from Thespiae, Malia, and Phocis joined the column, with Herodotus telling that even 400 joined from Thebes, soldiers who did not agree with their city state’s “medizing” stance.  Altogether, Leonidas arrived at Thermopylae with somewhere around 7,000 Greek soldiers and an unknown number of retainers and began to prepare the battlefield.

Preparing the Battlefield

The location of Thermopylae gets its name from the nearby hot sulfur springs, and the area was referred to as the “Hot Gates” by local Greeks. This region is dominated by a coastal floodplain fed by the Spercheios River, surrounded by sloping brush laden limestone mountains.  Access through the area is limited with only one main narrow passage between the sea and mountains.  However, other smaller trails did exist, as Leonidas and his small Panhellenic Greek army would eventually find out. As a strategic chokepoint, the topography is well-suited to mitigate numerical advantage of the Persians, with the narrowest point, referred to by the classical Greeks as the “Middle Gate” where modern scholars believe the battle took place. At only around 100 feet wide and with a sheer cliff protecting their left flank and the sea on their right, it was the ideal location for a Greek delaying action because of the limited battlefront favored heavy infantry hoplite tactics. Interestingly, this location already had a defensive wall constructed earlier by the Phokians which was repaired and reinforced as time allowed.  According to Herodotus, a reconnaissance of the area and conversations with sympathetic locals revealed smaller trails weaving between the mountains, most notably the now infamous Anopaia Path, leading Leonidas to station 1,000 Phokians at important strategic locations on the heights surrounding the pass to prevent an outflanking maneuver by the approaching enemy.

This land strategy was mirrored by the commanders of the Panhellenic allied fleet gathering at the nearby Strait of Artemisium. The earlier Isthmus of Corinth accord gave overall command to the inexperienced Spartan Eurybiades, with the very experienced Athenian Themistocles and Corinthian Adeimantus as advisors, despite most of the ships coming from Athens and Corinth. The Greek flotilla consisted of 280 ships, made up overwhelmingly of newly built triremes (271 warships) and older pentekontors (nine ships). The fleet sailed separately from Athens, Corinth, and bases in the Peloponnesus to the northern tip of the long island of Euboea off the eastern coast of the Greek mainland, arriving in the protected waters of Cape Artemisium where they beached their ships and waited for the Persian fleet shadowing the invasion army to appear. Two weeks passed before an advanced reconnaissance force of ten Phoenician triremes met a Greek naval patrol.  Not knowing whether this was the van of the fleet or the entire fleet itself, the decision was made to withdraw southward along the eastern coast of Euboea and the Greek mainland to the protected harbor of Chalcis. Ten days later, the main Persian flotilla approached the precarious waters known as the Gap of Sciathos northeast of Thermopylae but was caught in a dangerous late-summer storm.  A great many Persian ships were crushed against the rocks, destroying perhaps a third of the entire invading fleet. News of the wrath of Poseidon reached Themistocles and his allies safely tucked away at Chalcis, and the order was given to return to Cape Artemisium to support Leonidas and the allied army holding Thermopylae against overwhelming odds. 

Bottom photo one: Modern depiction of a Greek hoplite. Based on Wikipedia content that has been reviewed, edited, and republished. Original image by Johnny Shumate. Uploaded by Jan van der Crabben, published on 26 April 2012. The copyright holder has published this content under the following license: Public Domain. This item is in the public domain, and can be used, copied, and modified without any restrictions

Bottom photo two: Map of the battle of Thermopylae where the Greeks fought the Persians. Source: Wikimedia. In the Public Domain.

Bottom photo three: Modern bronze monument (1955) in homage to Leonidas at Thermopylae. Source: Wikimedia. In the Public Domain.

The Battle of Thermopylae

The battle of Thermopylae began five days after the Persian army arrived north of the Pass at Thermopylae. For four days, Great King Xerxes waited for his column to consolidate and make camp (a column with this many troops, retainers, beasts of burden and wagons was many miles long), while supplies from the shadowing fleet were offloaded and distributed.  The Greeks, on the other hand, waited calmly behind the newly repaired Phokian Wall that limited the frontage of the “Middle Gate” while providing both refuge from enemy attacks and the place where tired hoplites could be swapped out for fresh ones during the upcoming battle. The first day of what would be a three day battle began on day five with Xerxes sending a messenger to the Spartan king asking for him to lay down his arms and surrender. To this request, Leonidas laconically answered Molōn labe, Greek for “come and get them.”  After Leonidas’ refusal to surrender, the Great King ordered 5,000 archers forward to launch barrages of arrows against the Greek defensive position. However, the Greek heavy infantry’s large round hoplon shields, three feet in diameter and made from wood and bronze, protected the hoplites from the enemy’s shafts. It seems the Spartans did not initially fear the Persian bowmen. When told by a frightened Greek ally that there were so many archers on the Persian side that their arrows would blot out the sun, a Spartan named Dieneces promptly replied: “Then we shall fight them in the shade.” And in the end enemy archery would be the instrument of their demise. Unable to soften up the enemy with arrow fire, Xerxes launched a frontal assault with 10,000 troops, predominately Medes (Persia’s oldest and most important ally), which broke against the disciplined Spartan led hoplites, standing in rank-and-file with shields overlapping and outreaching the attacking enemy with their longer thrusting spears. Frustrated by the lack of progress, Xerxes sent a second wave into the fray, this time made up of his personal bodyguard, the Immortals, who fared no better than the first wave, as these highly trained but poorly armored soldiers also broke against Greek shields and thrusting spears. Below is a thought-provoking reconstruction of Herodotus’ assessment of Persian tactical capabilities in the narrow pass:

“Their shorter spears” and wider files in offense and their “small round or irregularly shaped shields” in defense could make no headway against the longer spears of the closely arrayed Greeks, “their entire bodies protected by shields.” The Persians could have had the “advantage in open fields, since they were…enabled to move more easily,” but not “in narrow space” against enemies “formed in close ranks.”

The Greeks also must have fought somewhat forward of their defensive wall. Herodotus writes that the Spartans feigned a series of retreats, which induced the enemy to close with them. The less-protected Persians were sucked in and slaughtered by better-armored Greek heavy infantry. 

Most Greek phalanxes were made up of citizen-soldier militia organized by file, with soldiers from the same city (and sometimes members of the same family) organized front to back as units normally six to eight men deep and fighting shoulder to shoulder in numerous ranks (thus the term “rank and file”). Unlike the accompanying hoplites sent by the Greek allies, Leonidas’ Spartan 300 Hippias were essentially professional soldiers, the best of the best, and products of the Agoge and who trained, ate, slept, and fought together year-round and for many years as a cohesive unit.  It was organized into three battalions (lochos) of 100 men divided into two companies (pentekostyes) a fifty men each. Each company was divided into two platoons (enomotiai) of twenty-five men altogether. Each enomotiai or platoon was three ranks across and eight files deep, with the platoon leader (enomotarch) positioned in the first rank, and a rear rank officer (ouragos) located in the back to keep order and discipline within the files.  Although not explicitly stated by Herodotus, one wonders whether Spartan officers were integrated into the allied army during this battle, or whether each of the files fought under their own command. This author assumes it was the former. When fatigued, files were swapped out for fresh ones, allowing for the battle to continue throughout the day.  At the end of the first day of the battle of Thermopylae, the Greek defended Phokian Wall still stood, with Spartan and allied casualties very low.

The primary sources describe a second day of battle, similar to the first.  Herodotus tells us that Xerxes was confident the events of day one had worn down the Greek defenders, stating he “suppose that their enemies being so few, were now disabled by wounds and could no longer resist.” The Great Persian King once again sent his lighter armed infantry into the battle, but they were unable to make headway against the hoplites, who again stood shoulder to shoulder and withstood the waves of enemy assaults. Frustrated by the lack of a breakthrough, Xerxes halted the offensive and went back to his royal pavilion to contemplate his next course of action.  Undoubtably, frontal assaults were proving futile, and the thinning of his own elite bodyguard, the Immortals, undoubtably had an impact on the morale of the entire expedition. What was needed was a way to outflank the Greek defenders, a need unexpectedly fulfilled by a local Greek named Ephialtes of Trachis (a nearby polis) who traded his allegiance to fellow Greeks for Persian coin in one of the greatest acts of treason in the history of Western Civilization (a name that went on to hold the same meaning to the Greek world as Benedict Arnold means to Americans).  According to Diodorus, Ephialtes offered to lead a sizable contingent of 20,000 Persian soldiers, commanded by their general Hydarnes, to and through the Anopaia Path on a night mission that very evening. The path led from east of the Persian camp along the ridge of Mount Anopaia and behind the cliffs that flanked the pass. It branched, with one path leading to Phokis and the other down to the Malian Gulf at Alpenoi. Quietly, these Persian troops made their way down this path, hoping to surprise the Greek army guarding the “Middle Gate” from behind, however, Herodotus tells us that they stumbled upon the 1,000 Phokians at rest along the path.  Hastily the Phokians retreated to a nearby hill and formed up in a phalanx, a common defensive tactic. But after learning that the Greeks were not Spartans, Hydarnes brought up his archers to keep the Greeks in place while the rest of his troops continue down the path. Luckily, the Phokian commander dispatched a runner to warn Leonidas of the impending encirclement, prompting the Spartan king to hold a war counsel at dawn of day three of the battle. Leonidas told the assembled men that he and his Spartans would stay to defend the pass while those who wanted to retreat back to their families could do so.  Here, it is important to emphasize that Leonidas and his loyal 300 Spartan bodyguard were not the only ones to stay. It is likely the 900 non-citizen Perioikoi and Helots which originally accompanied the Spartans remained, as did the contingent of 700 Thespians and 400 Thebans who refused to “medize” in the face of the Persian threat. So, the often lauded historical last stand of Leonidas and the “300” was actually the last stand of probably around 2,000 Greek troops, minus any Spartans and allied Greeks who had perished in the previous two days of fighting.  Additionally, two Spartans were allowed to leave with the retreating troops. Both had suffered eye injuries (likely from Persian arrow fire, a common battlefield injury when military archery is employed). One killed himself in dishonor on his journey back to Sparta, while the other, Aristodemus, endured the shame of leaving his king and later took part in the Spartan-led victory a year later (479) at Plataea, but was killed in action having restored his honor. 

The third and final day of the battle of Thermopylae began with Xerxes pouring libations and ordering 10,000 light infantry and cavalry forward while the Immortals descended the pass. A close reading of Herodotus gives the impression the Greeks who decided to leave successfully retreated eastward and then south before the arrival of the Persian encircling force engaged Leonidas, his 300 Hippias, and the 1,700 remaining allies near the Phokian Wall. Leonidas moved his troops away from the wall to better use the entirety of his remaining force. Probably fighting in the first rank, as was custom for Greek generals, Leonidas was cut down early in the engagement. With the descending Immortals closing in and without their leader and comrade-in-arms, the remaining hoplites and their men-at-arms retreated to a nearby hill west of their original position. It was in this formation when they were finally overwhelmed by Persian archery fire and killed to the last man. This theory is supported by an early twentieth century archaeological dig on a nearby hill east of the defensive wall, where Persian bronze arrowheads were exhumed. Herodotus tells us that the defenders fought on until the very end, switching from broken spear to side sword, before using their hands and teeth once their weapons broke. After the last Greek fell at Thermopylae, Xerxes ordered Leonidas’ body found and his head taken as a trophy and displayed on a stake for all to see. Herodotus tells us 4,000 Greeks in all fell defending the pass, but not before killing 20,000 invaders. Modern historians look at this number in many different ways. If we subtract the 2,000 who died in Leonidas’ rearguard as his fellow Greeks withdrew, we are left with 2,000 who died during the first two days of the battle. However, Herodotus does not give us information on the fate of the 1,000 Phokians. They may have melted away from their last position, or they could be counted against the original 4,000 Greek loses. Either way, it is an impressive kill ratio and a sign of the courage and martial capabilities of the Greek defenders.    

The nearby naval battle of Artemisium was also a three day engagement, and like Thermopylae, it only served as a delaying action to slow the advancing Persian fleet.  Unlike Thermopylae, it was not a last stand with the Greek navy withdrawing south to the Gulf of Salamis seven miles west of Athens. Here, the Athenian led Greek alliance decisively defeated the Persian flotilla during the battle of Salamis (September 26), but not before Xerxes razed the non-medizing cities in his path towards Athens before setting that city alight. Defeated at sea, Xerxes returned home but left a large expeditionary force in Greece to complete his conquest during the next campaigning season. This Persian force was soundly defeated at the battle of Plataea in August 479, the same month, the Greeks took the battle directly to Persian territory in an amphibious assault at the battle of Mycale on the Ionian coast of Anatolia. Combined, the three victories in less than a calendar year ended this phase of the Persian Wars with Greece united against their Asian foe. These victories also greatly enhanced the reputations of Sparta as the leading land power, and Athens, the leading sea power. This friction would later lead to two civil wars, known as the Peloponnesian wars, later in the century.

At the end of 479, the members of the Panhellenic alliance were exuberant, taking stock of their victories against the largest empire on earth, while paying homage to their fallen. The death of King Leonidas and his “300” became in the minds of both their Greek contemporaries and succeeding generations a symbol of free men standing against an invading horde of slaves. Herodotus would become the “Father of Western History” decades later in no small part because of his retailing of the events of the Persian War and his laudatory treatment of Leonidas and the fallen Spartans. Today, there are memorials erected near the site of the battle, not only in honor of Leonidas, but also other less well-known soldiers who fought and died at Thermopylae. Visitors will see a large bronze statue of the Spartan king with Leonidas’ famous words, Molōn labe, inscribed on the marble base. Recently, a new museum opened there (Thermopylae's Innovative Centre of Historical Information) with three halls and virtual reality presentations celebrating this seminal battle in the history of Western Civilization, a modern edifice to the battle’s lasting legacy.

Leonidas the Commander

But how is Leonidas remembered as a military leader? As mentioned above, we only have the battle of Thermopylae to judge him by. Clearly, he was unafraid to die, leaving on a mission prophesized by the Oracle of Delphi to kill him. Indeed, according to the Greek historian Plutarch (46-119 CE) Leonidas was so sure of his fate before leaving Sparta, he responded to his wife Gorgo’s question concerning what she should do with herself in his absence, replying, “Marry a good man and bear good children.” As far as we know, she did not marry again, and spent the rest of her life counseling her son and husband’s successor, King Pleistarchus. We also know Leonidas prepared the battlefield well, choosing a strong defensible location at the “Middle Gate” and repairing and using the Phokian Wall in a tactically advantageous way for the first two days of the battle. He also had the foresight to reconnoiter beyond the battlefield and station 1,000 allied hoplites to guard the most obvious way to outflank his position. Ultimately, this rearguard was outnumbered ten to one, and proved unable to fulfill its task. Once the threat of encirclement appeared, Leonidas’ war council made two things clear: he and his Spartans would stay and fight to the death, and those who wish to retreat back to hearth and home could do so. Perhaps most tellingly, 1,100 non-Spartans decided to stay, fight, and ultimately die as free men for and with a king who was not their own, in what is perhaps the greatest testament to Leonidas’ skill as a commander.

Suggested Readings:

Primary sources

Diodorus Siculus. The Persian Wars to the Fall of Athens: Books 11-14.34 (480-401 BCE). Translated by Peter Green. University of Texas Press, 2010.

Strassler, Robert B. ed.  The Landmark Herodotus: The Histories. Translated by Andrea L. Purvis. Anchor, 2009.

Secondary sources

Cartledge, Paul. The Spartans: The World of the Warrior-heroes of Ancient Greece. Vintage Books, 2004.

Cartledge, Paul. Thermopylae: The Battle That Changed the World. Vintage Books, 2007.