At the beginning of the Early Modern era (1500-1800 CE) Italy was divided into a dozen city states, some ruled by old medieval institutions (kingdoms, duchies and the Papal State), while others experimenting with a type of neo-republicanism modeled after ancient Rome.  This was also a time when Italy found itself at the mercy of greater European powers. The Italian Wars (1494-1559) began when King Charles VIII of France (r.1483-1498)) crossed the Alps and invaded the Italian city states, humbling the mercenary-based Italian armies in the first early modern war.[1] Afterwards, invasions by other great European powers continued for more than half a century. Witnessing these events up close, Niccolo Machiavelli (1469-1527), the sometimes diplomat, political scientist, and military commentator, penned two works of strategic and tactical significance, Il Principe or The Prince (written in 1513 and published five years after his death in 1532) and Dell'arte della guerra or Art of War (published 1521) designed to assist an Italian prince on how to best prepare for this new political and military environment.  His Discourses on the First Ten of Titus Livy (Discorsi sopra la prima deca di Tito Livio) published posthumously in 1531 discusses the Roman Republic as an ideal republican state and stresses the importance of a well-trained citizen-soldiers. The military philosophy of Niccolo Machiavelli was shaped by the age in which he lived. Born into a poor family in Florence, Machiavelli served the Republic of Florence first as a bureaucrat and diplomat, then as chancellor and secretary of the Ten of Liberty and Peace, where he became familiar with the military affairs of the republic. His public career ended abruptly in 1512 when the Medici family returned to power in Florence, briefly imprisoning and torturing Machiavelli before releasing him.[2]

Right: A Renaissance era Florentine diplomat and political theorist, Niccolò Machiavelli (1469-1527) is best known for The Prince (completed 1513, published 1532), a pragmatic guide to power that argues rulers must often act immorally to maintain stability and authority. In it, Machiavelli famously asserts that it is better for a ruler to be feared than loved if he cannot be both, emphasizing realpolitik over idealism. His lesser-known but once more influential Art of War (1521) presents a dialogue advocating for citizen militias over mercenaries, drawing on Roman military models to argue that a strong, virtuous republic depends on disciplined arms. Together, these works reflect Machiavelli’s belief that political and military strength are inseparable foundations of a secure and enduring state. This portrait of Niccolò Machiavelli was created by Santi di Tito around 1575, nearly 50 years after Machiavelli's death.  It is considered a famous posthumous portrait of Machiavelli, who died in 1527, and is currently housed in the Palazzo Vecchio in Florence, Italy.

Machiavelli wrote The Prince in 1513, a year after his incarceration. He dedicated the small treatise to Lorenzo de Medici, (r.1469-1492), the ruler of Florence before the Italian Wars, probably as a way of gaining favor with the de Medici family now ruling Florence.[3] The stated aim of his book is to discuss the attributes of a great ruler with the expressed hope that his instructions will help a prince lead Florence out of its current difficult political situation. However, since the beginning of the twentieth century political scientists have seen The Prince as an expression of Realpolitik, a political and military strategy based on concrete, practical goals, rather than on morality or abstract ideals. The Prince’s twenty-six chapters are usually divided into four sections by modern scholars. 

Niccolo Machiavelli’s The Prince, written 1513, published 1532

Chapters one through eleven of The Prince describes the four types of Italian principalities. These include hereditary principalities, which are inherited by the ruler; mixed principalities, followed by territories that are annexed to the ruler's existing territories. He then describes the formation of new principalities, which may be acquired by several methods: by one's own power, by the power of others, by criminal acts or extreme cruelty, or by the will of the people described today as civic principalities. Finally, Machiavelli explores the fourth type of principality, ecclesiastical principalities, specifically the powerful Papal States belonging to the Catholic Church which exercised both spiritual and temporal power during the medieval era and his own time.[4] In chapters twelve through fourteen, The Prince emphasizes the responsibility of a ruler to understand the role of military power in first securing and then maintaining political power. Here, Machiavelli lists four types of armies, including mercenaries (condottieri) or hired soldiers, which he describes as dangerous and unreliable; auxiliaries or troops that are loaned to you by other rulers, which he also perceives as dangerous and unreliable; native troops, composed of one's own citizens or subjects, which he sees as the most loyal and desirable, and mixed troops, a combination of native troops and mercenaries or auxiliaries, described as still less desirable than a completely native army.[5] The next eight short chapters, fifteen through twenty-three, Machiavelli’s treatise explores the character and actions of an effective rule, often presented in relation to his concept of virtue, described as virtu in his writings.  Virtu encompasses a range of personal qualities and actions necessary for a ruler to establish and maintain power, specifically in the face of Fortuna (chance or fate). It is a blend of skill, courage, cunning, and the ability to adapt to changing circumstances, often exceeding the traditional notion of virtue.[6] The final two chapters of The Prince detail Italy’s current political situation, giving modern scholars special insights into early sixteenth century Italian politics. Here, Machiavelli explains that many of the rulers of Italy lost their states to foreign aggressors by ignoring the political and military principles outlined in his work. The author maintains fortune controls half of all human affairs, while free will controls the rest, leaving the prince free to act. However, few princes can adapt their actions to the times and therefore fail as rulers. The final chapter is a direct appeal to the Medici family to follow Machiavelli's principles and free Italy from foreign domination.[7]

Taken as a whole, The Prince describes the political realities of Italy during Machiavelli’s life, then discusses the kinds of armies present on the peninsula before describing the best kind of army to create to serve an effective prince (the attributes of which he then lays out). This pragmatic advice shocked his contemporaries and was in direct conflict with the dominant Catholic and scholastic doctrines of the time concerning how to consider politics and ethics.  Nearly a decade later, Machiavelli would pen another treatise, the Art of War, this time focusing on classical and medieval military institutions and their application to building a new model Italian army. Just as his The Prince is often seen as the first dedicated political science handbook in Western Civilization, his Art of War has been described as the birth of Early Modern military thought presented in a treatise trying to initiate a proto-“revolution in military affairs” (RMAs) in Italy, one advocating for a mixture of old and new military technologies and tactics and presaging later RMAs in Western military doctrine.[8] 

Niccolo Machiavelli’s Art of War, 1521

Machiavelli’s Art of War (Dell'arte della guerra) was written between 1519 and 1520 and published in 1521. Its main thesis centers on the essential role of citizen-soldiers in the defense of their state and the importance of recreating an Italian military based on the drill, discipline and patriotism of earlier classical and medieval models. Echoing his earlier work, The Prince, Machiavelli expresses his distrust for mercenary soldiers (condottieri) as protectors of the state, mostly because of their greed and disloyalty, but partly because of their penchant for maneuver over decisive engagement. For Machiavelli, participation as citizen soldiers represents the best military system, drawing evidence from the success of the earlier Greek, Macedonian, Roman, and Swiss models. Machiavelli discusses the specific military problems facing Italy during the Italian Wars with the goal that his instruction would help an Italian ruler create an Italian infantry capable of defeating the Swiss and Spanish infantries dominating Italian battlefields. He also maintains that cavalry, long the most important tactical system on medieval battlefields, was now of secondary importance to infantry in Early Modern warfare. Machiavelli’s insight into the nature of war and the role of the military in the structure of society as a whole is the foundation of his military philosophy. He believes that the life of the state depends on the excellence of its army. To this end, he advises using classical models based on citizen-soldier militias to create a fighting force capable of winning decisive battles.

Right: This statue of Niccolo Machiavelli is located outside the Uffizi Gallery in Florence, Italy, and is part of a series of sculptures called the "Great Florentines". It was sculpted by Lorenzo Bartolini (1777-1850).

Machiavelli's treatise emphasizes the importance of a well-trained and disciplined military, drawing heavily on his understanding of the campaigns of great classical era battle captains like Cyrus the Great of Persia, Philip II and Alexander of Great of Macedon, Pyrrhus of Epirus, Hannibal Barca of Carthage, and Scipio Africanus as well as Renaissance commanders like Francesco Sforza and Cesare Borgia.  He focuses on the military practices of Roman legions as described in the writings of Polybius, Livy, Julius Caesar, Frontinus, and Vegetius.[9] The Art of War covers various aspects of warfare, including the organization, training, and deployment of troops, as well as the moral and civic virtues necessary for a strong military. Machiavelli organizes his treatise in seven books mimicking the organization of earlier classical and medieval military texts. The entire work is presented as a Socratic dialogue, primarily featuring the character Lord Fabrizio Colonna (1450-1520), a real mercenary captain in the service of the papacy and a contemporary of Machiavelli, who discusses military strategy and tactics with four other men in the setting of a garden.

Book One of Machiavelli’s Art of War begins with a discussion on the nature of virtu and its relationship with the military profession, before describing the importance of imitating classical systems, with specific references to the Greeks, Macedonians, and Romans, as well as the Swiss military of his own day. He also addresses how and where to recruit quality troops, echoing the views of Vegetius on the virtues of farmers as militia. “It is better to take them from rural areas, because such men are accustomed to bearing up under hardships and fatigues, enduring all sorts of weather, handling a spade, digging ditches, carrying heavy burdens-- these men are, generally speaking, more temperate and incorrupt than others.”[10] He also discusses the ideal physical attributes of troops, citing classical precedents for age, size, and dexterity, while also noting the constitution of an ideal militia, limitations on its commanders, as well as how to recruit, raise, and pay both infantry and cavalry.[11] On the topic of who and where an officer should command he writes:

“It is necessary to take care that the commanders do not acquire too great an authority over their men.  Now, authority of this kind is either natural or accidental: to guard against the [first], provisions should be made that an officer ought not to have any command over the men raised in the district where he was born, but to command only those men who were selected from places other than where he has any natural interest or connections; to guard against the other, it may, for the most part be prevented by changing the officers and sending them to commands in different parts every year--- for a long continuation of command over the same people is apt to create too strict a union between them.”[12]

Interestingly, Machiavelli cites both the Assyrian and Roman empires’ long term policy of shifting officers from place to place as an important reason for the longevity of these empires and the effectiveness of their armies. Modern militaries rotate commands for similar reasons today. 

Book Two explores the arms and armor of classical, medieval, and contemporary armies, comparing the panoplies of these eras in some detail. Interestingly, in these comparisons he constructs his ideal army pulling from historical examples, specifically contemporary German mercenaries fighting in Italy known as the Landsknechts and classical Roman legionaries fighting with sword and shield. The Landsknechts, famous for their flamboyant costumes, fought in phalanxes using pikes, halberds, great swords (zweihanders), and handguns (arquebuses). The brainchild of Holy Roman Emperor Maximilian I (r.1508-1519) to further German military aspirations, the Landsknechts originally emulated Swiss formations and were capable of offensive action against other infantry formations and could defend themselves from heavy cavalry attacks.[13]

“I would take some of the Roman arms and armor, and some of the German; half of my men would be armed with one and half with the other; for out of every 6,000 infantry, 3,000 were provided with swords and shields like the Romans, and 2,000 with pikes and 1,000 with harquebuses like the Germans… I would place my pikemen either in the first ranks, or where I thought the enemy’s cavalry was most likely to make an impression; I would post the others so as to support the pikemen and push forward when the way was opened for them.”[14]

Machiavelli’s willingness to innovate using both contemporary and classical methods of warfare made him a trailblazer in sixteenth century warfare and sets a standard for doctrinal innovation moving forward into the Early Modern era. He then describes different training drills and how troops should be arrayed for battle, the responsibilities of officers in maintaining discipline within the ranks and file, and the size and complement of baggage trains. The book ends with a discussion of military virtue and the number of cavalry necessary for a regiment.[15]

Book Three of the Art of War opens with a discussion of classical Greek, Roman, and medieval Swiss battle formations and then proceeds to describe why the best military system for the Italians would be a mixture of all three tactical styles. It continues with a detailed description of the number of men in a Roman army, pulling heavily from Livy’s understanding of the mid-Republican legion rather than an examination of later legionary formations from the late Republic or Imperial eras. The book ends with a description of a simulated engagement using his new model army and the reasons for the various maneuvers within this mock battle, an elegant example of an early sixteenth century wargame which presages the use of military scenarios in later military theories and manuals.[16]

Book Four contains an interesting conversation concerning the general rules commanders should follow, advice on when and where to engage or avoid battle, and insights into the psychology and motivation of troops (including a discussion on the utility of religion).[17] Here, he makes mention of why commanders should take into account the position of the sun and wind conditions when preparing for battle.

“Great attention should be paid to the wind and sun in forming your army for battle; for if you have [both] in your face, one will dazzle you’re your sight with its rays, and the other will blind you with dust. When the wind is against you it will diminish the force of your blows; as for the sun, you must be careful that it is not in your face when the battle begins, and that it may not be afterward be troublesome to you.”[18]

He cites examples from classical history, including campaigns by Hannibal Barca and Gaius Marius to make his point. He also emphasizes the importance of a general’s communication skills. “It is necessary that a general be a good orator as well as a good soldier; for if he does not know how to address himself to the whole army, he will sometimes find it no easy task to mold it to his purposes.”[19] He ends Book Four with a discussion on the role of religion and military oaths in motivating men to fight throughout history.

“Religion too, and the oath soldiers took when they were enlisted, greatly contributed to making them do their duty in ancient times; for upon any default, they were threatened by not only human punishments, but the vengeance of the gods. They also had several other religious ceremonies that had a very good effect on all their enterprises and would still in any place where religion is held in due reverence.”[20]

 Right: This 1494 map shows Italy’s fragmented city-states, Florence, Venice, Milan, whose rivalries shaped Machiavelli’s political realism and inspired The Prince. Click to enlarge.

Even as an established humanist, Machiavelli understood the power of religion and oath-taking in motivating and sustaining an army’s purpose and morale.

Machiavelli compares Roman and contemporary strategies for marching into enemy territory, and another dialogue on forming and defending an army in battle formation in his Book Five of Art of War. This section also discusses how to give commands, provision the army, divide spoils, and avoid ambushes. It ends with a discussion on the importance of understanding terrain, including how to ford the river in combat conditions and how to avoid enemy traps in mountain passes.[21]  Book Six begins with a discussion on how the Greeks and Romans chose their campsites and continues on how to set up and guard a military camp, borrowing heavily from classical sources, including Polybius and Vegetius. This book also discusses how the Greeks and Romans administered military justice and ancient regulations on women and gambling. It continues with precautions against famine and a discussion on preventing famine within your own army. It ends with advice on how to conduct psychological warfare against the enemy and how to campaign in the winter.[22] 

The seventh and final book in Machiavelli’s treatise explores how to build and fortify towns, garrison the walls, and then continues with how to defend a walled city against attack, including advice on how to communicate with the outside and how to repair and defend a breach in your own walls. It continues with a discussion of siege techniques, including how to draw out a besieged garrison, employ mines and countermines, and approach an enemy wall under fire. He continues with advice concerning military discipline, how to obtain sufficient horses and employ new military technologies, and how they should be employed.[23]  The Art of War ends with Lord Fabrizi’s twenty-seven “general rules of war”:

“1. Whatever is of service to the enemy must be prejudicial to you; whatever is prejudicial to him must be of service to you.

2. He who is most careful to observe the motions and designs of the enemy and takes the most care in drilling and disciplining his army, will be least exposed to danger and will have the most reason to expect success in his undertakings.
3. Never come to an engagement until you have inspired your men with courage and see them in good order and eager to fight, nor hazard a battle until they seem confident of victory.
4. It is better to subdue an enemy by famine than by sword, for in battle, fortuna has often a much greater share than virtù.
5. No enterprise is more likely to succeed than one concealed from the enemy until it is ripe for execution.
6. Nothing is of greater importance in time of war than knowing how to make the best use of a fair opportunity when it is offered.
7. Few men are brave by nature, but good discipline and experience make many so.
8. Good order and discipline in an army are more to be depended upon than ferocity.
9. If any of the enemy’s troops desert him and come over to you, it is a great acquisition—provided they prove faithful; for their loss will be more felt than that of those killed in battle, although deserters will always be suspected by their new friends and odious to their old ones.
10. In drawing up an army in order of battle, it is better to keep a sufficient reserve to support your front line than to extend it so as to make only one rank, as it were, of your army.
11. If a general knows his own strength and that of the enemy perfectly, he can hardly miscarry.
12. The virtù of your soldiers is of more consequence than their number; sometimes the location of the place is of greater advantage and security than the virtù of your soldiers.
13. Sudden and unexpected accidents often throw an army into confusion, but things that are familiar and have come on gradually are little regarded; therefore, when you have a new enemy to deal with, it is best to accustom your men to their sight as often as you can by slight skirmishes before you come to a general engagement with them.
14. He whose troops are in disorder while pursuing a routed enemy will most probably lose the advantage he had previously gained and be routed in his turn.
15. Whoever has not taken proper care to furnish himself with a sufficient stock of provisions and ammunition bids fair to be vanquished without striking a stroke.
16. He who is stronger in infantry than cavalry, or in cavalry than infantry, must choose his ground accordingly.
17. If you would know whether you have any spies in your camp during the day, you have nothing more to do than to order every man to his tent.
18. When you are aware that the enemy is acquainted with your designs, you must change them.
19. After you have consulted with many about what you ought to do, confer with very few concerning what you are actually resolved to do.
20. While your men are in quarters, you must keep them in good order by fear and punishment; but when they are in the field, by hopes and rewards.
21. Good commanders never come to an engagement unless they are compelled to by absolute necessity, or occasion calls for it.
22. Take great care that the enemy may not be apprised of the order in which you design to draw up your army for battle; make such a disposition that your first line may fall back with ease and convenience into the second, and both of them into the third.
23. In time of action, be sure not to call off any of your battalions to a service different from what they were destined to do at first, lest you should occasion disorder and confusion in your army.
24. Unexpected accidents cannot be easily prevented, but those foreseen may easily be obviated or remedied.
25. Men, arms, money, and provisions are the sinews of war, but of these four, the first two are the most necessary; for men and arms will always find money and provisions, but money and provisions cannot always raise men and arms.
26. A rich man without arms must be a prey to a poor soldier well-armed.
27. Accustom your soldiers to abhor fastidious living and luxurious dress.”[24]

Both The Prince and the Art of War were influential long after Machiavelli’s death in 1527. The Italian translation circulated widely after his death, with German, French and Latin editions emerging later in the sixteenth century. Henry Neville (1620-1695) translated it into English in 1675. Its influence continued into the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In fact, it was read by eighteenth and nineteenth century battle captains Marshal de Saxe, Frederick the Great, and Napoleon Bonaparte, while the Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz acknowledged its influence on his own writing. The Prince is often considered one of the first modern treatises on political science and has provided Western civilization with a template for political realism (power is, or should be, the primary end of political action). His last name has given us the term “Machiavellian” an adjective usually associated with using expediency, cunning, and duplicity in pursuit of power (often read as “the ends justifies the means”).

Endnotes

[1]  See chapter one of Christine Shaw and Michael Mallett, The Italian Wars 1494-1559: War, State and Society in Early Modern Europe, Second Edition (Routledge, 2018),

[2]  Daniel Coetzee and Lee Eysturlid, Philosophers of War: The Evolution of History's Greatest Military Thinkers, Volume 1: The Ancient to Premodern World, 3000 BCE-1815 CE (Praeger, 2013), 102-103.

[3]  Nicollo Machiavelli, The Prince, trans. Peter Bondanella (Oxford University Press, 2008), ix-xviii.

[4]  Ibid, 7-41.

[5]  Ibid, 42-52.

[6]  Ibid, 53-81.

[7]  Ibid, 84-90.

[8]  This analysis is taken from Christopher Lynch’s  introduction to Nicollo Machiavelli, Art of War, trans. Christopher Lynch (University of Chicago, 2005), XIII-XIV. 

[9]  Ibid, XV.

[10]  Nicollo Machiavelli, Art of War, trans. Ellis Farneworth (DaCapo Press, 1965), 27. 

[11]  Ibid, 7-43.

[12]  Ibid, 41.

[13]  Brian Todd Carey, Joshua B. Allfree, and John Cairns, Warfare in the Medieval World (Pen and Sword Military, 2012), 201.

[14]  Machiavelli, Art of War, trans. Ellis Farneworth, 51-52.

[15]  Ibid, 44-82.

[16]  Ibid, 83-109.

[17]  Ibid, 110-129.

[18]  Ibid, 112.

[19]  Ibid, 128.

[20]  Ibid.

[21]  Ibid, 130-149.

[22]  Ibid, 150-182.

[23]  Ibid, 183-202.

[24]  Ibid,  202-204.

Bibliography

Primary Sources

Machiavelli, Nicollo.  Art of War. Translated by Ellis Farneworth. DaCapo Press, 1965.  

_____. Art of War. Translated and edited by Christopher Lynch. University of Chicago, 2005.  

_____. The Prince. Translated by Peter Bondanella. Oxford University Press, 2008.

Secondary Sources

Carey, Brian Todd, Joshua B. Allfree, and John Cairns. Warfare in the Medieval World. Pen and Sword Military, 2012.

Coetzee, Daniel, and Lee Eysturlid. Philosophers of War: The Evolution of History's Greatest Military Thinkers, Volume 1: The Ancient to Premodern World, 3000 BCE-1815 CE. Praeger, 2013.  

Shaw, Christine, and Michael Mallett, The Italian Wars 1494-1559: War, State and Society in Early Modern Europe, Second Edition. Routledge, 2018.