The Battle of Tarawa, fought on 20-23 November 1943, was another turning point in the Allied campaign against Japan during World War II. Tarawa, an atoll in the Gilbert Islands, was the most fortified island that the Americans attempted to invade during the Pacific Campaign. The Japanese garrison at Betio, the main island of Tarawa, was heavily fortified with concrete bunkers, seawalls, trenches, and an airstrip, supported by a variety of artillery including heavy and light machine guns and light tanks. Betio Island was tiny however at less than one square mile. Japanese Admiral Keiji Shibasaki was confident that the Americans couldn't take the island even with "a million men fighting for a hundred years could not take it." (Symonds 2018, 491)

The United States Fifth Fleet that arrived at Tarawa included battleships, aircraft carriers, cruisers, destroyers, and a huge supply fleet, all supporting 18,000 Marines. U.S. Naval forces were led by Admiral Raymond A. Spruance aboard the cruiser USS Indianapolis (CA-35). The attack was a coordinated effort of combined arms, dubbed "Atoll War," which relied on heavy pre-invasion bombardment by battleships and carrier planes, followed by an amphibious landing using new amphibious tractor vehicles dubbed amphtracs. The assault was highly coordinated and relied on the precise timing of several key elements to succeed. (Hoyt 2012, 264)

However, the American attack was plagued by numerous problems right from the beginning. Heavy sea turbulence slowed transfer operations of the U.S. Marines to the landing crafts. A pre-invasion air raid was delayed, upsetting the timetable for other parts of the assault. Holding for the air raids, support ships ready to launch massive pre-invasion bombardments lingered in position longer than expected, exposing them to increasingly accurate fire from the island's defenders. Furthermore, a lower-than-anticipated tide level around the island that morning caused most of the larger, heavier landing crafts to jam into coral reefs exposed by the shallow tide. Marines were forced to abandon their landing crafts and wade through chest-deep water amidst enemy fire. Precious gear, especially radios, became soaked and useless. Many Marines were hit in the open water, and those who made it to shore arrived exhausted or wounded, ill-equipped and unable to communicate with supporting forces.

DAY ONE
The assault path through the lagoon to the shore became congested with disabled landing crafts and bloodied bodies, hindering the dispatching of reinforcements. Marines on the beach crawled forward, knowing that to stand or even rise slightly made them easy targets. By the end of the first day, 5,000 Marines had landed at Betio while at least another 1,500 had perished in the process. Historian Edwin Hoyt notes that "On beaches Red Two and Red Three, some twenty amphtracs were stuck on the reef, under cross fire and shellfire from the island's big guns. There was a beachhead--yes, some 1,500 Marine were pinned down on a narrow beach before the coconut log barricades." (Hoyt 2012, 274)

At the forefront of the battle was Colonel David Shoup, the senior officer of the landed forces, who assumed command of all landed Marines upon his arrival on shore. Despite being wounded by an exploding shell soon after landing at the pier, Shoup had the pier cleared of Japanese snipers and rallied the first wave of Marines who had become pinned down behind the limited protection of the sea wall. Over the next two days, working without rest and under constant withering enemy fire, he directed attacks against strongly defended Japanese positions, pushing forward despite daunting defensive obstructions and heavy fire. Throughout, Shoup was repeatedly exposed to Japanese small arms and artillery fire, inspiring the forces under his command. For his actions on Betio, he was awarded the Medal of Honor.

The landing of tanks for close support was crucial to the success of the assault. However, early attempts to do so failed when the LCM landing craft carrying them hung up behind the reef. Some of these craft were hit out in the lagoon while they waited to move in to the beach and either sank outright or had to withdraw while taking on water. Nevertheless, the surviving Shermans on the western end of the island proved considerably more effective than the lighter Stuarts. They helped push the line into about 300 yards from shore. One became stuck in a tank trap, and another was knocked out by a magnetic mine. The remaining tank took a shell hit to its barrel and had its 75 mm gun disabled. It was used as a portable machine gun pillbox for the rest of the day. A third platoon was able to land all four of its tanks on Red 3 around noon and operated them successfully for much of the day, but by day's end only one tank was still in action.

Despite the success of the tanks, the battle was fiercely fought and the Japanese defenders were heavily armed and dug in. Marine Major Michael P. Ryan, a company commander, had gathered together remnants of his company with diverse disconnected Marines and sailors from other landing waves, as well as two Sherman tanks, and had diverted them onto a more lightly defended section of Green Beach. This impromptu unit was later referred to as "Ryan's Orphans." Ryan, who had been thought to be dead, arranged for naval gunfire and mounted an attack that cleared the island's western end.

The Japanese defenders had laid shallow communication lines on the island that were destroyed in the naval bombardment, effectively preventing commander Keiji Shibazaki's direct control of his troops. In mid-afternoon, he and his staff abandoned the command post at the northeast end of the airfield to allow it to be used to shelter and care for the wounded, and he prepared to move to the south side of the island. He had ordered two of his Type 95 light tanks to act as a protective cover for the move, but a 5-inch naval artillery shell exploded in the midst of his headquarters personnel as they were assembled outside the central concrete command post, resulting in the death of the commander and most of his staff. This loss further complicated Japanese command problems.

As night fell on the first day, the Japanese defenders kept up sporadic harassing fire but did not launch an attack on the Marines clinging to their beachhead and the territory won in the day's hard fighting. With Shibazaki killed and their communication lines torn up, each Japanese unit had been acting in isolation since the start of the naval bombardment. The Marines brought a battery of 75 mm Pack Howitzers ashore, unpacked them and set them up for action for the next day's fight, but most of the second wave was unable to land. They spent the night floating in the lagoon without food or water, trying to sleep in their Higgins boats.

DAY TWO
The second day of fighting was marked by unexpectedly low tides, which again forced the assault troops to wade through chest-deep water amidst enemy fire. In addition to being fired upon from shore, Marines were also assaulted from their sides and rear by enemy snipers who had entered the lagoon under the cover of night to position themselves on crafts that had been wrecked and abandoned the day before. It was only by noon of the second day that the tide finally began to rise, and U.S. destroyers were able to maneuver closer to shore to lend accurate supporting fire. Reserve combat teams and support craft transporting tanks and weapons raced to shore, and the ground assault finally took orderly form. The Marines moved inland, blasting surviving enemy emplacements with grenades, demolition packs, and flamethrowers. The Marines were given the task of attacking Red Beach 2 and 3, while also securing Green Beach and expanding the bulge near the airfield until it reached the southern shore. Despite heavy resistance and difficulties encountered during the day, American forces were able to take control of much of Tarawa and establish a foothold for the rest of the campaign.

The effort to take Green Beach was the first major objective of the day, but it was met with heavy resistance from the Japanese defenders. Naval gunfire was called in to reduce the pill boxes and gun emplacements that were barring the way, while artillery spotters on the ground were able to direct naval gunfire directly upon the machine gun posts and remaining strong points. With the major obstacles reduced, the Marines were able to take the positions in about an hour of combat with relatively few losses.

Operations along Red 2 and Red 3 proved to be much more difficult, as the defenders had set up several new machine gun posts overnight between the closest approach of the forces from the two beaches. Fire from these machine gun nests cut off the Marines from each other for some time, making progress difficult. By noon, however, the Marines had brought up their own heavy machine guns, and the Japanese machine gun posts were put out of action. By the early afternoon, they had crossed the airstrip and had occupied abandoned defensive works on the south side.

Around 12:30PM, a message arrived that some of the defenders were making their way across the sandbars from the extreme eastern end of the islet to Bairiki, the next islet over. Portions of the 6th Marine Regiment were ordered to land on Bairiki to seal off the retreat path. They formed up, including tanks and pack artillery, and were able to start their landings at 16:55. Although they received machine gun fire, aircraft were sent in to try to locate the guns and suppress them. The American force landed with no further fire, and it was later found that only a single pillbox with 12 machine guns had been set up by the forces that had been assumed to be escaping. They had a small tank of gasoline in their pillbox, and when it was hit with fire from the aircraft the entire force was burned.

Later in the day, other units of the 6th Marine Regiment were landed unopposed on Green Beach, further expanding the American presence on the island. By the end of the day, the entire western end of the island was under American control, as well as a fairly continuous line between Red 2 and Red 3 around the airfield aprons. Though there was still a gap of over 500 yards between the forces at Red 1/Green and Red 2, and the lines on the northern side inland from Red 2/Red 3 were not continuous, the Marines had succeeded in establishing a toehold on Tarawa and achieving their initial objectives.

DAY THREE
The day began with an eastward thrust from the wharf, with additional heavy equipment and tanks being brought ashore onto Green Beach at 08:00. While some progress was made towards Red 2, the forces originally landed on Red 1 took significant casualties. Meanwhile, the 6th Marines landed on Green Beach to the south of Red 1 and formed up, while the remaining battalion of the 6th Marines landed as well. The Marines began their assault on the western end of the island at 08:30 with a coordinated attack by the 2nd and 8th Marines. As they advanced, they were met with fierce resistance from entrenched Japanese soldiers armed with machine guns and artillery. Despite the heavy fire, the Marines pushed forward and by midday had secured a foothold on the western end of the island. The battle continued throughout the afternoon as the Marines faced Japanese counterattacks and continued to clear buildings and bunkers of enemy forces. At one point, a Japanese soldier entered a Marine position armed only with a grenade and was able to kill three Marines before being taken down.

By the afternoon, the 1st Battalion, 6th Marines (1/6) had organized and equipped themselves to take the offensive. At 12:30, they initiated an assault on the Japanese forces along the southern coast of the island, pushing them back towards the eastern end of the airfield. By late afternoon, they had formed a continuous line with the forces that landed on Red 3 two days earlier. As a result, the remaining Japanese forces were either pushed back into the tiny amount of land to the east of the airstrip or operating in several isolated pockets near Red 1/Red 2 and near the western edge of the airstrip.

However, the nightfall brought a new threat to the U.S. lines. Japanese forces formed up for a counterattack, which started at about 19:30. Small units were sent in to infiltrate the U.S. lines in preparation for a full-scale assault. Despite the Japanese forces' best efforts, they were unable to successfully mount the assault. The U.S. forces were able to repel the attack with concentrated artillery fire. As night fell, the remaining Japanese forces made a desperate last stand in a network of reinforced concrete pillboxes. The Marines spent the night digging in and preparing for a final assault in the morning. At dawn, the Marines launched their final attack on the remaining Japanese forces. The fighting was intense, with Marines engaging in hand-to-hand combat with Japanese soldiers who refused to surrender. By 10:00 in the morning, the last pockets of resistance had been eliminated and the island of Betio was declared secure.

AFTERMATH
In the aftermath of the battle, some commanders, including General Holland Smith, criticized the decision to seize Tarawa. Smith, who was highly critical of the Navy, argued that the decision was a mistake. He blamed the Joint Chiefs for making the wrong call, which led to needless casualties. However, other commanders, including Nimitz, Admiral Raymond A. Spruance, Lieutenant General Julian C. Smith, and Lieutenant Colonel David M. Shoup, disagreed with General Smith. They argued that the loss of life was a tragic but necessary cost of winning the war.

The losses on Tarawa were heavy for the United States Marine Corps, with over 1,000 killed and over 3,000 wounded. (Symonds 2018, 495) These losses had a significant impact back home. The public was shocked when the news of the high casualties came to light. The loss of life at Tarawa was difficult to comprehend, especially since it was just a small island. The public was further incensed by the unguardedly frank comments of some of the Marine Corps command, who compared the losses to Pickett's Charge at Gettysburg.

The families of men killed on the island inundated Admiral Chester Nimitz with angry letters. The public reaction was so strong that Congress demanded an explanation from the Marine Corps Commandant, Alexander Vandegrift. Vandegrift, who was a highly respected and decorated veteran of Guadalcanal, reassured Congress that "Tarawa was an assault from beginning to end." He pointed out that the battle was fought under extremely difficult circumstances, and the losses were an inevitable consequence of war. General Douglas MacArthur referred to Tarawa and the operation as "a tragic and unnecessary massacre of American lives." (Symonds 2018, 496)

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Alexander, USMC (Ret), Col. Joseph H. Utmost Savagery: The Three Days of Tarawa. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1995.

Hoyt, Edwin P., and Rear Admiral Admiral E. M. Eller. How They Won the War in the Pacific: Nimitz and His Admirals. Guilford: Lyons Press, 2012.

Mawdsley, Evan. The War for the Seas: A Maritime History of World War II. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2019.

Spector, Ronald H. Eagle Against the Sun: The American War with Japan. New York: Vintage Books, 1985.

Symonds, Craig L. World War II at Sea: A Global History. New York: Oxford University Press, 2018.

Toll, Ian W. The Conquering Tide: War in the Pacific Islands, 1942-1944 (Vol. 2). New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2015.

Multimedia: Video, Web and Photo
Photo albums: Tarawa - Lieutenant General Julian C. Smith Collection  |  Tarawa - Official USMC photos

Video: The History Channel: The Battle of Tarawa: How the US Won in the Gilbert Islands  |  U.S. National Archives: With The Marines at Tarawa

Additional websites: History Channel: Battle of Tarawa  |  Naval History and Heritage Command: National Museum of the U.S. Navy: Battle of Tarawa Atoll: Betio Island