I read “The Coldest Winter” in preparation of a one-night continuing education class I was teaching.  In my reading, in breadth, length and detail, it is the magnus opus of American Korean War literature.  Neither a commendation nor a condemnation of what has been characterized as “The century’s nastiest little war”, it tells the whole story, good, bad and ugly.

It begins with the mistakes and miscalculations that set the stage for North Korean aggression.  Before the National Press Club on January 12, 1950, Secretary of State Dean Acheson seemed to signal that South Korea was outside America’s Asian Defense Perimeter.  Stalin’s acceptance of the signal opened the door for his approval of Kim Il Sung’s drive for national unification.  Demands for demobilization after World War II and comfortable occupation duty in Japan had left “Undermanned, poorly trained American units, with faulty, often outmoded equipment and surprisingly poor high-level command leadership” that were an embarrassment.  The theatre commander, Gen. Douglas MacArthur, had made it clear that he had no interest in Korea, perhaps reflected in his unwillingness to spend a night in-country during the War.  Obsolete, initially deployed American equipment was no match for the Soviet-supplied equipage of the North Korean People’s Army, one-third of which had combat experience with the Communist forces in the Chinese Civil War.

Politics of two continents are extensively explored.  Kim, Stalin, Harry Truman, Douglas MacArthur, the newly triumphant Mao Zedong, the recently humiliated Chaing Kai-shek and his Republican allies in the United States all stirred a brewing pot of strategy and intrigue.  United Nations’ involvement brought a host of nations to greater or lesser degrees, into the decision process.

The tide of war would shift repeatedly.  Though it initially seemed likely that South Korean and United Nations forces would be driven off the peninsula, increasing land, sea and air forces slowed the North Korean advance, eventually stabilizing the line outside the southeastern port of Pusan.  MacArthur’s outrageously bold landing at Inchon, far behind North Korean lines, turned a desperate hold on the tip of Korea into an open route to the pre-war border at the thirty-eighth parallel and as far north as the United Nations would sanction.

Success brought its own challenges.  The approach to the thirty-eighth forced the question:  Had the expulsion of the invaders from South Korea fulfilled the United Nations’ mission, or was the liberation of North Korea a fitting retribution for its aggression?  Should Zhou Enlai’s warning, relayed through K. M. Panikkar, the Indian ambassador to China, that American, but not South Korean, crossing of the thirty-eighth would necessitate Chinese intervention have been taken seriously?  In the heady days of victory, was restraint politically possible?  Even without reading the book, we know the warning was ignored, American troops surged north and China intervened, sending United Nations forces reeling south in the “Great Bugout” that stabilized in the general region of the prewar zone.

The Truman-MacArthur Wake Island meeting, with its long travel, limited discussions and greatest miscalculation on MacArthur’s part that China would not intervene has its place in the narrative.  Contrary to legend, MacArthur did not delay his plane so the President would land first, but did display casual regard for his commander-in-chief.

MacArthur’s insubordination grew to the point that dismissal was necessary on April 11, 1951.  Gen. Matthey Ridgeway assumed command.  The war devolved into a stalemate compared to the Western Front of World War I.  An armistice was accepted in 1953 and the war faded from America’s consciousness.

The Korean War would long cast its shadow over both Korea and America.  South Korea would grow into a an economic powerhouse, always under threat of renewed aggression from the North.  It undermined support for the Truman Administration, ended the Democrat’s twenty-year control of the White House and enabled the Eisenhower Presidency and the Age of McCarthyism, the reach of which extended far beyond that of its namesake.  It legitimized stalemate as a substitute for victory while establishing toughness on Communism as a litmus test for future American politicians, making Vietnam a seemingly vital American interest.

War History members appreciate the many facets of war, the views through the gunsights, the plans of the generals, the visions of governments, the mischief of opportunists and its rippling effects, the end of which we can never be certain.  Few tomes on any war are as encompassing and insightful as The Coldest Winter.  It is long, 719 pages, detailed and thought provoking, but worth the read.