A few Allied soldiers (probably French) soldiers occupy entrenchments and dugout bunkers in the shell blasted wood called Des Fermes in the Somme. Photo licensed to War History Network.

Left: John French, Joseph Joffre and Douglas Haig (left to right) visit the front line during 1915. Photograph in the public domain.

Field Marshal Douglas Haig commanded the British Expeditionary Force on the Western Front from late 1915 until the end of the war. He was commander during the Battle of the Somme, the Battle of Arras, the Third Battle of Ypres, the German Spring Offensive, and the Hundred Days Offensive. He was nicknamed "Butcher Haig" for the two million British casualties endured under his command. 

Condemnation of Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig for the exorbitant loss of men under his command along the Western Front during the First World War is understandable but unwarranted. This war, the first major global conflict of the Twentieth Century, was characterized by evolving, devastating weaponry (artillery, machine guns, gas) of which the deployment of and use amid vast fronts was new not only to all commanders in the field but to those answerable to at home; British Prime Minister Lloyd George, the War Office, and both British public and press in this instance.

Haig’s relationship with Lloyd George, George a staunch ‘easterner’ who believed that victory was impossible in the west but obtainable “in the Eastern theatre of operations,” proved to be difficult in his quest for victory on the western front. As a predominantly defensive war, decisions were to be reached through costly offensive strategies which had to result in excessive loss of infantry. Haig was not the only field commander to suffer this legacy; Germany lost approximately 500,000 men during the second Battle of the Somme in 1916.

Haig’s dilemma of ‘old school’ leadership during the First World War owes not only to the changing nature of warfare in 1914, but his approach to war fighting which was forged during the (Second) Boer War. It was not that cavalry had little place on the Western Front; it was Haig’s tactic of infantry leading the way for cavalry that was outdated. Gerard J. DeGroot in Haig: A Re-Appraisal 80 Years On writes that "Aside from the difference in rank, the Haig who returned from war in 1902 was essentially the same Haig who went to war in 1914. While he and his co-religionists argued the merits of antique weapons and tactics, their minds were diverted from studying the implications of technological developments upon military science. This was unfortunate, for the Army, if not for Haig. He had many of the qualities of greatness. His unemotional, conservative nature was suited to crisis. His courage and devotion to his men and to his profession cannot be questioned. He was capable of clear thinking and decisive action. Nor was he unintelligent—as those who seek an easy explanation for the carnage of the Great War have often claimed. But a good commander was weakened by an irrational adherence to outdated doctrine." (Bond and Cave, 2009, Kindle Edition)

Left: Dead German soldiers in a captured German trench near Ginchy, August 1916. Photograph in the public domain.

Additionally, in Haig’s defense, Great Britain had “limited resources” in 1915, which on the surface appear to support his defense early in the war. Chief among these limited resources was the shortfall of artillery shells.

As noted by historians of the Great War, Haig should not be condemned for failures without mentioning his subsequent successes. There is a ‘learning curve’, or an adaptation that takes place in every war. Again, to hold Haig to a higher standard seems unjust, but understandable given the losses. Haig’s over-aggressive tactic of “decisive breakthrough” from 1915-1917 as opposed to conservative but wiser “short advances backed by massive firepower” led many British soldiers to their deaths.

In J.P. Harris’s final summary in Douglas Haig and the First World War, he reconciles Haig’s leadership in context of the entire war, of which this essay’s stance is in agreement with. Harris concludes that Haig was not “one of history’s great generals” and at times during the Great War “not good.” Harris adds: "The Western Front 1914-1918 was a time and place that tended to make nearly all generals look inadequate. Haig was not, of course, responsible for the war, and given that the British government had decided to intervene, it was practically inevitable that hundreds of thousands of British Empire troops would die in France and Flanders before final victory was attained."

It is only proper that a new generation of historians sees fit to recognize the Great War and its tragedy for what it was, and recognize that the failings of any one leader—in this case Haig—must be evaluated in its global context and entirety.

Multimedia: Video, Web, and Photo
YouTube video: The Battle of the Somme - Full Documentary  |  Website: History Channel: Battle of the Somme  |  Website: Photos: The Battle of the Somme in pictures, 1916

Books and Further Reading
Niall Ferguson, currently a Senior Fellow at Stanford and Harvard, is one of today's top historians and authors. The Pity of War: Explaining World War I first published in 1998, is an excellent read that goes far beyond battle chronology.

J.P. Harris, Senior Lecturer in War Studies at the Royal Military Scadeny, Sandhurst, authored Douglas Haig and the First World War. His work was published in 2008.

The Somme: The Darkest Hour on The Western Front by Peter Hart, published in 2008 gives an excellent read on this devastating battle.

Lastly, take a look at The Great War by Ian F.W. Beckett. First published in 2001, this book is used as a text at Oxford University.