Since time immemorial, mankind has used animals in one form or another during armed conflict. Ancient historian Livy tells of how the Romans used geese to avert an attack from Gallic barbarians in 386 B.C. Livy relates that as barbarian invaders silently scaled the walls of the Citadel, neither Roman guards nor dogs heard them. Roman Consul Marcus Manlius would have been slain had it not been for the flapping of goose wings.[1]

In 1207, the Mongols reportedly used cats to attack the city of Volohai by tying cotton to the cats’ tails and lighting them on fire. The terrified felines ran back into the city, igniting it on fire. The defenders were so busy fighting the fires that had erupted that the Mongols enjoyed a leisurely time breaching the city's walls.[2] But geese and cats are not the only animals that have been used in warfare.

The horse is arguably the one animal that has consistently been utilized for warfare, perhaps more than any other animal throughout recorded history. Even the Holy Bible mentions the horse and alludes to its penchant for combat. Proverbs 21:31 states, “The horse is prepared against the day of battle.”[3] And, of all the animals God could have selected for His return to this earth, He chose a horse.

RIGHT: Harry Bensons Battery A, of the Second United States Artillery, and Horatio Gates Gibsons Batteries C and G, combined of the Third United States Artillery, near Fair Oaks, Virginia, June 1862, The photographic history of the Civil War - thousands of scenes photographed 1861-65, with text by many special authorities (1911).

Since the New Egyptian Empire, the team or draft horse has proven to be a force multiplier in armed conflict. Whether pulling a chariot into battle against the ancient Canaanites or harnessed to an artillery piece during the Battle of Antietam, the team horse is undoubtedly one of the unsung heroes of military history. Their role during the American Civil War generates areas for further exploration.

Dozens of Civil War artillery and cavalry unit histories reveal that artillery horses were more often targeted by enemy infantry than cavalry horses to impede offensive capabilities. While it is a substantiated fact that Union soldiers targeted Confederate artillery horses, only the experiences of Union artillery will be considered to limit the scope of this article.

The use of horses and their impact on the American Civil War cannot be overstated. Gene C. Armistead, in Horses and Mules in the Civil War (2013), estimates that as many as 3,000,000 equines played some vital role during the Civil War…thirty-six percent more than their human counterparts. He asserts that “there is virtually no account of the Civil War that does not include references to horses or mules.”[4] Of those 3,000,000 equines, not all were used to carry men into combat, scout enemy troop concentrations, or charge dismounted infantry. More than 260,000 horses were used solely in the artillery.[5]

During the Civil War, various types of artillery pieces were used, most of which required a team of horses to transport them to the place of utility. The typical cannon used in most Civil War engagements was the Model 1857 Napoleon (M1857) gun. The official Handbook of Artillery for the Service of the United States mandated that all field artillery batteries, no less than four M1857 cannons, and two howitzers be present and in sound working order.[6] Therefore, anywhere from six to eight guns were allotted (under ideal conditions) to one field battery.[7]

Including the pieces themselves, a two-part carriage (caisson) carried ammunition chests, spare tools and a spare cannon wheel. The caisson was affixed to the front portion of the carriage, or the limber, which was then attached directly to the horse team. In addition to the carriages, a traveling forge with smiths’ and armorers’ tools, accompanying tools for shoeing and effecting routine repairs, and a battery wagon for stores, materiel, and the tools of the carriage-maker, wheelwright, saddler, and harness-maker all formed parts of a single battery.[8] Altogether, a typical 12-pounder cannon battery with all the accouterments weighed in at around 8,313 pounds.[9]

A healthy draft horse could haul roughly 1,600 pounds for 23 miles during an 8-hour day.[10] Since an average battery consisted of 150 men, 6-8 guns, and associated carriages, wagons, etc., approximately 110 artillery horses were required per battery during wartime. Of those, a team of 6 horses pulled one carriage.[11] 

Because of the immense amount of equipment and the sheer weight involved in moving it, the only logical means of transporting it with any measure of rapidity rested upon horses or mules. While various types of horses were used during the war, those employed to carry the cumbersome artillery pieces into battle had to be carefully selected.

The Instruction for Field Artillery (1861) specifies the requirements for artillery horses. Artillery horses were to range from 5-7 years old; stand 15.3 hands high (5 feet, 3 inches); broken to the harness, free of vice, possessing a full chest and shoulders; have broad, deep loins, solid hindquarters, and weigh anywhere from 1000-1200 pounds. Healthy hooves were also a necessity as they could be expected to pull 600 pounds each, excluding that of the cannoneers.[12]

Given the weight of the artillery piece and their inevitable exposure to weapons fire, artillery horses needed to be carefully chosen not only for their physical attributes but also for their ability to withstand the cacophony of combat.[13] Obtaining and keeping such horses fit for active service during the war proved no easy task. Initially, there was the issue of procurement.

There existed a variety of means by which army quartermasters could procure horses for the artillery. Shortly after hostilities broke out, Montgomery C. Meigs was appointed Quartermaster General for the Union Army. Unlike the Confederacy, which had to resort to impressment, private provisioning, and capturing horses from the enemy, Meigs utilized a purchasing arrangement between the Federal Government and individual contractors.[14] While many contractors proved unscrupulous in their dealings with the Federal Government, by 1864, the Union Army had obtained 220,000 horses, most purchased at an inflated rate.[15]

The average cost of an artillery horse during the war was on par with that of a cavalry horse. In his annual fiscal report to the Quartermaster General, Brevet Brigadier General James A. Ekin reported that the price paid for artillery horses was $161-$185 per head.[16] Considering that private citizens were paying $75-$80 for the same type of horse at the war's outset, the value of artillery horses rose appreciably, and the prospects of losing such valuable commodities weighed heavily on the Union Army.[17]

Indeed, during the Peninsula Campaign in 1862, a first lieutenant assigned to the Fourth U.S. Artillery described an artillery engagement his unit experienced against Confederate artillery at the Battle of White Oak Swamp. The two-day artillery skirmish resulted in a handful of wounded Union soldiers and the disabling of several cannons, to which the lieutenant makes passing reference in his report. However, what seems to have impressed the lieutenant more than that his captain had to be taken to the rear for medical care or that he lost some vital cannon implements in the fight was the “want of horses.” Quite simply, he did not have enough horses to extricate his men and cannons from the field following the battle.[18]

During that same campaign, a similar account involved the First Battalion of New York Light Artillery at the Battle of Gaines Mill. Third Brigade Commander, Major Albert Arndt, detailed how Rebel infantry attacked from the woods, killing both men and horses. Consequently, he was forced to abandon two perfectly functioning caissons because the horses could not pull them.[19]

In a letter to Major-General Henry Halleck, dated August 31, 1862, Major-General Pope pleaded with Halleck that he needed horses “terribly,” requesting that 2,000 be sent in lots and under strong escort.[20] The very next day, Halleck replied to Pope that he could rest assured that “horses will be sent to you today.”[21] A year later, General William S. Rosecrans also bemoaned the loss of horses and requested from the Secretary of War that he “send good horses, and that rapidly.”[22]

These correspondences from field commanders regarding how much they valued horses evoked a standard sentiment throughout the war, regardless of whether it was North or South. To be sure, the Confederacy suffered from a lack of horses more so than the Union, but when it came time for battle, artillery horses were every bit as esteemed as cannons.

Once the Union army had procured sufficient numbers of horses, the problem of keeping them healthy, well-fed, and adequately groomed competed with the day-to-day rigors of serving in the army. There was no professional corps of equine doctors during this time. Union General George B. McClellan was one of the first to realize this and recommended that a veterinary school be established for the instruction of officers and veterinarians and that French veterinary textbooks be adapted.[23] While this helped somewhat, horses were still vulnerable to various diseases.

RIGHT: A Union artillery battery with its horses, Library of Congress.

Of the more than 1.5 million horses estimated to have died during the war, most perished from disease, much like their soldier counterparts. According to John D. Billings, historian for the Tenth Massachusetts Battery of Light Artillery, the most common affliction was glanders. A summary of their morning reports revealed that the Tenth Massachusetts reported no less than 54 horses dead from respiratory disorders.[24] Aside from diseases, other factors contributed to equine mortality on the battlefield.

Despite specific instructions for artillery horses mandating a 12-pound daily allowance of oats, barley, and corn and 14 pounds of hay, exhaustion and starvation also threatened artillery horses, and several regimental histories of various Union artillery batteries attest to this fact.[25] Quite frankly, supplying horses with fresh hay, grain, and water was challenging, particularly during sieges. During the winter of 1863, the Union Army of the Cumberland was under siege near Bridgeport, Alabama, and, as a result, approximately 10,000 horses starved to death.[26]

The official history of the Seventh Independent Battery of the Indiana Light Artillery records that during a routine march in inclement weather, their horses dropped dead in their harnesses due to sheer exhaustion.[27] As members of Company A of the Third Rhode Island Heavy Artillery rode into Gainesville, Florida, in the summer of 1864, an exhausted George H. Luther recorded how the shoulders of their horses were “galled and bleeding from the harness equipment, rubbing them down to the raw flesh.”[28]

Following the Battle of Malvern Hill (1862), Captain Walter Bramhall of the Sixth New York Artillery Battery reported to the Commander of the Reserve Artillery that the primary damage he sustained during his movement from Fair Oaks to the James River was not loss of men or cannon, but instead of his artillery horses, of which, he lost eight along the route, all having dropped dead, still in harness…utterly incapable of being moved.[29]

Notwithstanding their best efforts, Union artillery units were not always able to properly care for or feed their horses. Like human soldiers, the severities of military life often took its toll on artillery horses. Similar to human soldiers, the sheer attrition of artillery horses significantly impacted the Union’s ability to wage an effective war against the Confederacy.

The average life expectancy of an artillery horse during the war was only seven and a half months, about 106 days longer than that of a cavalry horse.[30] While accurate Civil War statistics listing casualty ratios for artillery versus cavalry horses remains to be seen, in all likelihood, artillery horses lived slightly longer because they were not ridden into the fray of combat like their cavalry counterparts. Instead, they were kept back with the artillery.

Moreover, a Union cavalryman from the Fifth New York affirmed that because a cavalry horse presented a larger target for enemy musket fire than its rider, the horse was twice as likely to be hit as the rider in the saddle.[31] Incredibly, Confederate General Nathan Bedford Forrest had 29 horses shot from under him![32]

However, being positioned where the artillery batteries were located did not guarantee an artillery horse’s safety from enemy fire. Numerous battlefield reports reveal that Confederate sharpshooters and infantry aimed their sights specifically at Union artillery horses for obvious reasons. Even a novice should understand that if one can disable a force multiplier during combat, one improves one’s chances for survival.

While Civil War snipers, or sharpshooters as they were commonly called, were not as widely used as today’s snipers nor sent to specialized sniper schools, there were dedicated units created for the sole purpose of having skilled marksmen kill targets of importance. Perhaps one of the more noteworthy of these types of units was the First U.S. Sharpshooters, also known as Berdan’s Sharpshooters. Founded by Hiram Berdan, his sharpshooters were permitted to choose their own rifle or accept $60 from the Government to purchase one. Like the British 95th Rifles of Napoleon’s time, Berdan’s sharpshooters wore a dark green coat and cap with black plume and light blue trousers.[33]

The antithesis to Berdan’s Sharpshooters were the Whitworth and Blackford Sharpshooters. These Confederate soldiers were specially selected for their marksmanship skills and were armed with the highly accurate British-made Whitworth rifle. Confederate sharpshooters proved so successful that by the spring of 1864, Confederate General Robert E. Lee directed that all infantry brigades form dedicated sharpshooter battalions. As it turned out, Union sharpshooters were not numerous enough to effectively counter Rebel sharpshooter battalions.[34] Additionally, the fact that Confederate sharpshooters regularly stymied Union artillery by deliberately targeting artillery horses is well attested in various correspondence.

Brigadier General Henry J. Hunt, Chief of the Artillery for the Army of the Potomac, compiled a lengthy report in September 1863 regarding artillery operations during the Battle of Gettysburg (1863). His report mentioned that his men were forced to construct special earthworks before their batteries to protect them from Rebel sharpshooters. It appears not so much his cannons being knocked out that troubled Hunt as much as those precious artillery horses. Without them, he would have been unable to have quickly maneuvered his batteries on Cemetery Hill.[35]

During the Battle of Chancellorsville (1863), a member of the first detachment of Battery B, First New Jersey Artillery, authored a detailed history of his battery’s activities during that engagement. He stated that during the battle, enemy sharpshooters shot down so many of his horses and men that they were ordered to lie down behind the crest, out of the sight of the enemy's sharpshooters. His detachment was then ordered off the field, causing fellow foot soldiers to withdraw.[36]

John D. Billings reported that during the Battle of Ream’s Station on August 25, 1864, Rebel sharpshooters considered his artillery horses a “sighty target” as Confederate General William MacRae ordered his sharpshooters to concentrate their fire upon the Federal batteries. Billings stated, “Many men and horses rapidly fell under the deadly fire of these intrepid marksmen.”[37]

Billings’ account rings familiar with numerous similar reports of artillery horses being singled out for destruction. Battle of Atlanta (1864) veteran Private Washington Crumpton of the Thirty-Seventh Mississippi Infantry recalled that as fast as Union caissons were rushed forward into battle, his fellow Mississippians shot the horses down.[38]

Evidently, enemy efforts to harass and impede Union artillery actions were often quite successful. Captain O.H. Morgan of the Indiana Light Artillery reported on the Atlanta Campaign and wrote from Jonesborough, Georgia, in September 1864 that his men found it almost impossible to work the guns because of the nearness to enemy sharpshooters.[39]

RIGHT:  Lieut. Colonel A.V. Colburn, 1862, Library of Congress.

At the Battle of Mansfield in April 1864, Confederate infantry attacked, driving Union infantry and cavalry back to where the Second Massachusetts Battery of Light Artillery was positioned. When Union infantry support failed, orders were given to remove the battery so the guns would not fall into Confederate hands. However, because Rebel troops deliberately killed the artillery horses, three Union guns had to be left on the field. Soon after, Union forces retreated.[40]

On the rare occasion Union cavalry horses were shot by enemy infantry, there is scarce evidence in primary sources that substantiates that Confederate sharpshooters aimed specifically at cavalry horses. To be sure, the man riding the horse was often targeted, just as has been the case as long as there have been wars involving mounted soldiers. However, as a horse presents a much larger target than a man, it is understandable why so many cavalry horses were shot from beneath their riders.

A look at the history of the Third Massachusetts Cavalry mentions the loss of only eight cavalry horses throughout its 669 pages and none shot by sharpshooters.[41] Similarly, the official history of the Fourth Illinois Cavalry Regiment mentions horses that were killed by musket balls, shrapnel, or by the owners themselves, but never at the hands of enemy sharpshooters.[42] A cavalryman assigned to General Custer’s Sixth Michigan reported several horses being shot from under their riders but never affirmed enemy sharpshooters were to blame.[43]

Stephen Z. Starr, one of the definitive historians on Union cavalry, authored The Union Cavalry in the Civil War: The War in the East From Gettysburg to Appomattox 1863-1865 (1981). Rather than providing accounts of enemy sharpshooters killing Union cavalry horses, Starr recounts several narratives involving Union soldiers killing their own mounts.

Shortly after the Battle of Yellow Tavern in 1864, renowned Union cavalry commander General Philip Sheridan failed to ensure enough forage for his horses. To the distress of many of his men, any horse unable to go on was killed on the spot and left to rot. Considering that most of these horses would have made a sure recovery with a few days of rest and adequate feeding, it seems pretty egregious to have dealt with these noble animals so harshly.[44]

During Wilson’s Raid (1865), a Union cavalry operation designed to disrupt and destroy Confederate railroad tracks, Roger Hannaford of the Second Ohio Cavalry noted that on the third day of the raid, their horses were beginning to tire. He goes on to state that they shot, on average, one horse every quarter mile and that “at least one-half” of the horses could have been saved with just a few hours of rest. Sadly, the first shot was not always effective, and the poor creatures suffered miserably.

One account of a Rebel sharpshooter shooting a cavalry horse involved a member of the First Kentucky Cavalry who stopped to talk with a member of the Sixth Indiana Artillery Battery. Interestingly, the trooper stated, “A Rebel sharpshooter concealed in the woods saw my gray horse, took deliberate aim at me, and shot my horse in the side, close by my leg.”[45] [emphasis added]

Two considerations stand out in this account. First, the cavalryman stated the sharpshooter was aiming at himself (not his horse), and second, in all probability, this sharpshooter was planning to fire on the artillery battery, as was their habit. The appearance of a cavalryman probably proved an unexpected nuisance to the sharpshooter’s plans.

There are two plausible reasons why one does not find records of Confederate sharpshooters targeting cavalry horses in primary source material. First, one may assume that these cavalry regiments neglected to mention the loss of every horse assigned because, to most, horses were simply incidental warfare items, like a tent, musket, or canteen. The previous accounts from The Union Cavalry in the Civil War: The War in the East From Gettysburg to Appomattox 1863-1865 support this assumption.

The second reason is the more obvious. Frankly, one is hard-pressed to find primary accounts of Confederate sharpshooters targeting cavalry horses simply because this was a rare practice. Conversely, as has been shown, Union regimental histories confirm that Confederate sharpshooters regularly targeted artillery horses. Moreover, there are even accounts from Confederate sharpshooters themselves that disclose they singled out artillery horses.

Major W.S. Dunlop published Lee’s Sharpshooters in 1899. Dunlop was a member of a corps of Rebel sharpshooters assigned to McGowan’s Brigade of the First South Carolina Regiment. During the Battle of Deep Bottom in 1864, Dunlop records an incident where his men were directed to take a position in a two-story tenement house. When they reached the house, they discovered a Federal artillery battery located 400-500 yards away, after which, “they began at once to tease and fret the artillerists by picking off their men and horses.”[46] [emphasis added]

Dunlop offered another account during the Battle of Ream’s Station (1864). Before a final push against the Federals, his sharpshooters turned their attention to the artillery horses hitched a short distance in the rear, and at almost every shot, “some gay steed would rear and squeal and writhe and die, so that a great many of their best horses were killed or disabled before the final assault was made.”[47] Conspicuously absent from Dunlop’s account is any reference to his men shooting cavalry horses.

The same could be said of another treatise on Confederate sharpshooters entitled Shock Troops of the Confederacy: The Sharpshooter Battalions of the Army of Northern Virginia (2006). Written by Fred Ray, it primarily focuses on the activities of Major Eugene Blackford, an officer in the Fifth Alabama Infantry who led a sharpshooter battalion.

Ray mentions various accounts of Blackford’s sharpshooters and their prowess with the highly accurate Whitworth rifle but does not comment that Blackford’s men targeted cavalry horses. Several accounts reveal that his men regularly shot Union soldiers from their horses, but not the horse itself. 

For example, at the Battle of Laurel Hill on May 8, 1864, Union troops charged two batteries of Rebel guns. As the Federals went uphill toward the batteries, one of the sharpshooters yelled, “Pick that officer off his horse!”[48] The sharpshooter fired, and Union Colonel Andrew Denison of the Maryland Brigade went down.

The following day, shortly before a sharpshooter’s bullet famously killed Major General John Sedgwick during the Battle of Spotsylvania Courthouse, one of Sedgwick’s brigade commanders was shot from his horse and grievously wounded. Again, the cavalry horse was not the target, only the man atop the horse.[49] As accurate as Rebel sharpshooters were with scoped Whitworth rifles, the chances of them being unable to distinguish between an artillery and a cavalry horse is doubtful.

To further underscore this point, a Confederate officer alleged he witnessed a Union general shot off his horse from a nearly unbelievable distance of 2,250 yards by a sharpshooter with a Whitworth.[50] Confederate Major General Patrick Cleburne, a division commander in the Army of Tennessee, reported that while retreating from the continual fire of Union troops, his only recourse was five sharpshooters who were able to hit mounted Yankees at ranges from 700-1,000 yards with their Whitworth rifles.[51]

Without doubt, a sizeable amount of evidence points to the fact that Confederate sharpshooters, armed with what was arguably the most accurate rifle of the war, could have easily picked off cavalry horses with impunity had they chosen to do so, and yet research indicates that this was not the case. On the other hand, an investigation into post-war regimental histories written by Union artillery and Confederate veterans supports the assertion that Confederate sharpshooters made it a matter of tactical practice to deliberately aim at and shoot defenseless artillery horses to interdict their ability to both transport and move cannons into positions where they could be effectively employed against the enemy.

While more than 260,000 artillery horses served during the Civil War, there exists a shortage of available data that collates how many were killed by enemy gunfire throughout the war. Unlike books that tally battlefield casualties for human soldiers, such as Grigori Krivosheev’s Soviet Casualties and Combat Losses in the Twentieth Century (1997), no such comparable work for artillery horses has yet to be completed. This represents a significant gap in Civil War historiography and minimizes the incredible sacrifice of these fantastic four-legged “warriors.”

The American Civil War holds the distinction of being the deadliest conflict in American history, not only for humans but also for the multitude of artillery horses who labored beneath massive amounts of equipment, stood for days in the mud and rain, went days without food or water, suffered a myriad of equine maladies and experienced horrendous gunshot wounds. When one takes the time to contemplate their remarkable spirit, the stellar contribution of the artillery horse validates their place in American history.

Notes

[1] Livy, The Early History of Rome. Books I-V of The History of Rome from Its Foundation. trans. by Aubrey de Selencourt (Baltimore: Penguin, 1971), 393.

[2] Michael Prawdin, The Mongol Empire: Its Rise and Legacy (New York: Free Press, 1967), 108. 

[3] Prov. 21:31 (KJV).

[4] Gene C. Armistead, Horses and Mules in the Civil War: A Complete History with a Roster of More Than 700 War Horses (North Carolina: McFarland & Company, Inc., 2013), Kindle Edition, Loc. 75.

[5] Earl J. Hess, Civil War Field Artillery: Promise and Performance on the Battlefield (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2023), 314.

[6] Ibid.

[7] John Gibbon, The Artillerist’s Manual, (New York: D. Van Nostrand, 1860), 388.

[8] Instruction for Field Artillery. Prepared By a Board of Artillery Officers (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott & Co., 1861), 3.

[9] Ibid., 22.

[10] Warren Ripley, Artillery and Ammunition of the Civil War (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold Company, 1970), 194.

[11] Instruction for Field Artillery, 3-4.

[12] Ibid., 46-50.

[13] Hess, Civil War Field Artillery, 314.

[14] Armistead, Horses and Mules in the Civil War, Loc. 279.

[15] Russell F. Weigley, Quartermaster General of the Union Army: A Biography of M.C. Meigs (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), 269.

[16] U.S. War Department, The War of the Rebellion: Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, 128 vols. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1881-1901, Series III, vol. 5, p. 256. (hereinafter noted as OR; except as otherwise noted, all references are to Series I).

[17] Weigley, Quartermaster General of the Union Army, 187.

[18] OR, V, 59-60.

[19] OR, XI, Part 2, 265.

[20] OR, XII, Part 2, 81.

[21] Ibid., 82.

[22] Letter from Gen. Rosecrans to Sec. of War Stanton. William S. Rosecrans Papers (Collection 663). UCLA Library Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles.

[23] Major-General George B. McClellan, Regulations and Instructions for the Field Service of the U.S. Cavalry In Time of War (Philadelphia: Lippincott& Co., 1862), 14.

[24] John D. Billings, The History of the Tenth Massachusetts Battery of Light Artillery in the War of the Rebellion (Boston: The Arakelyan Press, 1909), 48-408.

[25] Instruction for Field Artillery, 47.

[26] Larry J. Daniel, Cannoneers in Gray: The Field Artillery of the Army of Tennessee, 1861–1865 (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1984), 107.

[27] O.H. Morgan and E.R. Murphy, History of the 7th Independent Battery, Indiana Light Artillery (Press of the Democrat, 1898), 6.

[28] Frederic Denison, Shot and Shell: The Third Rhode Island Heavy Artillery Regiment In the Rebellion, 1861-1865 (Providence: J.A. & R.A. Reid, 1879), 270.

[29] OR, XI, Part 2, 105-106.

[30] Daniel, Cannoneers in Gray, 126.

[31] Willard W. Glazier, Three Years in the Federal Cavalry (New York: R.H. Ferguson, 1870), 133.

[32] Richard Tillinghast, “Nathan Bedford Forrest: Born To Fight,” Sewanee Review 123, No. 4 (2015): 606.

[33] Captain C.A. Stevens, Berdan’s United States Sharpshooters in the Army of the Potomac 1861-1865 (Minnesota: The Price-McGill Company, 1892), 3-5.

[34] Fred L. Ray, “Civil War Sharpshooters,” Infantry 95, no. 3 (2006): 19-20.

[35] OR, XXVII, Part 2, 228-233.

[36] Michael Hanifen, History of Battery B First New Jersey Artillery (Ottawa, Ill: Republican-Times Printers, 1905), 52-54.

[37] Billings, The History of the Tenth Massachusetts Battery of Light Artillery in the War of the Rebellion, 337.

[38] Washington Bryan Crumpton, A Book of Memories, 1842-1920 (Montgomery, AL: Baptist Mission Board, 1921), 87.

[39] Morgan and Murphy, History of the 7th Independent Battery, Indiana Light Artillery, 38.

[40] Caroline E. Whitcomb, History of the Second Massachusetts Battery (Nims' Battery) of Light Artillery, 1861-1865 (Concord: The Rumford Press, 1912), 67.

[41] James K. Ewer, The Third Massachusetts Cavalry in the War for the Union (Maplewood, MA.: WM. G.J. Perry Press, 1903).

[42] P.O. Avery, History of the Fourth Illinois Cavalry Regiment (Humboldt, NE: The Enterprise: A Print Shop, 1903), 55-167.

[43] J.H. Kidd, Personal Recollections of a Cavalryman With Custer’s Michigan Cavalry Brigade in the Civil War (Ionia, MI.: Sentinel Printing Company, 1908), 127-430.

[44] Stephen Z. Starr, The Union Cavalry in the Civil War, vol 2, The War in the East From Gettysburg to Appomattox 1863-1865 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State Press, 1981), 114.

[45] Sergeant E. Tarrant, The wild riders of the first Kentucky cavalry: a history of the regiment, in the great war of the rebellion, 1861-1865: pathetic scenes, amusing incidents, and thrilling episodes, a regimental roster, prison life, adventures, and escapes (Louisville, KY: Press of R.H. Carothers, 1894), 364. 

[46] Major W.S. Dunlop, Lee’s Sharpshooters (Little Rock, AR.: Tunnan & Pittard Printers, 1899), Kindle, Loc. 1231.

[47] Ibid., 1646.

[48] Gilbert E. Govan and James W. Livingood, eds., The Haskell Memoirs (New York: G. P. Putnam, 1960), 67-68.

[49] Fred L. Ray, Shock Troops of the Confederacy: The Sharpshooter Battalions of the Army of Northern Virginia (Asheville, NC: CFS Press, 2006), Kindle, Loc. 2364.

[50] Ray, Shock Troops of the Confederacy, 5258.

[51] John Anderson Morrow, The Confederate Whitworth Sharpshooters, 2nd ed. (n.p.: Privately published, 2002), 30, 88, 55.