Throughout the eighteenth century, shifting alliances attempted to maintain a great power status quo across Europe. At mid-century Austria, France, and Russia joined together to check the rising power of Prussia in Central Europe, while Great Britain and France fought each other in Europe, the West Indies, North America, and India in what most modern scholars call the first worldwide great power competition, the Seven Years’ War or Great War for Empire (1756-1763). This conflict pitted two main coalitions against one another: France and Austria on one side, and Prussia aided by Great Britain on the other, with other states (Portugal, Spain, Saxony, Sweden, and Russia) entering the fray on the periphery to benefit their self-interest. After their victory over the French in 1763, Britain emerged as the dominant European naval and colonial power with expanded territories in Canada and India, while on the continent the conflict ended with a treaty between Austria and Prussia that confirmed Prussia’s control over Silesia, long a Habsburg territory. Prussia was now firmly established as a major power in Central Europe, guided by the outstanding military mind of Frederick II, more commonly referred to as Frederick the Great, commanding a formidable Prussian army decades in the making.

Right: A later portrait of the Prussian King Frederick II, also known as Frederick the Great, at the age of sixty-eight.  Painted by Anton Graff (1736-1813), and available in the Sanssouci Collection in Potsdam, Germany.

Earlier in the century in 1733, Frederick William I (r.1713-1740), Frederick II’s father, instituted the “canton system” to enroll young Prussian men from each canton (district) in the army, gave them three months of training, then returned them to their farms and towns.  These men remained part of the Prussian militia system as long as they were able-bodied.  Using this system, the Prussian army steadily grew in size, becoming by 1740 the fourth largest army in Europe, despite ranking tenth in total population and twelfth in land area.^[1] Under Frederick II military spending rose to two-thirds of state revenues, putting his country firmly on a war footing. In Prussia, nearly every nobleman served in the army, buying his commission from the king, and returning to his canton after retirement to coordinate the canton system.  The militarization of Prussian society created a military caste (Junker) that fused the army with the agricultural class and gave the Prussian king the manpower required to expand Prussian holdings.^[2] Like the Marshal de Saxe, Frederick II also participated as a commander in the War of Polish Succession and, after becoming king in 1740, expanded Prussian territory in Silesia. Between 1746 and 1756 he enlarged the army, strengthened his economy, and wrote and published his most well-known work, The King of Prussia’s Military Instructions to His Generals (Militärische Instruktionen für seine Generäle). Completed in 1747 and published secretly and circulated to his officer corps beginning in 1753,  this military treatise demonstrates his concern for his troops’ provisioning and his preference for fast-paced and aggressive battlefield tactics over defensive maneuvers. Frederick the Great’s Military Instructions to His Generals comprises twenty-five articles, each bearing a title that succinctly reflects its subject matter. Much of the guidance presented is tailored to Prussia’s strategic realities, with frequent references to its geography and the specific challenges posed by its eighteenth-century adversaries.

In article one, “Instruction, 1747,” Frederick the Great begins with an overview of why he wrote his instructions followed by a discussion on the “capabilities and particular merit” of Prussian troops, insisting their excellence comes from a combination of drill, military discipline, and bravery:

“The discipline of these troops, now evolved into habit, has such a fact that amidst the greatest confusion of the action and the most evident perils their disorder still is more orderly than the good order of their enemies.

Prussian discipline renders these troops capable of executing the most difficult maneuvers, such as traversing a wood in battle without losing their files or distances, advancing in close order at double time, forming with promptness, reversing the direction suddenly to fall on the flank of the enemy, gaining an advantage by forced march, and finally in surpassing the enemy in constancy [consistency] and fortitude.

The Prussians are superior to their enemies in constancy since the officers, who have no other profession nor other fortune to hope from except that of arms, animate themselves with an ambition and a gallantry beyond all test, because the soldier has confidence in himself and because he makes it a point of honor never to give way.

Obedience to officers and subordination is so exact that no one ever questions an order, hours are observed exactly, and however little a general knows how to make himself obeyed, he is always sure to be.”^[3]

In his second article, “Projects of Campaign” Frederick continues with an explanation on what a general should know about his enemies, their alliances, their resources, and the nature of their country before planning a military campaign. He ends the section by emphasizing the importance of maintaining firm control and discipline over his army as essential to the success of the campaign.^[4]

Right: The illustration depicts soldiers from the army of Frederick the Great, arranged from left to right as follows: a hussar, a dragoon, a cuirassier, a grenadier, and a musketeer. The image comes from Geschichtsbilder, published in 1896 by Friedrich Polack (1834–1915).

Article three, “Defense to Offense,” describes the importance of denying your enemy logistical support as a way of weakening him, then discusses the importance of strategic turning movements to secure victory. This maneuver can “only be made with vigor.  It is essential to gain the rear of the enemy, or to surprise them in their camp, or to cut them from their country by a forced march.”^[5]  Article four “Subsistence and Commissary” continues with a description of the importance of echelon depots to supply an army on campaign, while also discussing how to best assemble a magazine.

“The first rule is always to place magazines and fortified places behind the localities where you are assembling the army. By placing the principal magazine at the head of your army, you risk being cut off from it by the first misfortune, and then you would be without resources, whereas, if your supplies were distributed by echelons the loss of these parts would not lead to that of the whole.”^[6]

There is also a discussion on what is the best kind of food and drink for an army on campaign (beef, beer and brandy) and the importance of quality sutlers and fixed pricing for maintaining morale. “In the camp itself, prices of everything are established with equity, so that the soldier is not defrauded and the sutler is able to live.”^[7] The article ends with a section on foraging, with dry foraging (oats, barley, hay, and cut straw) collected and stored in magazines off season, and green forage seized in the field in summer months.^[8] 

In article five, “Importance of Camps,” Frederick explores the necessity of building military camps through the application of four cardinal rules:

“The first rule is always to occupy the heights; the second, that if you have a river or stream in front of the camp, not to move more than half of a rifle shot’s distance from it. The third: to place your camp so that if the enemy passes on your right or on your left, the terrain will give you an equal advantage.  Bends in rivers, marshes, and precipices will serve for this. The fourth: having your front and flanks well supported, your rear should be free; that is to say that there are no defiles, so you are able to make a march to the rear in several columns without embarrassment.”^[9]

Significantly, this article also advises building entrenched camps with open terrain in front, with the flanks of the camp always covered by natural obstacles (marshes, streams, woods, or precipices). Finally, Frederick discusses how to guard your camp against surprise attacks and what defensive measures should be taken to protect the camp. ^[10]

Right: The Battle of Leuthen (1757) was fought between Frederick the Great's Prussian army and an Austrian army commanded by Prince Charles of Lorraine and Count Leopold Joseph von Daun. Frederick used maneuver warfare and knowledge of the terrain to rout the larger Austrian force, producing a Prussian victory and control of Silesia during the Third Silesian War.

Map at right - Phase 1: As Frederick advanced, Charles’s forward detachment (dotted red line) fell back to Nypern. From his position at Borne, Frederick assessed the strength and alignment of the Austrian main force (solid red line) and arranged his army for the oblique attack. On the extreme right lay the village of Lissa, where Frederick concluded his march for the day.

Articles six, “Study of Enemy Country,” gives advice on how a general should evaluate enemy terrain to gain the advantage on campaign, while article seven, “Detachments; How and Why,” advises against breaking up an army into detachments unless it is absolutely necessary, focusing on the importance of holding your forces together for maximum mass in offensive action.^[11]

“Petty geniuses attempt to hold everything; wise men hold fast to the most important points.  They parry great blows and scorn little accidents.  There is an ancient apothegm: he who would preserve everything preserves nothing.  Therefore, always sacrifice the bagatelle [thing of little importance] and pursue the essential.  The essential is to be found where big bodies of the enemy are.  Stick to defeating them decisively, and the detachments will flee by themselves, or you can hunt them without difficulty.”^[12]

The eighth article in Military Instructions to His Generals, “Talents of a General,” is an interesting interlude where Frederick discusses the characteristics of a successful general; including respect for the enemy, showing the appropriate attitudes towards troops (firmness and mercy).  It also discusses the value of asking for advice from subordinates and ends with a short discussion on the value of skepticism when evaluating all things.^[13] On this last account he states:

“Skepticism is the mother of security. Fools trust their enemies, prudent persons never do. The general is the principal sentinel of his army.  He should always be careful of its preservation and see that it is never exposed to misfortune.  One falls into a feeling of security.  After battles, when one is drunk with success, and when one believes the enemy completely disheartened; also, when a skillful enemy amuses you with pretended peace proposals.

To proceed properly, it is necessary to put oneself in [the adversary’s] place and say: what would I do if I were the enemy?  What project could I form?  Make as many as possible of these projects, examine them and above all reflect on means to avert them… Always presume that the enemy has dangerous designs and always be forehanded with the remedy.  But do not let these calculations make you timid.  Circumspection is good only to a certain point.  A rule that I practice myself and which I have always found good is that in order to enable one to rest easily it is necessary to keep the enemy occupied.  This throws them back on the defensive, and once they are placed that way they cannot again take the offensive during the entire campaign.”^[14]

Article nine, “Ruses, Stratagems, Spies,” explores the importance of using ruses to deceive an enemy to avoid battle, how to employ spies, and also how to use bribery to gain an advantage over your enemy.  On the first account, he recommends that:

“When it is desirable to avoid battle, different ruses are used… It is your attitude that imposes on your enemy, and the suspicion that you are forming the boldest projects against him.  The attitude is maintained by not withdrawing easily, and often the appearance that you are waiting for him will make him lose all desire to attack.  But if he does come, you steal away by a night march planned long before.  He thinks he has you.  But the next day you are gone.  If you only withdraw.  You will be followed, but then it is necessary to take a position to the flank, which will prevent him from passing you without running into great danger.”^[15]

Map at right - Phase 2: As Charles pushed the bulk of his reserve northward (red dotted lines) to shield his exposed flank from the Prussian approach, Frederick slipped his army past the Austrian front and struck unexpectedly against their left.

In his next article, “Different Countries; Precautions” Frederick describes how to enter diplomatic relations with Prussia’s neighbors, assigning different diplomatic strategies for different neighbors, depending on their allegiances, neutrality, and religious orientation (Lutheran or Catholic).  

“In neutral countries it is necessary to make friends.  If you can win over the whole country so much the better.  At least organize your partisans.  The friendship of the neutral country is gained by requiring the soldiers to observe good discipline and by picturing your enemies as barbarous and bad intentions.  If the people are Catholic, do not speak about religion; if they are Protestant, make the people believe that a false ardor for religious attaches you to them.  Use priests and the devout for this purpose.  Religion becomes a dangerous arm.  When one knows how to make use of it.  However, move more carefully with your partisans and always play a sure game.”^[16]

Here, Frederick displays an understanding of the role of religious affiliation and sometimes fanaticism in eighteenth century foreign relations, adhering to a pragmatic approach for the use of religious fervor and partisans to further Prussian strategic and military aims when operating in either Protestant or Catholic countries. 

Article eleven describes “Kinds of Marches,” giving advice to generals on how to provide security on the march into friendly territory, into enemy territory, and what kinds of troops to place where in the marching column. When discussing how to approach an adversary arm, he gives the following advice:

“If you wish to make such a march toward the enemy, you would send all of the baggage under an escort to the strongest city in your vicinity.  Your advance guard would only precede you by a quarter of a mile and you would march bridle in hand, always attentive of everything that passes and always observing the ground, so that you will always have a position ready in your mind, in case you should have to occupy one in haste.  That is why in these sorts of marches, you should always go on the heights, as much as you are able, without endangering yourself, to see the ground better and get detailed knowledge of it.”^[17]

Map at right - Phase 3: When Charles finally grasped the danger, he attempted to pull cavalry and infantry from his right to reinforce the fight. But with his line (solid red) stretched nearly five miles, those units had too far to march. The Prussians (dotted blue) pressed the Austrians back before the redeployed troops could arrive. 

In “River Crossings” Frederick’s twelfth article, he describes how to defend the river against an enemy crossing, as well as how to cross the river under combat conditions.  When defending the riverbank, he insists that the general “personally reconnoiter the two banks of the river; on the enemy side to note all of the places that favor his crossings; on your own side in order to have three or more big roads made from one end to the other of your front of attack so as to be able to march conveniently and easily in several columns [along the bank of the river].”^[18]  He goes on to recommend how to protect the riverbank at night and during the day in order to contest a river crossing:

“After these precautions, camp your whole army in the center of your line of defense and make sixteen detachments, each consisting only of a few troops, and at the head of each place the elite of your officers. These detachments should be from the hussars or dragoons. You will use them to scout the riverbank all night. Each of these officers should be assigned a definite piece of ground for the security of which he is responsible. In the daytime it is sufficient to place mounted sentinels at the places on the banks where they are best able to observe the country.”^[19]

Article thirteen “Surprise of Cities” is a short article focused on how to determine whether an enemy city is capable of being surprised and taken easily. “Cities can be surprised when they are badly guarded, either by detachments which are sent against them by different roads or by introducing disguise soldiers into them.” He continues with advice on how to attack large and small cities, respectively.

“When cities are large and lightly garrisoned, it is only necessary to attack them on all sides to master them.  The garrison cannot resist everywhere, and the forcing of one point carries with it the loss of all the rest… Little cities can be taken with light ordnance.  Only observe, that if you bring up cannon to destroy the gates, the cannon should be covered so that the enemy’s small arms fire cannot kill the cannoneers.”^[20]   

The next article, “Attack-Defense of Fortified Places,” explores siegecraft tactics, while also discussing the art of defending fortified places. Here, Frederick’s penchant for aggressive tactics are evident when discussing the use of sorties to keep a besieging army off guard:

“I believe that a commander should not make large sorties, except when help is coming to drive away the attacker.  In this case, he should not spare his garrison and should regard the advantages [of this tactic].  But if he is not expecting aid promptly, he can gain time in a more secure manner.

Everyone who has conducted sieges will have seen how the laborers become confused at the first shots of the enemy and how, once they have fled, the labor of the whole night is lost.  This truth admitted, it follows from it that frequent small sorties, which continually alarm the procedures, will be more successful and more sure to delay their work than large sorties, which you can never make without risking the loss of many men; and the consequence of the latter will be that you will have almost no garrison when it comes time to defend your works.  It is exactly for these works that the garrison must be conserved.”^[21]

Map at right - Phase 4: Charles’s forces withdrew from the field, and Frederick took possession of the small castle at Lissa.

Article fifteen is entitled “Battles and Surprises” and describes what information a general should gather in order to determine whether an enemy army can be surprised, while also providing advice on how to provide appropriate security in order to not be surprised by your enemy.  Here, he notes that if surprise can be achieved, he

“should use a large body of light troops and cavalry against the camp to spread terror and confusion, and on the side where the cavalry is, I should have infantry, and cannon fire to spread confusion and to prevent the squadrons from forming.  However, the more the darkness is avoided the better.  Daylight is favorable because you can recognize one another, you do not risk killing your own men, and the cowards who think they can run away in the shadows, are not able to do it as well.  When the officers are able to distinguish them.  Having carried the enemy camp, the cavalry should pursue the fugitives a certain distance.  Above all, the soldiers should be prevented from pillaging and getting drunk after this success, for the enemy may be able to recover from his terror and profit from your confusion.”^[22]

On the subject of how to prevent surprises in your own camp, he recommends camping:

“… with a detached core, a certain distance ahead of the army; we also garrison all of the villages, up to quarter of a mile away in front of the camp; we place cavalry guards in the rear, then infantry guards for the defense of the camp, proper.  Every night, besides, eight or ten patrols are made on all sides around the camp, so we may be warned of what is happening.”^[23]

In “Attack on Entrenchments” Frederick discusses tactics used to attack enemy entrenched positions, as well as how to employ redoubts in your own defensive lines to create defense-in-depth.  He recommends in this article that if an entrenched enemy is to be attacked

“do it at once and do not allow him time to perfect his works.  The principal point for success in your design is to know the strength and weaknesses of the entrenchment thoroughly.  It is the general’s all-around knowledge of the situation that must decide this….  Ordinarily, the defects of the entrenchments are either that they are not solidly enough supported, or that they are too extensive for the number of troops to guard them.  It is upon this knowledge that you should make your [troop] dispositions.  In the first case, either the enemy, instead of pushing its trench and its parapet all the way to a river, does not reach it at all, or else the river is fordable and allows you to turn him.”^[24]

Articles seventeen, “Defeating Enemy with Unequal Forces,” explores the best strategies to defeat an enemy who is numerically superior.  Here, Frederick explores the role of terrain when facing an enemy with superior or inferior numbers.

“A general should choose his ground with regard to the number and types of his troops and the strength of the enemy.  If he is stronger and has a great deal of cavalry, he will seek the plains, primarily because his cavalry can act best there and, in the second place, because his superiority [in horsemen] gives him the means to envelop an enemy on open ground, something he would be unable to do in broken country.

If, on the contrary, you are inferior in numbers, do not despair of winning, but do not expect any other success than that gained by your skill.  It is necessary to seek mountainous country and use artificers [battlefield obstacles], so that if you were to be forced to battle, the enemy would not be able to face you with a front superior to your own, and so that you may be able to protect your flanks.

All weak armies attacking stronger ones should use the oblique order, and it is the best that can be employed to [outflank and turn the enemy line]; for in setting yourself to defeat a wing and in taking a whole army in the flank, the battle is settled at the start.”^[25]

Frederick continues with a discussion on “Defensive Positions,” providing more detail on how to use natural obstacles to secure your flanks when both camping and making defensive entrenchments.^[26]

Map at right: Europe at the time of Frederick II's death in 1786. Prussia's territory was greatly enlarged by his Silesian Wars, his inheritance of East Frisia and the First Partition of Poland, making the Kingdom of Prussia a major player in European politics.

In article nineteen, “Battle in Open Field,” Frederick describes how best to deploy infantry, cavalry, and artillery for open battle. Here, he advises “you should keep your enemy occupied everywhere so that he cannot make movements that would be dangerous to you.  The principal thing to watch is to block his wings….  It is necessary, in addition, to reinforce the flanks of your infantry, so that in case one wing of cavalry gives way all your infantry will be able to supported equally.”  He goes on to discuss the importance of initiative when it comes to arraying your army for battle. “It is a great advantage on the day of action to be formed first.”  He also states that while the army is arraying for battle, “all of the cannon will fire as briskly as possible” and the cavalry on the wings will support the infantry as they form.  “This will guarantee the flank of the cavalry, in such manner that if the enemy were to fall on it.  They would be taken in the flank themselves.”  He continues with the primary role of the cavalry in the Prussian art of war.  “The duty of the cavalry on a day of action is to attack, as soon as ordered, in the manner that I have prescribed in my Military Instructions.  It will certainly disconcert the enemy.  They also should pursue when the enemy cavalry is entirely scattered.”  On the role of the reserve, he recommends that “it should be commended by a skillful general and be placed in a locality where he can see everything he should act on his own initiative, he should conduct a reserve there without being called.  But if everything goes well.  Then the general should employ the reserve in the pursuit.”^[27] 

In article twenty “Pursuit and After Battle” Frederick discusses the appropriate actions when pursuing a defeated enemy, cautioning against allowing “yourself to become so drunk with success that you become imprudent.  If the enemy is thoroughly defeated, make several marches after him and you will gain a prodigious amount of territory.  But always camp in accordance with regulations!”^[28] He ends the article with a discussion on how to perform retrograde actions after a battlefield loss, recommending remaining smaller formations of infantry form a square to protect remaining cavalry while slowly withdrawing to a more protected topography, ideally woods.  If a large army still remains intact, he prefers a retreat in checkerboard formation by entire lines which pass through each other and retrograde action.^[29]

Next, Frederick discusses “How and Why to Accept Battle” in what is his shortest article focusing again on the importance of decisive battle and seizing the initiative in order to secure victory.

“Advantages are procured in battles every time that you determine to fight, or when a battle that you have meditated upon for a long time is a consequence of the maneuvers that you have made to bring it on.  The best occasions that can offer are when you cut the enemy off from his supplies and when you choose terrain favorable to the qualities of your troops and which forces the enemy to fight where you choose.”^[30]

Article twenty-two, “Hazards and Misfortunes of War,” is a short discussion on what a general should look out for that might hamper success on campaign, including weather, the harvest, the health of his troops, personal misjudgments, the death of a trusted and capable officer, low morale of troops, the discover of allied spies, the negligence of your own officers, and finally, betrayal.^[31]

Frederick returns to operational consideration in article twenty-three, Cavalry and Infantry Maneuvers,” describing the essential role cavalry plays in the Prussian art of war and the role infantry plays in taking and holding ground. On the role of combined arms operations with both types of units, he explains why drill and discipline carry the day on the day of battle, and why large cavalry operations play an essential role in seizing and maintaining the initiative:

“(1) so that this large movement will carry the coward along with the brave men; (2) so that the cavalryman will not have time to reflect; (3) so that the power of our big courses and their speed will certainly overthrow whatever tries to resist them; and (4) to deprive the simple cavalryman of any influence in the direction of such a big affair.”^[32]

On infantry maneuvers he ruminates on the role of taking the offensive and seizing ground:

“As for the rapid step by the infantry and attack, rifle on the shoulder, I have some very good reasons to prefer it to any other.  It is not the greater or lesser number of dead that decides in action, but the ground you gain.  It is not fire, but bearing which defeats the enemy.  And because the decision is gained more quickly by always marching against the enemy than by amusing yourself firing, the sooner a battle is decided, the fewer men are lost.  My system is based on the idea that it is up to the infantry to expel the enemy and push him, so to speak, off the field of battle, and that it is the cavalry which crowns the action and gives it brilliance by the number of prisoners that it is their obligation to take.”^[33]

The final two articles, twenty-four (“Winter Quarters”) and twenty-five (“Winter Campaigns”) of Frederick the Great’s Military Instructions explore how an army should prepare for winter quarters and discussing the strategic pros and cons of winter campaigning. As for where to establish winter quarters, he recommends that “skillful generals never occupy positions which lend themselves to many ruses.” He prefers a location where “troops are rested during the winter”, and where they are well-nourished, receiving “his bread for free and is given more meat than ordinarily, that is to say a pound a day.”  He also recommends preparing for the upcoming campaign season by procuring new uniforms and shoes, and that the wagons, cannon carriages, saddles and cavalry boots be repaired.^[34] Frederick ends his instructions with a strong statement against winter campaigns unless absolutely necessary.

“Only absolute necessity and prospect of great advantages can excuse winter operations.  Ordinarily, they ruined the troops because of the sickness by which they are followed, and because, remaining constantly in action, there is no time either to recruit troops nor to clothe them.  An army that is employed frequently and for a long time in such a rigorous season assuredly will not stand up well.”^[35]

Frederick the Great's Military Instructions to His Generals had a profound influence on military strategy and tactics, shaping both the art and science of European warfare. His innovative approaches, characterized by rapid mobilization, flexible maneuvering, and the integration of combined arms tactics using cavalry, infantry and mobile artillery, laid the foundation for early nineteenth century military operations exemplified by Napoleonic warfare. Ulrich Bräker, a soldier assigned to the 13th Prussian Infantry and veteran of the Seven Years’ War, describes in his autobiography how Frederick practices mock battles involving “opposing” forces in open and challenging terrain. Here, each arm of the Prussian army practiced maneuvers against friendly forces, including artillery drills, cavalry charges, bridge crossings, and flanking maneuvers, which encompassed what eventually became a routine practice for the Prussian army and birthing the modern practice of military maneuvers.^[36] This emphasis on discipline and thorough training ensured that his troops were well-prepared for diverse combat situations, while his victories at Hohenfriedberg and Soor (1745) during the War of Austrian Succession and Rossbach and Leuthen (1757) during the Seven Years’ War established his reputation as a great battle captain. Frederick's military successes not only expanded Prussian territory, securing precarious frontiers and vital natural resources, but also fostered a sense of unity and pride among both his troops and citizens, reinforcing Prussian, and later German, national identity.

Frederick the Great's most significant influence was on the generalship of Napoleon Bonaparte (1769-1821), who saw the Prussian king as a military and political mentor, recommending in his own Maxims of War the necessity of reading about the campaigns of Frederick, whom he lists in the company of classical generals Alexander the Great, Hannibal Barca, and Julius Caesar, and the seventeenth century battle captain Henri de La Tour d'Auvergne, Viscount of Turenne, in order to understand the generalship of great military leaders.^[37] While not a military innovator when compared to Gustavus Adolphus, or a strategic mind of the caliber of Napoleon, Frederick was a master tactician who regularly defeated armies far larger than his own and is one of the greatest battle captains in military history. Over the course of his career, Frederick wrote extensively on military matters, largely for the instruction of his own generals.  Although intended as secret, many of these documents fell into enemy hands and, after publication in France, were intensely studied throughout Europe. The full corpus of his writings was not published until 1846 as the Works of Frederick the Great (Oeuvres de Frederic le Grande), consisting of thirty-one volumes of which volumes twenty-eight through thirty are devoted to exclusively military subjects.^[38] 

Frederick the Great’s Instruction for His Generals stands as one of the most influential military texts of the eighteenth century because it distilled the operational logic of the emerging “cabinet warfare” system into a coherent, teachable doctrine. Its emphasis on disciplined linear tactics, rapid maneuver, rigorous officer education, and the integration of intelligence and logistics provided a practical blueprint for professionalized armies at a time when European warfare was becoming increasingly systematized. More importantly, Frederick articulated the idea that war was an intellectual activity governed by principles rather than mere tradition—a notion that helped shape the intellectual environment inherited by nineteenth‑century theorists. His work became a touchstone for later military thinkers, including Napoleon and Clausewitz, who both reacted to and built upon Frederick’s insistence on disciplined forces, decisive maneuver, and the commander’s responsibility for shaping the battlefield. In this way, Frederick’s writing served as a bridge between the rigid geometries of eighteenth‑century warfare and the more dynamic, theory‑driven military thought that defined the military philosophy and doctrines of the nineteenth century.

Bibliography

Primary Sources

Frederick the Great. Instruction for His Generals. Translated by Thomas R. Phillips. Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, 2005.

Napoleon Bonaparte. Napoleon’s Military Maxims. Translated by George C. D’Aguilar. Edited by David G. Chandler. London: Greenhill Books, 2023.

Secondary Sources

Bräker, Ulrich. The Poor Man of Toggenburg: Being the Life and Times of Ulrich Bräker. Translated by Margaret Clare Britton. London, 1788.

Coetzee, Frans, and Marilyn Shevin‑Coetzee, eds. Philosophers of War: The Evolution of History’s Greatest Military Thinkers. New York: Oxford University Press, 2013.

Koch, Hannsjoachim Wolfgang. A History of Prussia. London: Routledge, 2014.

[1]  Hannsjoachim Wolfgang Koch, A History of Prussia (Routledge, 2014), 100.

[2]  Ibid, 46-47.

[3]  Frederick the Great, Instruction for His Generals, trans. Thomas R. Phillips (Dover, 2005), 22.

[4]  Ibid, 24-30.

[5]  Ibid, 32.

[6]  Ibid, 34.

[7]  Ibid, 37.

[8]  Ibid, 37-39.

[9]  Ibid, 40-41.

[10]  Ibid, 40-46.

[11]  Ibid, 47-52.

[12]  Ibid, 52.

[13]  Ibid, 53-57.

[14]  Ibid, 56-57.

[15]  Ibid, 59.

[16]  Ibid, 61.

[17]  Ibid, 63.

[18]  Ibid, 69.

[19]  Ibid.

[20]  Ibid, 71.

[21]  Ibid, 73.

[22]  Ibid, 75-76.

[23]  Ibid, 76.

[24]  Ibid, 77.

[25]  Ibid, 82.

[26]  Ibid, 87-88.

[27]  Ibid, 89-92.

[28]  Ibid, 93.

[29]  Ibid, 93-94.

[30]  Ibid, 95.

[31]  Ibid, 96-98.

[32]  Ibid, 99.

[33]  Ibid.

[34]  Ibid, 102.

[35]  Ibid, 104.

[36]  Ulrich Bräker, The Poor Man Of Toggenburg being The Life And Times Of Ulrich Bräker, trans. Margaret Clare Britton (London, 1788), 70.

[37]  Napoleon’s reference is from Maxim LXXVIII of his Napoleon's Military Maxims, trans. George C. D’Aguilar, ed. David G. Chandler (Greenhill Books, 2023), 82.

[38]  Coetzee and Eysturlid, Philosophers of War, 276.