France under Louis XIV (the “Sun King” r.1614-1715) was the most powerful state in Western Europe through the eighteenth century as it sought to maintain and at times, expand its influence over the continent. During Europe’s Dynastic Age of warfare (1648-1789), talented aristocratic officers rose through the ranks of the French army, some French born, others of foreign aristocratic birth. One such talented officer was Maurice de Saxe (1696-1750). As an officer and commander, the Marshal de Saxe penned an important treatise published posthumously in 1757 entitled Reveries on the Art of War (Reveries sur l'Art de la Guerre), a profoundly influential treatment on the importance of discipline and morale on troop performance, as well as practical guidance on tactical formations, logistics, and fortifications, often referencing earlier Roman models tuned for contemporary applications.  In fact, Marshal de Saxe’s Reveries on the Art of War stands as one of the most influential military treatises of the eighteenth century, blending practical battlefield experience with forward‑looking reforms in training, organization, and technology. Its emphasis on discipline, morale, adaptable formations, and the psychological dimensions of combat helped shape Enlightenment‑era military philosophy and anticipated many doctrinal developments that later defined and perfected during the French Revolution and Napoleonic Age of warfare .

Right: Portrait of Maurice, the Marshal de Saxe, painted by Maurice Quentin de La Tour (1704–1788) and currently in the Gemäldegalerie Alte Meister in Dresden, Germany.

Eighteenth century continental European armies were built around infantry regiments consisting of roughly 1,600 troops, deployed in two battalions numbering 800 men apiece. British regiments were larger, with 1,000 men per battalion when at full strength. By the end of the century, a typical European infantry battalion  consisted of two line infantry companies and two flank companies. Usually, one flank company was made up of footmen called grenadiers, often the largest men in the regiment, who specialized in hand-to-hand combat using bayonets. The other flank was made up of light infantry soldiers, smaller agile men trained as scouts and skirmishers who were often armed with muzzle-loading rifles rather than smooth-bore muskets, a type of longarm more expensive to procure, slower to reload, but with a superior range ideal for skirmishing and sniping operations. In battle, line infantry formed three files deep, with a battalion’s frontage consisting of between 150 and 200 yards, and a depth of about nine yards. Often, a second infantry battalion was arrayed three hundred yards behind the first to absorb enemy breakthroughs and provide a reserve for commanders. Artillery batteries were typically fielded in the intervals between infantry battalions in groups of two to six guns, and were usually stationary during battle. However, smaller mobile field artillery, introduced by the capable Prussian King and General Frederick the Great (r.1740-1786) at mid-century, changed the role of cannons on the battlefield, with horse-drawn guns moving into new positions as the infantry and cavalry maneuvered. Cavalry remained an important part of combined operations, but the proportion of cavalry decreased throughout the century from about one-fourth to one-seventh of the army’s total size. Specialized horse units persisted from earlier centuries, including hussars and dragoons armed with sabers and carbines, the former used as light cavalry skirmishers, and the latter as both mounted and unmounted infantry. Heavy cavalry cuirassiers, famous for the heavier horses and breastplates for personal armor, were also used as shock cavalry. Heavy cavalry lancers continued to be utilized in Central Europe, with some units used in Western Europe.1

Europe’s great aristocratic dynasties fought a series of wars throughout the eighteenth century, shifting the balance of power across the continent. Although Louis XIV succeeded in putting his grandson Philip (later Philip V, r.1700-1746) on the Spanish throne, France emerged considerably weakened at the conclusion of War of Spanish Succession in 1714. France ceded large territories in Canada to Britain, which also gained key Mediterranean outposts from Spain, most notably Gibraltar, as well as a monopoly on providing slaves to the Spanish colonies in the New World. Spanish losses were catastrophic. Philip had to renounce any future claim to the French throne and give up considerable territories in the Netherlands and Italy to the Austrians. By 1740, Europe had achieved the kind of diplomatic equilibrium in which no one power was dominant, however, some powers were in decline while others were on the rise.  Spain, the Dutch Republic, Poland-Lithuania, and Sweden had all declined in power and influence, while Great Britain, Russia, Prussia, and Austria had solidified their strategic and economic positions. France’s ambitions had been thwarted, but its combination of a large army, advantageous geographical position in Western Europe, and rich overseas possessions made it a major player at the end of the century during the French Revolutionary War (1792-1802).

This balance of power would continue to change after 1748 with the War of Austrian Succession (1740-1748), a conflict that pitted Austria and Great Britain against France and the rising power of Prussia under the rule of Frederick the Great and ending with the expansion of Prussian territory south into Silesia. Eight years later a wider conflict began, known in European history as the Seven Years’ War (1756-1763) and globally as the “Great War for Empire.” The fallout from the Seven Years’ War in North America led directly to the Revolutionary War (1775-1783) and the foundation of the United States. These conflicts necessitated new approaches to land warfare, approaches that married new martial technologies to new tactics and producing innovative military manuals authored by two of the leading battle captains of the age, first Maurice de Saxe of France, and later Frederick the Great of Prussia.

Maurice de Saxe (later, and more famously known by his title Marshal de Saxe, 1696-1750) was the illegitimate son of King Augustus II the Strong of Poland (r.1697-1733). A self-made man whose military career was based more on merit than privilege, de Saxe began his military career at the age of twelve serving Prince Eugene of Savoy (1663-1736) in the War of Spanish Succession (1701-1714). Rising to the rank of Marshal of France in 1744, the newly monikered Marshal de Saxe would win the battle of Fontenoy against the coalition Pragmatic Army composed of British, Dutch, Hanoverian, and Austrian troops a year later during the War of Austrian Succession (1740-1748), enshrining him as the most successful French commander of the first half of the eighteenth century. This decisive victory also earned him the rank of Marshal General of France in 1747, commander of all the armies in the realm, a rank he held until his death in 1750.2 Marshal de Saxe tells us in the preface that his Reveries on the Art of War was written over a thirteen night span in December 1732, when he was bedridden with the effects of a fever, which may account for the somewhat scattered organization of the text.3 The contents of Reveries are broken down into thirty-two short chapters following a handful of themes, however, the blending of the classical Roman military organization, using Roman terms (legion, centurion, century), with eighteenth century martial technologies and troop types is a central theme throughout:

The first nine chapters of the Marshal de Saxe’s Reveries on the Art of War are dedicated to troops, military drill and infantry formations. Here, in chapter one “Raising Troops” he begins with the different ways troops were raised in the eighteenth century, by enlistment with a fixed term, by fraud, and by compulsion.

“When recruits are raised by enlistment it is unjust and inhuman not to [honor] the engagement. These men were free when they contracted the enlistment which binds them, and it is against all laws, human or divine, not to keep the promises made to them.

The raising of troops by fraud is also an odious practice.  Money is slipped secretly into the man’s pocket and then he is told he is a soldier.

Raising troops by force is still worse.  This is a public misfortune from which citizens and inhabitants of a country can only save themselves by bribery, and it is founded on shameful methods.”4 

 Left: The battle of Fontenoy (1745). Marshal Saxe’s fortified French position near Tournai repelled the English duke of Cumberland’s Allied assault after a brief British breakthrough. The victory enabled France to capture Tournai and dominate Flanders, weakening the Pragmatic Army and shifting the War of the Austrian Succession’s strategic balance toward France despite failing to end the wider conflict.

He then endorses mandatory conscription of five years as the best way to procure troops, choosing men between the ages of twenty and thirty, believing “this method of raising troops would provide an inexhaustible reservoir of fine recruits who would not be so much inclined to desert.”5 This endorsement of mandatory conscription presages levee en mass policies of nation-states in the nineteenth century. In chapter two “Clothing Troops” he is also quite specific concerning the necessity to clothe soldiers in an appropriate standardized uniform, preferring helmets over hats.  “They do not weigh more than hats, are not at all uncomfortable, protect from a saber below, and are sufficiently ornamental,” once again anticipating a later shift to helmets in modern warfare.6  In chapter three “Feeding Troops” he recommends a public-private partnership, assigning a sutler with four wagons to each company of a hundred men, allowing the merchant to gain his profit from the sale of extras to the troops (liquor, cheese, tobacco, and the leather from cattle butchered for meat).  He also prefers biscuits over bread, anticipating the role of hardtack as a daily provision for later armies.  Interestingly, he also recommends vinegar taken as a prophylactic to maintain health, citing the Romans as inspiration.7 In the fourth chapter “”Pay for Troops” he advocates for a smaller, better paid army over a larger poorly compensated one, believing the former makes for better motivated soldiers.8  He continues in chapters five through eight with a discussion on the importance of military drill and forming troops for combat, once again citing the combat effectiveness of the Roman Legion as inspiration. He then considers the appropriate types of artillery and small arms for a modern army (chapters eight and nine). Here, the author mentions his preference for the newly invented breech-loading rather than ubiquitous muzzle loading long arm, anticipating its widespread adoption of the former in the early nineteenth century.

“I recommend the breech-loading muskets.  It can be loaded quicker, carries farther, is more accurate, and the effect is greater.  In the excitement of battle, soldiers will not be able to put cartridges in the barrel without opening them.  This often happens now and makes the muskets useless. They [breech-loading musketeers] will not be able to insert two charges because the chamber will not hold them. Consequently, [breech-loading] muskets will not burst as [muzzle-loading] muskets often do.9

 He mentions the need for the infantryman’s kit to be light enough to allow maneuverability in combat, but perhaps most provocatively, he advocates for tattooing the right hand of conscripts to identify their allegiance to the state, again echoing the Roman practice of burning a mark with a hot iron.10 He also describes infantry types (“infantry of the line” or line infantry and light infantry, specifically Grenadiers), their roles on the battlefield, and advocates for the return of pikes into the battle array to offer protection to reloading musketeers, believing pikemen to be superior to socketed-bayonet wielding infantrymen.11

Chapters ten through fifteen, “Cavalry in General, “ “Arms and Equipment for Cavalry,” “Organization of Cavalry,” Combined Operations,” “Army in Column,” and “Use of Small Arms” begins with an examination of the different kinds of eighteenth century cavalry units, how they are organized, and how cavalry should be used as part of a combined-arms force with infantry and field artillery. He states boldly that “there should be two kinds of cavalry: light and dragoons. I have no use for any other.”12 He also advocated up-armoring all of his horsemen with flexible lamellar armor and helmets, something which had fallen out of favor in the eighteenth century, except in specialized units like cuirassiers, who were protected by breastplates.13 This section ends with a description of the merits of an assault column and effective small arms tactics through the use of an innovative form of firing by file for concentrated fire. Here a noncommissioned officer acts as a spotter for two files consisting of eight men (four men per file), directing fire for the musketeer in the lead rank.14 Instead of file executing volley fire, the lead marksman takes each of the shots.

“The soldier behind him will pass his gun forward and the others in the same manner.  The file leader will thus fire four shots in succession.  It would be unusual if the second or third shot does not reach its mark.  The commanding officer is close by him, watches his aim, directs, and where to fire, and exhorts him not to hurry.  This man is not hindered, nor crowded, nor hastened by the word of command.  No one presses him; he can fire at ease and take as long as he wishes.  And he can fire four times in succession.

This file having fired, the officer withdraws it and advances the second which performs in the same fashion.  Then, he returns the first, which has had ample time to reload.  This can be repeated for several hours.”15

 Here, the Marshal de Saxe was attempting to address some of the main issues associated with volley fire in eighteenth century warfare, confusion during the drill to reload and a lack of concentrated fire due to the file constantly rotating personnel to the firing position. 

Chapter sixteen of Reveries on the Art of War, “Colors or Standards,” discusses the central role of military colors and standards as a way of identifying different units within the army, assisting with command, control and communication, and as a symbol of military pride (invoking the Roman legionary’s relationship with his own standards).

“The general or commander-in-chief of an army should have a standard to be carried ahead of him as a mark of his rank.  This also has a purpose.  Anyone searching for him will know instantly where to find him, especially in battle, and the troops seeing the standard will know that the general is observing them.

The soldiers of each century should make it an article of faith never to abandon their standard.  It should be sacred to them; it should be respected; and every type of ceremony should be used to make them respected and precious….

If the standards are distinguished by their different colors, the actions of every century will be conspicuous.  This will create the greatest emulation because both officers and soldiers were no that they are seen and that their countenance, conduct, and behavior are not ignored by the rest of the army.”16

Right: Painting of the battle of Lauffeld (1747) by Auguste Couder (1789-1873) Painted in 1836, Couder depicts the events of July 2, 1747 when Louis XV visited the site of the French victory, pointing out the village of Lauffeld to Maurice.  Saxe’s victory at Lauffeld shattered Allied hopes of retaking Flanders, enabling subsequent French captures of Bergen op Zoom and Maastricht and accelerating the strategic stalemate that produced the Treaty of Aix‑la‑Chapelle (1748), ending the War of the Austrian Succession. 

Here, his description of unit loyalty, reinforced by identification with military colors and standards, simultaneously harkens back to classical age and forward to the importance of unit pride in modern militaries. Chapter seventeen, “Artillery and Transport” describes the transport of artillery (oxen were preferred over horses), while the eighteenth chapter deals with military discipline.17 Here, he advocates for flogging as an acceptable practice for corporal punishment, stating one of his best known passages on the relationship between military discipline and combat effectiveness:

“It is a false idea that discipline, subordination, and slavish obedience debase courage.  It has always been noted that it is with those armies in which the severest discipline is enforced that the greatest deeds are performed.”18

 Chapter nineteen, “Defense of Places,” describes the ideal terrain to erect fortifications, preferring standalone fortresses over fortified towns, with the fortresses erected at the junction of two rivers, or if lacking, rivers, on easily defendable topography, high up with command of the area and secure wells.  He also makes an argument against garrisoning fortified towns, preferring standalone fortifications because of the complications inherent in managing civilian populations during sieges (provisioning, morale, the possibility of Fifth Column operations).19 

Chapters twenty, “War in General” begins with a purposeful retreat from a discussion on fortifications to a brief analysis on the importance of logistics for maintaining an army, before returning to a discussion on “How to Construct Forts” (chapter twenty-one), once again using a Roman model and in direct opposition to the military engineering standards of the day. However, instead of preferring a classical rectangular design, he offers an octagon, and imagines his soldiers as part of the manual labor, again like the Romans. “Continual exercise makes good soldiers because it qualifies them for military duties; by being habituated to pain, they insensibly learn to despise danger. The transition from fatigue to rest enervates them.”20 Chapters twenty three through twenty-five discuss “Mountain Warfare and “River Crossings under Combat Conditions,” as are the roles of “Siege Lines and Entrenchments” in defensive warfare. He also advocates for the need of mobile reserves to buttress any failing lines.21

Chapter twenty-six, “Observations of Polybius,” is an interesting interlude, one where the Marshal de Saxe seeks to justify his obsession with the Roman military organization by comparing his conclusions on the superiority of the Roman legion to those of the Roman era historian Polybius, who he quotes directly and at great length in this section. Polybius’ observations on why the Romans won wars during the Middle Republic are highlighted, with a reiteration of the classical historian’s description of what modern scholars refer to as the organization and tactical capabilities of the Polybian Legion. Here, de Saxe maintains that both he and the Roman chronicler agree. “Such an illustrious author can only justify my ideas.”22 

Chapters twenty-seven and twenty-eight, “Attacks on Entrenchments” and “Advantages of Redoubts,” returns the conversation to siege warfare, specifically how to attack entrenchments and why the construction of redoubts (standalone fortifications square or polygonal in shape without flanking defenses) is desirable in order to prepare a battlefield.23  The Marshal de Saxe next describes the importance of obtaining the best spies and guides in the chapter of the same name. On the characteristics of the former, he writes:

“Spies should not know one another.  There should be several ranks of them.  Some should associate with soldiers; others should follow the army under the guise of peddlers.  These should know one of their companions of first rank from whom they receive anything that is to be conveyed to the general who pays them.  This detail should be committed to one who is faithful and intelligent.  He should report his activities every day, and it should be certain that he is incorruptible.”24

Left: Portrait of Maurice, the Marshal de Saxe, painted by Jean-Étienne Liotard (1702–1789) in 1747 at the  height of the battle captain’s professional reputation.  Displayed at the Rijksmuseum  in Amsterdam,  Netherlands.  

In chapter thirty-one, “The General Commanding,” de Saxe lists the most important attributes of a commanding general, explicitly listed as “courage”, “intelligence”, and “health,” and making a direct reference to Prince Eugene of Savoy (1663-1736), his former commander and field marshal serving the Habsburg emperors, as the ideal general.  He goes on to describe the “functions” of a general as “infinite”:

“He must know how to subsist his army and how to husband it; how to place it so that he will not be forced to fight, except when he chooses; how to form his troops in an infinity of different dispositions; how to profit from that favorable moment which occurs in all battles and which decides their success. 

In order to see all these things, the general should be occupied with nothing else on the day of battle.  The inspection of the terrain and the disposition of his troops should be prompt, like the flight of an eagle.  This done, his order should be short and simple, as for instance: ‘The first line will attack, and the second will be in support.’

Thus, on the day of battle, I should want the general to do nothing.  His observations will be better for it, his judgment will be more sane, and he will be in better state to profit from the situation in which the enemy finds himself during the engagement.  And when he sees an occasion, he should unleash his energies, hasten to the critical point at top speed, seize the first troops available, advance them rapidly and lead them in person.  These are the strokes that decide battles and gain victories.  The important thing is to see the opportunity and to know how to use it.”25

 Finally, in the last chapter of the treatise, “Pitched Battle Opposed” the author discusses his caution concerning pitched battles unless favorable conditions exist, and the importance of pursuing a retreat with the hope of creating a rout to facilitate battlefield victory.26

As both a theoretician and practitioner of war, the Marshal de Saxe’s military philosophy was shaped by Enlightenment approaches to understanding the world, specifically the belief that reason should guide all human endeavors, including war. His Reveries on the Art of War provided important instructions on how to form battle lines, establish garrison and field camps, and raise and train recruits which became standard procedure across Europe. His modification of the linear battle formations and tactics of his day by using an early form of assault column required less training and proved effective in battle, becoming a standard tactic in eighteenth century warfare. He was also fascinated by changes in military technology, favoring the development of breech-loading muskets and cannon over the muzzle loading weapons of his own time, technologies that would become widely used in the second half of the nineteenth century with improved manufacturing precision and greater engineering tolerances. Perhaps most significantly, he proposed the reintroduction of integrated combined arms maneuver units he described as “legions,” again taking his cues from classical Rome. He envisioned these units as the core of a permanent standing army. Each of these legions would number precisely 3,582 men, and each would consist of four infantry regiments, four companies of cavalry (one for each regiment), two twelve-pounder artillery pieces, a permanent headquarters, logisticians, military engineers, and supporting services. This concept of building large, permanent, combined arms formations was adopted after the publication of Reveries on the Art of War, shaping the art and science of military operations across Europe and their colonies during the second half of the eighteenth century and into the Age of Napoleonic warfare.27 

Footnotes

[1]  Larry H. Addington, The Patterns of War Through the Eighteenth Century (Indiana University Press, 1990), 120-121.

[2]  Ibid, 41.

[3]  Maurice de Saxe, Reveries on the Art of War, trans. Thomas R. Phillips (Dover, 2007), 1.

[4]  Ibid, 21.

[5]  Ibid, 22.

[6i]  Ibid, 23.

[7]  Ibid, 24-26.

[8]  Ibid, 27-28.

[9]  Ibid, 72.

[10]  Ibid, 40-41.

[11]  Ibid, 47-48.

[12]  Ibid, 55.

[13]  Ibid, 58.

[14]  Ibid, 71-73.

[15]  Ibid, 73.

[16i]  Ibid, 74.

[17]  Ibid, 75-80.

[18]  Ibid, 77.

[19]  Ibid, 80-85.

[20]  Ibid, 85-91.

[21]  Ibid, 91-103.

[22]  Ibid, 104-108.

[23]  Ibid, 108-115.

[24]  Ibid, 115.

[25]  Ibid, 118-119.

[26]  Ibid, 121-122.

[27]  Martin van Creveld. A History of Strategy: From Sun Tzu to William S. Lind (Castalia House, 2015), 42-43.

Bibliography

Primary Sources

De Saxe, Maurice. Reveries on the Art of War. Translated by Thomas R. Phillips. Dover, 2007.

Secondary Sources

Addington, Larry H. The Patterns of War Through the Eighteenth Century. Indiana University Press, 1990.

Van Creveld, Martin. A History of Strategy: From Sun Tzu to William S. Lind. Castalia House, 2015.