Naval warfare was transformed in the nineteenth century. The steam driven paddlewheel began the revolution by gradually replacing sails as the primary means of propulsion. Steam power freed warships to maneuver in battle, independent of the wind, and to move more safely in and out of port. However, access to coal as a power source spurred Europe and America to secure coaling stations along maritime routes to provide the necessary fuel for long ocean voyages (necessitating mid oceanic colony building). The famous American “Black ships” of Commodore Matthew Perry (1794-1858) which opened Japan in 1853 are of this design.[1] Better engines eventually appeared, and the screw propeller located underwater at the stern of the ship solved the vulnerability problem of the earlier paddlewheel. However, oceangoing ships still required sails as late as the American Civil War because of limitations in range. Beginning in 1859 ship construction itself began to change, with the addition of iron plating over wood hulls, which quickly gave way to iron framed and iron hulled ships in the 1860s, culminating in the USS Monitor and CSS Virginia “ironclads” used in the American Civil War.[2] These innovations would become standard as the century progressed, culminating in the construction of the first modern “battleships’ by the 1880s, large warships carrying turret-mounted naval guns with barrel bores as large as fifteen inches firing exploding shells at exceptionally long distances. In the 1890s, the typical British battleship displaced 13,000 tons, carried four twelve-inch guns into large turrets, and were additionally armed with as many as ten smaller six-inch and four-inch guns. In 1906, Great Britain launched the HMS Dreadnought, the first “all big-gun” battleship armed with ten twelve-inch guns in five turrets capable of withering fire at some 13,000 yards, overwhelming older battleship designs before they could come within range to reply. The Dreadnought was well armored and equipped with steam turbine engines that propelled her to a top speed of twenty-one knots, or a full six knots faster than existing battleships, making all previous battleships obsolete.[3] New dreadnaught class battleships were quickly commissioned across the world, becoming the pride and joy of great power navies, symbols of economic power and military strength.

Right: Alfred Thayer Mahan, naval officer and historian, profoundly shaped global naval strategy through his theory of sea power. His 1890 work argued that maritime commerce, battle fleets, and command of the sea determined national greatness, influencing U.S., British, German, and Japanese policy. 

However, these new battleships were challenged by the invention and perfection of the torpedo and underwater mine, the first were carried by a new class of faster and smaller vessels (patrol-torpedo or pt-boats) designed as an economical alternative to the construction of expensive battleships, and the second becoming essential for area denial warfare in the defense of harbors and coastal waters or in offensive action for naval blockades. The growing danger of pt-boats required a naval response, and the destroyer class was born to hunt down these dangerous torpedo vessels and counter the emerging maritime threat of submarines. Meanwhile, the cruiser class evolved as a mid-range warship, sacrificing armor for speed, but still possessing reasonable firepower to engage with larger ships.[4] This rapid evolution in naval technology required new approaches to naval doctrine, approaches promulgated by the American Alfred Thayer Mahan (1840-1914) and Britain Julian Corbett (1854-1922), the two leading naval theorists to emerge at the end of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, with the first of these two men focusing on the rise of British naval power as a model for American sea dominance.

Beginning in the reign of Henry VIII (r.1509-1547), England consciously expanded its naval capabilities to become at first a European, and then a global thalassocracy, building the world’s finest sailing navy by the end of the Napoleonic Wars. This dominance expanded in the nineteenth century as Great Britain used its industrial might to create the largest and most modern navy in the world, securing its maritime links to its global Commonwealth while forging an era between 1815 and 1914 often referred to as Pax Britannica (“British Peace”). During this time, the British Navy was the envy of the world and the subject of academic inquiry by the son of a West Point professor named Alfred Thayer Mahan. The son of a West Point dean and graduate of the United States Naval Academy (class of 1859), Mahan served as a naval officer for the Union Navy in the Civil War and an instructor at the Naval Academy. In 1865 he was promoted to Lieutenant Commander, then to Commander (1872), and finally to Captain (1885), serving as the skipper of the steam-powered sloop-of-war USS Wachusett protecting American interests in South America during the War of the Pacific (1879-1883), a conflict involving Bolivia and Peru against Chile.[5] An eye witness to the fast-paced changes in nineteenth century naval technologies, Mahan favored the ships of the Age of Sail over the newest warships, once complaining when he took command of the state-of-the art steam-powered cruiser USS Chicago, “I have forgotten what a beastly thing a ship is, and what a fool a man is who frequents one.”[6] This perspective was evident when he was appointed as professor at the Navy War College in 1885 where his lectures concentrated on British naval history during the Age of Sail and its role in the creation of the British Empire, drawing heavily on the writings of the Antoine-Henry Jomini. This emphasis on the strategies of the Swiss theorist earned Mahan moniker “Jomini of the Sea” as he advocated for a powerful American navy to match its growing economic influence.[7] His lectures culminating with the publication of his most famous work, The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660–1783, in 1890. Mahan formulated his concept of sea power while serving in South America in the early 1880s. The publication of this treatise took place when Mahan was serving a term as president of the Navy War College (1886-1889).[8]

Left: USS Chicago, commissioned in 1885, was a modern steam‑powered cruiser whose design reflected America’s transition from wooden sailing vessels to steel warships. Mahan briefly commanded her, famously criticizing the discomforts of steam‑era ships compared to the Age of Sail.

The Influence of Sea Power is organized into fourteen chapters, and does include four regional maps and twenty-one tactical illustrations of important naval engagements highlighting Great Britain’s rise to naval dominance.[9]  Mahan begins his study with an introductory discussion on the role of sea power in shaping history and the purpose of his treatise:

“The history of Sea Power is largely, though by no means solely, a narrative of contests between nations, of mutual rivalries, of violence frequently culminating in war. The profound influence of sea commerce upon the wealth and strength of countries was clearly seen long before the true principles which governed its growth and prosperity were detected. To secure to one's own people a disproportionate share of such benefits, every effort was made to exclude others, either by the peaceful legislative methods of monopoly or prohibitory regulations, or, when these failed, by direct violence… Therefore the history of sea power, while embracing in its broad sweep all that tends to make a people great upon the sea or by the sea, is largely a military history; and it is in this aspect that it will be mainly, though not exclusively, regarded in the following pages.”[10]

Chapter one begins with an examination of what factors lead to a supremacy of the seas, especially how Great Britain was able to rise to its near dominance during the dates which bookend  Mahan’s study, 1660-1783, or from the beginning of Britain’s dominance during the “Age of Sail,” to the end of the American Revolution. He identifies six “principal conditions” which shape a powerful early modern sea power, summarized below as:

“Geographical Position”: naval powers controlling chokepoints or situated near major sea lanes to more easily project naval power and influence global commerce. For example, Great Britain’s position allowed it to dominate Atlantic trade, while the United States' location between two oceans shaped its naval priorities.

“Physical Conformation”: coastline shape and accessibility or whether a nation has deep harbors, navigable rivers, or natural defenses; proximity to key maritime routes or how easily a country can access and control important sea lanes; natural resources or the availability of materials necessary for shipbuilding and sustaining a navy.

“Extent of Territory”: the size and scope of a nation's land holdings, particularly in relation to its ability to support naval operations. A country with a large territorial expanse had innate advantage as a sea power including: access to multiple coastlines thus allowing for diversified naval bases and strategic positioning; control over overseas possessions which could serve as refueling stations, trade hubs, or military outposts; and resource availability to ensure a steady supply of materials for shipbuilding and sustaining naval forces.

Right: HMS Dreadnought revolutionized naval warfare with uniform 12‑inch guns, turbine propulsion, and unprecedented speed. Launched in 1906, it rendered all earlier battleships obsolete and triggered a global naval arms race that reshaped great‑power strategy before the First World War.

“Number of Population”: a strong labor force to ensure enough personnel for shipbuilding, naval crews, and maritime industries; economic strength equals a larger population to support a more robust economy to sustain naval expansion; and military recruitment to create a greater pool of potential sailors and officers for a powerful navy.

“Character of the People”: a nation’s aptitude for seafaring, commercial enterprise, and military discipline. Mahan believes societies with a strong tradition of maritime activity such as Great Britain were naturally better suited to naval dominance. Traits like initiative, adaptability, and a willingness to engage in overseas trade and exploration were crucial for fostering sea power.

“Character of the Government”: a government’s commitment to maritime strategy was crucial. A strong, centralized government that prioritized naval expansion, trade protection, and strategic planning would enhance a nation’s sea power.[11]

Mahan also promotes in chapter one the belief that any army would succumb to a strong naval blockade, an idea reinforced by the Union’s success in the Anaconda Plan during the Civil War.[12]

Chapters two through fourteen continue with a description of seventeenth and eighteenth century European and American wars and how naval power was used in each. Mahan describes naval operations during the Second Anglo-Dutch War (1665-1667) in chapter two, highlighting the battles of Lowestoft (1665) and The Four Days’ Battle (1666), with detailed accounts of ship types and orders of battle. He ends the chapter with a discussion on the military merits and limitations of commerce raiding,

“…of maintaining a sea-war mainly by preying upon the enemy's commerce. This plan, which involves only the maintenance of a few swift cruisers and can be backed by the spirit of greed in a nation, fitting out privateers without direct expense to the State, possesses the specious attractions which economy always presents. The great injury done to the wealth and prosperity of the enemy is also undeniable; and although to some extent his merchant-ships can shelter themselves ignobly under a foreign flag while the war lasts, this guerre de course, as the French call it, this commerce-destroying, to use our own phrase, must, if in itself successful, greatly embarrass the foreign government and distress its people. Such a war, however, cannot stand alone; it must be supported, to use the military phrase; unsubstantial and evanescent in itself, it cannot reach far from its base. That base must be either home ports, or else some solid outpost of the national power, on the shore or the sea, a distant dependency or a powerful fleet. Failing such support, the cruiser can only dash out hurriedly a short distance from home, and its blows, though painful, cannot be fatal.”[13]

Chapter three explores naval power associated with the late seventeenth century, specifically the early naval campaigns of Louis XIV’s France (1643-1715) and the naval battles of Soleby (1672), the Texal (1673) and Stromboli (1676).[14] Here, Mahan comments on the general ineffectiveness of maritime coalitions during this era. In chapter four, maritime operations during the English Civil War (1642-1651) and War of the League of Augsburg (1688-1697) are discussed. The author makes note of the role of sea power in support of army landings in these conflicts and how significant losses of French capital ships to an Anglo-Dutch fleet can shift the strategic outcome of a war, citing the battle of La Hougue in 1692. He also discusses the role of maritime operations during conflicts when no great naval engagements took place, commenting that during the last phase of War of the League of Augsburg.

“….in which all Europe was in arms against France, are marked by no great sea battles, nor any single maritime event of the first importance. To appreciate the effect of the sea power of the allies, it is necessary to sum up and condense an account of the quiet, steady pressure which it brought to bear and maintained in all quarters against France. It is thus indeed that sea power usually acts, and just because so quiet in its working, it is the more likely to be unnoticed and must be somewhat carefully pointed out.”[15]

Left: USS Connecticut, flagship of the Great White Fleet, symbolized America’s emergence as a global naval power. Her world cruise demonstrated U.S. industrial capacity, long‑range steam capability, and Theodore Roosevelt’s commitment to projecting American influence through a modern, battleship‑centered fleet.

Mahan maintains that blockades and commerce interdictions have a cumulative effect on an adversary over time, weakening their war effort.

In chapter four of Mahan’s treatise he explores the role of sea power during the War of the Spanish Succession (1702-1713), focusing on the naval battle of Malaga in 1704 after which the French focused almost solely on commerce raiding, while Great Britain emerged as the dominant naval and maritime power in Europe.[16]

“The overwhelming sea power of England was the determining factor in European history during the period mentioned, maintaining war abroad while keeping its own people in prosperity at home, and building up the great empire which is now seen; but from its very greatness its action, by escaping opposition, escapes attention. On the few occasions in which it is called to fight, its superiority is so marked that the affairs can scarcely be called battles; with the possible exceptions of Byng's action at Minorca and Hawke's at Quiberon, the latter one of the most brilliant pages in naval history, no decisive encounter between equal forces, possessing military interest, occurs between 1700 and 1778.”[17]

Mahan also makes note of the relative weakness of France’s commerce raiding strategy when compared to England’s successful pursuit of “command of the sea.” Here, he comments on France’s clear advantages in population, territorial size, and natural resources, but poor government administration, international credit, and naval strength. These factors forced France to fall behind its island-nation neighbor as a burgeoning global power in a clear reference to the “principal conditions” described in chapter one.[18]

            Chapters six and seven of The Influence of Sea Power explore the shifting alliance system in Europe in the early eighteenth century, culminating in hostilities between England and Spain and eventually a wider conflict, the War of the Austrian Succession (1740-1748), with France joining Spain against Great Britain. Here, the author outlines the naval engagements associated with British admirals Thomas Matthews (1676-1751), George Anson (1697-1762), and Edward Hawke (1705-1781) against French and Spanish fleets in the Mediterranean, Pacific and Atlantic during the conflict.[19]

Chapter eight details the growing importance of British sea power in establishing and maintaining a presence numerous theaters of operation, culminating in a global conflict between 1756-1763 with France and Spain known by many names--the Seven Years’ War in Europe, the French and Indian War in North America, and the Great War for Empire in the Caribbean and India.[20] Mahan concludes that Great Britain won

“…by the superiority of her government using the tremendous weapon of her sea power. This made her rich, and in turn protected the trade by which she had her wealth. With her money she upheld her few auxiliaries, mainly Prussia and Hanover, in their desperate strife. Her power was everywhere that her ships could reach, and there was none to dispute the sea to her. Where she would she went, and with her went her guns and her troops. By this mobility her forces were multiplied, those of her enemies distracted. Ruler of the seas, she everywhere obstructed its highways. The enemies' fleets could not join; no great fleet could get out, or if it did, it was only to meet at once, with uninured officers and crews, those who were veterans in gales and warfare….

The one nation that gained in this war was that which used the sea in peace to earn its wealth, and ruled it in war by the extent of its navy, by the number of its subjects who lived on the sea or by the sea, and by its numerous bases of operations scattered over the globe”[21]

Right: USS Kansas sails ahead of the USS Vermont as the fleet leaves Hampton Roads, Virginia, on 16 December 1907.The Great White Fleet’s battleships steam in disciplined line‑ahead formation, illustrating the tactical doctrine and mechanical reliability required for a 43,000‑mile global cruise. Their uniform white paint scheme emphasized peacetime diplomacy while projecting unmistakable American naval strength. 

The remainder of The Influence of Sea Power focuses on British naval power in relation to the American Revolutionary War, the war in Europe, and distant theaters of operations. Mahan’s chapter nine is a precursor to naval actions in the American Revolution. Here, he describes the revival of the French navy under the last Bourbon king Louis XVI (r.1774-1792), the political environment of England and the North American colonies leading up to and in the early stages of the American rebellion, and the role of the British Navy in moving troops around the different theaters along the east coast of North America.[22]  He also discusses the role of American privateering in the war effort.

“As to the sea warfare in general, it is needless to enlarge upon the fact that the colonists could make no head against the fleets of Great Britain, and were consequently forced to abandon the sea to them, resorting only to a cruising warfare, mainly by privateers, for which their seamanship and enterprise well fitted them, and by which they did much injury to English commerce.”[23]

Chapter ten continues with a discussion of the American Revolutionary war, with Mahan expanding his commentary to different naval theaters of operation, including the Caribbean, and the role of French flotillas in support of the Americans.  He discusses fleet actions off Grenada, Hispaniola, and in Chesapeake Bay.[24] Significant British, French and American historical personalities are discussed in relation to naval actions. Here, the author cites a memorandum sent by General George Washington by way of the Marquis de Lafayette to the French concerning his views of the importance of naval operations to the American war effort:

“I. In any operation, and under all circumstances, a decisive naval superiority is to be considered as a fundamental principle, and the basis upon which every hope of success must ultimately depend."[25]

Mahan returns to the naval war in Europe in chapter eleven, discussing the role of allied fleets against Britain’s “command of the sea” doctrine off the home island and in the Mediterranean between the years 1779-1782, concluding that:  

“Whatever may be the determining factors in strifes between neighboring continental States, when a question arises of control over distant regions, politically weak,—whether they be crumbling empires, anarchical republics, colonies, isolated military posts, or islands below a certain size,—it must ultimately be decided by naval power, by the organized military force afloat, which represents the communications that form so prominent a feature in all strategy.”[26] 

In chapter twelve, Mahan explores naval actions off the coast of India, detailing the campaigns of the brilliant French admiral  Pierre André de Suffren (1729-1788) against British flotillas, while in chapter thirteen, the author returns to Western Hemisphere describing the significance of the French naval blockade of British forces leading to the American victory at Yorktown and naval actions between the British and French in the West Indies, highlighting the battle of the Saintes (1782).[27]  Mahan’s final chapter returns to the campaigning year of 1778, the year he describes as “purely maritime” in nature and ultimately critical to Great Britain’s losses across numerous theaters of operation.[28]

Throughout The Influence of Sea Power Mahan emphasizes Great Britain’s rise to naval predominance was no accident, a rather inevitable result of the natural forces being more favorable in its case that in the case of its continental rivals. He consistently links Great Britain’s prosperity with a large merchant fleet connecting the mother island with its overseas possessions, one protected by a great battle fleet with “command of the sea.” In subsequent writings, Mahan prescribes a new strategy for the United States Navy, offensive sea control, requiring a new force structure consisting of a battle fleet capable of enforcing the doctrine of “command of the sea” or the ability of a nation-state or alliance to control a body of water so that its military and merchant ships can move around at will, while its rivals are forced either to stay in port or evade the larger fleet. Mahan advocates building and maintaining a large navy consisting of modern battleships. This required a fundamental change in naval strategy. Before 1890 the United States Navy was a force of cruisers that operated in detached squadrons throughout the world as commerce raiders and monitors that were confined to harbor defense at home. Mahan understood that enemy flotillas could not be stopped by commerce raiders, while enemy blockades could not be broken by harbor defenses. He advocated meeting and defeating the nation’s enemies offshore, a strategy that required a concentrated battle fleet capable of defeating an enemy in a decisive engagement. In Mahan’s eyes, an American Navy with “command of the sea” would prevent an assault on the United States and was the precondition for the establishment or destruction of blockades, and the protection or destruction of enemy shipping. In the same year The Influence of Sea Power was published, the United States Congress passed the Naval Act of 1890 authorizing the construction of three first line battleships of the new Indiana class, and the modern United States Navy was born.[29]

Left: Shown in later life as a senior U.S. Navy Rear Admiral, Alfred Thayer Mahan’s steady gaze and formal uniform reflect authority. His influential theories on sea power, global trade, and naval supremacy shaped modern maritime strategy and transformed international geopolitics.

Mahan’s belief that great navies and imperialism combine to create economic prosperity was well received in the late nineteenth century, and The Influence of Sea Power was translated into many languages and helped shape naval doctrine in the United States, Europe, and an emerging Japan (who Mahan claimed used his ideas in their war against Russia). Mahan’s personal relationship with the American Roosevelt Administration (1901-1909) began when Theodore Roosevelt was a guest lecturer at the Naval War College in 1887, helping elevate his ideas to national policy in the early twentieth century. His writings and personal relationship with the president were certainly a motivating factor for the circumnavigation of the world by the U.S. Navy’s “Great White Fleet” between 1907 and 1909.[30] In Germany, Mahan’s treatise was ordered placed on every warship in the fleet by Kaiser Wilhelm II (r. 1888-1918) and was one of the impetuses behind the construction of Germany’s High Seas Fleet.[31] Mahan was pulled out of retirement again in 1893 to briefly command the modern cruiser USS Chicago on a tour to Europe but retired soon afterward to lecture and to write. Besides his seminal work, he wrote dozens of books and articles, including The Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution and Empire, 1793–1812 (1892), Sea Power in Relation to the War of 1812 (1905), and The Life of Nelson: The Embodiment of the Sea Power of Great Britain (1897).[32] Mahan was promoted to Rear Admiral in 1906 by an act of Congress promoting all living Civil War naval captains to this rank.[33] He is considered the most influential modern naval theorist in history.

 Endnotes

[1]  Martin van Creveld, Technology and War: From 2000 BC to the Present (Free Press, 1989), 199-203. Creveld provides a brief summary of technological changes at sea that mark the transition from the Age of Sail to modern warships.

[2]  For comprehensive treatments of the Civil War “ironclads” see R. Thomas Campbell’s Confederate Ironclads at War (McFarland, 2019) and John. D. Broadwater’s USS Monitor: A Historic Ship Completes Its Final Voyage (Texas, A&M University Press, 2012).

[3] The best recent academic treatment of the HMS Dreadnaught and its military and cultural legacy is Robert J. Blyth, Andrew Lambert and Jan Rüger, ed., The Dreadnought and the Edwardian Age (Ashgate, 2011).

[4]  Norman Friedman’s U.S. Destroyers: An Illustrated Design History (Navy Institute Press, 2004) remains an excellent treatment on the origins of both the patrol torpedo boats and their destroyer class nemesis in the late 1800s.

[5]  Philip A. Crowl, “Alfred Thayer Mahan: The Naval Historian” in Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, ed. Peter Paret (Princeton University Press, 1986), 445-446.

[6]  Robert Seager II and Doris D.  McGuire, eds., Letters and Papers of Alfred Thayer Mahan, 3 vols. (United States Naval Academy Press, 1975), I:4.

[7]  Ibid, 455-462.

[8]  Crowl, “Alfred Thayer Mahan,” 446-447.

[9]  Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783 (Little, Brown, and Company, 1890, reprint, Dover, 1987), xxiii-xxiv.

[10] Ibid, 1.

[11]  Ibid, 29-89.

[12]  Ibid, 84-88.

[13]  Ibid, 132.

[14]  Ibid, 139-172.

[15]  Ibid, 191.

[16]  Ibid, 173-200.

[17]  Ibid, 208-209.

[18]  Ibid, 225-226.

[19]  Ibid, 232-280.

[20]  Ibid, 281-329.

[21]  Ibid, 328-329.

[22]  Ibid, 330-358.

[23]  Ibid, 344.

[24]  Ibid, 359-400.

[25]  Ibid, 397.

[26]  Ibid, 416.

[27]  Ibid, 419-504

[28]  Ibid, 505-542.

[29]  See chapter on of George W. Baer, One Hundred Years of Sea Power: The U.S. Navy, 1890-1990 (Stanford University Press, 1994), for a detailed account of the rise of the United States Navy, and role of Mahan in its invention.

[30]  Robert L. O’Connell, Sacred Vessels: The Cult of the Battleship and the Rise of the U.S. Navy (Routledge, 2019), 114. O’Connell’s book is an excellent account of how American policy makers embraced the battleship as a symbol of American economic and military power. 

[31]  Addington, The Patterns of War Through the Eighteenth Century, 115.

[32]  “Alfred Thayer Mahan: A Select Bibliography,”  Naval History and Heritage Command, https://www.history.navy.mil/research/library/bibliographies/mahan-alfred-thayer-select-bibliography.html, accessed June 15, 2025.

[33]  Crowl, “Alfred Thayer Mahan,” 448.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Primary Sources

Mahan, Alfred Thayer. The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660–1783. 1890. Reprint, Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, 1987.

Seager, Robert II, and Doris D. McGuire, eds. Letters and Papers of Alfred Thayer Mahan. 3 vols. Annapolis: United States Naval Institute Press, 1975.

Secondary Sources

Addington, Larry H. The Patterns of War through the Eighteenth Century. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990.

Baer, George W. One Hundred Years of Sea Power: The U.S. Navy, 1890–1990. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994.

Blyth, Robert J., Andrew Lambert, and Jan Rüger, eds. The Dreadnought and the Edwardian Age. Farnham, UK: Ashgate, 2011.

Broadwater, John D. USS Monitor: A Historic Ship Completes Its Final Voyage. College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2012.

Campbell, R. Thomas. Confederate Ironclads at War. Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2019.

Crowl, Philip A. “Alfred Thayer Mahan: The Naval Historian.” In Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, edited by Peter Paret, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986, 444–478.

Friedman, Norman. U.S. Destroyers: An Illustrated Design History. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2004.

Naval History and Heritage Command. “Alfred Thayer Mahan: A Select Bibliography.” Accessed June 15, 2025. https://www.history.navy.mil/research/library/bibliographies/mahan-alfred-thayer-select-bibliography.html.

O’Connell, Robert L. Sacred Vessels: The Cult of the Battleship and the Rise of the U.S. Navy. New York: Routledge, 2019.

Paret, Peter, ed. Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986.

van Creveld, Martin. Technology and War: From 2000 B.C. to the Present. New York: Free Press, 1989.