If the Balloon Goes Up: The Effectiveness of U.S. Army Maneuvers, 1902–1944 by Randall S. Wells Jr. makes a valuable contribution to the study of American military preparedness by examining a subject that has received surprisingly little sustained attention from historians. Originating as a doctoral dissertation, the work addresses a notable gap in the historiography of the U.S. Army by investigating the purpose, conduct, and effectiveness of large-scale readiness exercises conducted between 1902 and 1944. Wells argues that despite the significance of training and maneuvering to military readiness, historians have devoted comparatively little attention to evaluating whether these exercises actually improved combat effectiveness.

Wells traces the evolution of Army maneuvers across more than four decades, assessing how these exercises sought to prepare soldiers and commanders for the realities of modern warfare. Covering a period that witnessed the reform efforts of Elihu Root, the emergence of a more professional Army under leaders such as John J. Pershing, and the wartime expansion overseen by figures including George C. Marshall, Lesley J. McNair, and Dwight D. Eisenhower, the study examines a broad range of readiness exercises and evaluates whether they successfully replicated battlefield conditions and provided meaningful training for forces that would later serve in Europe during the First and Second World Wars. By focusing on the relationship between peacetime training and wartime performance, Wells engages an important question that remains relevant to military planners and historians alike.

Particularly significant are Wells's discussions of the General Headquarters (GHQ) maneuvers and the large-scale exercises conducted by Third Army in Tennessee, the Carolinas, and Louisiana during the Interwar Years. These maneuvers represented some of the most ambitious training exercises undertaken by the U.S. Army prior to American entry into the Second World War. Designed to test doctrine, command relationships, communications, mobility, logistics, and the coordination of infantry, cavalry, artillery, armor, and air assets, the exercises provided invaluable opportunities to assess the Army's readiness under simulated combat conditions. The GHQ maneuvers exposed weaknesses in organization, equipment, and operational planning while simultaneously demonstrating the potential of a more mechanized and mobile force. Likewise, the famous Louisiana Maneuvers and related Third Army exercises in Tennessee and the Carolinas served as a proving ground for a generation of officers who would later command American forces in Europe and the Pacific. Through these exercises, leaders gained practical experience managing large formations across extensive operational areas, while observers evaluated the effectiveness of emerging doctrine and command structures. Their inclusion reinforces the book's central concern with whether peacetime readiness exercises genuinely translated into battlefield effectiveness.

The monograph's most important contribution is its central argument that U.S. Army maneuvers often exposed significant shortcomings in preparedness. Rather than portraying these exercises as unqualified successes, Wells concludes that they revealed persistent weaknesses that left American forces less than adequately prepared for the combat they ultimately encountered against both the Imperial German Army during World War I and the German Wehrmacht during World War II. His conclusion challenges assumptions that extensive maneuver programs automatically translated into operational readiness and combat effectiveness. In doing so, the author encourages readers to distinguish between the existence of training programs and their actual effectiveness in preparing soldiers for modern combat conditions.

Another strength of the study is its emphasis on realism in military training. Wells demonstrates that effective readiness exercises must subject participants to conditions that closely approximate actual combat, utilizing authentic equipment, tactics, and operational challenges. His discussion highlights the importance of testing command structures, logistics, communications, and battlefield decision-making under realistic conditions rather than relying solely on theoretical planning. In doing so, he underscores the enduring value of rigorous field training as a measure of military capability.

Overall, If the Balloon Goes Up is a thoughtful and original examination of U.S. Army preparedness in the first half of the twentieth century. Spanning an era that stretched from the reforms of Elihu Root to the global campaigns directed by George C. Marshall and Dwight D. Eisenhower, the book demonstrates the critical relationship between realistic training and battlefield effectiveness. By exploring an underdeveloped area of military historiography and offering a critical assessment of Army readiness, Wells has produced a substantial study that will be of interest to scholars of military history, military professionals, and students of organizational learning in wartime institutions.