For me, the Vietnam War was something that I read about and watched on television during my high school and college years, but had never studied it in depth.  Against that backdrop “Westmoreland: The General Who Lost Vietnam” is a stark eye-opener.  Author Lewis Sorley, an alumnus of the U. S. Military Academy and former member of Gen. Westmoreland’s staff, presents a history of the War and a portrait of the general who led it that is much different from what we heard from the media at the time.

“Westy’s” youth in South Carolina and education at West Point prepared him for service in World War II where he saw action in North Africa, Sicily and Italy before landing in Normandy on D-Day+4 and crossing the bridge at Remagen during the drive into Germany.  Korea brought more experience that would lead to appointment as Superintendent at West Point.  During his rise Westmoreland gained a powerful patron in Gen. Maxwell Taylor, whose military and political skills would advance his own career as well Westmoreland’s.  A critical fork in his career occurred when he had the choice of either continuing as commander in Vietnam or appointment as president of the Citadel.  It is perhaps a personal and national tragedy that he chose to stay on active duty.

Sorely portrays Westmoreland as an officer of significant, but limited abilities, who advanced beyond his capacities to the detriment of his country and his reputation.  Many of the points raised in this book seem incredible in light of our experience.  The fallacy of Westmoreland’s belief that a war of attrition would bring the Vietnamese Communists to their knees faster than it would undercut American support for the war boggles the mind.  Westmoreland’s policy of limiting supplies to the Vietnamese forces and Americanization of the war strikes me as counter to what I thought was American policy and President Nixon’s later policy of Vietnamization.

In his portrayal of Westmoreland, Sorely challenges traditional explanations for failure in Vietnam, including that the troops were constrained by micro-management from Washington.  The work makes the case that the administration placed limits on resources and the geographical extent of the war but that, for the most part, the conduct of the war was left to Westmoreland and to him belongs the lion’s share of the credit and the blame for the results.

Upon his return to the U.S., Westmoreland served as Army Chief of Staff, a position in which he used, according to this tome, as a bully pulpit to explain and justify his actions in Vietnam rather than one from which to lead the Army in its rebuild from that struggle.  His subordinates are presented as lacking respect for him.  It is suggested that his status as the only Chief of Staff whose official portrait depicts in a field, rather than a dress uniform, reveals the obsession with Vietnam that he could never put behind him.

War History Network members will get an insights into the relationships between Westmoreland and his political superiors.  The impression is created that Secretary McNamara was frustrated with Westmoreland’s inability to create a workable plan for the war and the repeated calls for more troops.  LBJ kept Westmoreland in Vietnam until about ten days after he asked Gen. Eisenhower how long one should keep a military commander and was told, “as long as you have confidence in him.”  Nixon, who inherited Westy as Chief of Staff, often did not see eye to eye with him and refused his request for an extra year in that position.

There are some incidents that may or may not be cheap shots.  Sorely cites incidences in which artillery was shot aimlessly into the jungle on the thought that some might hit the enemy.  He writes of an incident in the field in which Westmoreland pinned decorations on soldiers in a unit for which no decorations had been recommended.  With photographs taken and the brass and journalists safely flown away the decorations were collected and returned for use another day.  There are numerous other reports of seemingly inappropriate quotes and actions.  I tend to be a bit of a skeptic of anecdotes supporting pieces highly critical of public figures.  Perhaps some of the quotes are taking out of context.  Are phony photo ops unique to Westmoreland and other arguably severely flawed commanders?  I do not know, but I am reluctant to base my assessment on such anecdotes. 

This book leaves me with mixed feelings.  I feel outrage at the possibility that Americans were wasted combat actions driven by an inept top commander.  At the same time I wonder whether the examples cited present an unrepresentative picture of the man.  I often judge a book by whether it whets my appetite to read further on the subject.  By this standard “Westmoreland” gets a mixed review.  It gives me things to look for when I read about Presidents Nixon and Johnson and might even raise my interest in other administration figures, such as McNamara and Dean Rusk.  Those interests notwithstanding, I think that it will be awhile before I read another Vietnam book.