The Breakaway Republics: Texas, Yucatan, and US-Mexican War, 1835-1848

Editor's Note: The following article is from excerpts of Benjamin J. Swenson's new book to be released this fall. Addiitonal publication details below.

A major and overlooked issue surrounding the Mexican-American War (1846–8) is that the region was already in a state of crisis in the 1840s. Although many are aware of the role the breakaway Republic of Texas (1836–46) and its annexation to the U.S. played in provoking the conflict, the Republic of Yucatan opposite the Gulf was an important player in the larger geostrategic and international conflict affecting numerous countries – notably Great Britain and the smaller Central American states. Thus the beginning of Yucatan’s Caste War in 1847, at the height of the US-Mexican conflict, was no coincidence. The Yucatecan independence movement, which emulated the one that began in Texas in 1835, influenced the way Americans perceived Mexico leading up to US-Mexican hostilities in 1846. While some historians have blamed President James K. Polk for launching the war, a more thorough examination of the timeline of events demonstrates that American perception of Mexico was informed by the Mexican junta’s war against Yucatan in 1842, when centralists directed by General Antonio López de Santa Anna launched a failed invasion of the peninsular republic. That effort also contributed to weakening Mexico on the eve of the larger struggle with the United States, and helped spark the Caste War in 1847.[1]  

Right: Volunteers leaving for the Mexican War, Exeter, New Hampshire, daguerreotype by E. Punderson, ca.1846. C. Punderson; Exeter, N. H. [Exeter, New Hampshire, volunteers leaving for the Mexican War]; ca. 1846; Daguerreotype, quarter-plate; Amon Carter Museum of American Art, Fort Worth, Texas; P1979.33. Source: Wikimedia.

Mexico Invades Yucatan

On May 31, 1842, a tentative reintegration agreement brokered between Yucatan and Andrés Quintana Roo, a well-respected hero of the Mexican Revolution (1810–21), was rejected by the centralist junta in Mexico City, and plans were made for an invasion. American explorer and writer, John L. Stephens, passing through Merida on the last leg of a journey through the region, was in the Yucatecan Chamber of Deputies when Santa Anna’s “ultimatum” was read. “A smile of derision flitted over the faces of senators,” Stephens wrote, “and it was manifest that the terms would not be accepted”. On July 5, the Yucatecans realized the central government’s hostile intentions when one of their warships, anchored in the waters off Campeche, was stormed in the early hours and its crew taken prisoner. Soon after, Yucatecan authorities put the government on a war footing, and issued a call to arms. On August 22, four Mexican warships and three transport ships carrying 1,500 men appeared in front of the island city of Ciudad del Carmen south of Campeche. The war against the breakaway Republic of Yucatan had begun.[2]

The immediate campaign objective for the invaders was Campeche, and centralists established a beachhead some fifty kilometers south of the city at Champoton and waited for reinforcements to arrive. By the end of October, four thousand troops arrived from Veracruz under the expedition’s main commander General Vicente Miñón. The garrison at Campeche was undermanned but the formidable walls of the coastal city offered a defensive advantage. Despite setbacks and bombardment from the entrenched positions of the centralists, Yucatecans were determined to defend the city. Colonel Sebastian López de Llergo and roughly a thousand men attempted to expel Miñón’s cannons from the heights but failed after much bloodshed. This led him to harass centralists from flanking positions to mitigate the assault, which contributed to prolonging the siege. Food and arms were reaching the besieged, and the New Orleans Picayune reported the city was “well supplied with provisions and munitions of war, foreign vessels evading the blockade with the greatest ease.” By early January the two sides were at a stalemate, but the factor favoring the defenders was the outbreak of disease among the invaders. Furthermore, the longer the siege extended, the more difficult it became for the Mexicans to get supplies – particularly since the surrounding population either fled or opposed them. The war and subsequent stalemate in Yucatan also resulted in Texans being relieved of the fear of a pending invasion from Mexico.[3]

NEW RELEASE: "Wars of the Mexican Gulf: The Breakaway Republics of Texas and Yucatan, US Mexican War, and Limits of Empire 1835-1850" by Benjamin J. Swenson (Author) Casemate Imprint: Pen & Sword Military, November 2024. Hardcover, 272 pages.

From the publisher, "One nation in turmoil, another seeking aggrandizement, smaller states jostling for security, mercenary expeditions, and political and racial armed struggles breaking out. In 1835 the northern Mexican state of Texas declared its independence and won it after defeating General Santa Anna’s forces at the Battle of San Jacinto. A few years later, as a larger and looming war with the United States approached, the gulf state of Yucatan did the same by claiming itself a separate republic. For Mexican authorities, the existence of breakaway republics on its periphery represented an existential crisis and an opportunity for U.S. and European interests. For many on both sides, the US-Mexican war officially beginning in 1846 after the Republic of Texas was annexed to the United States was merely a continuation of a conflict that began ten years earlier. Adding to the turmoil, the uprising in Yucatan by indigenous Maya against a criollo minority in 1847 and the contemplated military intervention and annexation of that republic by American leadership towards the end of the war sheds light on a conflict with ethnic, national, and international dimensions. In his second transnational history of the Mexican-American War, historian Benjamin J. Swenson examines the breakaway republics of Texas and Yucatan and demonstrates how the war was not only a manifestation of American expansionism and internal Mexican disunion, but a geostrategic contest involving European states seeking to curtail a nascent imperial power’s dominance in North America."    ☞ Preorder here:  Casemate Publishers  |  Preorder on Amazon UK

After more than five months with little progress Santa Anna announced that “the war against Yucatan is a national affair, and that it is to be prosecuted with the same spirit as that against the ‘perfidous Texians.’” As a result, Mexico City officials decided to take a different approach by attempting to initiate a coup in the capital of Merida. It was believed if a change of leadership could be effected, opposition would collapse. Yucatecan forces under Colonel Llergo observed three Mexican vessels moving off the coast and with 1,600 soldiers followed the ships as they sailed north to ostensibly land off the coast near Merida. When Llergo’s forces arrived in that city arrangements were made with acting governor Barbachano to enlist guerrilla units in the vicinity to confront the enemy’s approach to the capital. Yucatan, with its difficult roads, dense vegetation, and tribal territory controlled by local batabs (Mayan chieftains) with authority over thousands of men made insurgent warfare quite effective – particularly since the defenders knew the terrain. 2,500 centralist soldiers disembarked and engaged Llergo’s forces in several heated skirmishes over a period of days before Barbachano requested Llergo to withdraw to Merida to fortify the city. On the morning of April 16, a representative of the centralist forces approached an outpost on the edge of the capital with a white parley flag. Soon after, General Pedro Ampudia, who was appointed by Santa Anna, arrived in Campeche – effectively nullifying the northern commanders’ desires to end the conflict. Partisan attacks continued, and it was clear to everyone that Ampudia’s presence in the war could not prevent the inevitable centralist capitulation.[4]    

A week of renewed attacks in the north, along with reinforcements of guerrillas led by Colonel Gamboa, took their toll. Soon after, Mexicans found themselves encircled on three sides near Tixkokob, and surrender became unavoidable. Terms were finalized April 24. The northern forces were required to submit a request to Ampudia for ships and evacuate their forces to the gulf port of Tampico. If centralist forces were still in Yucatecan territory after ten days, partisans were allowed to resume attacks and new terms were required. When Ampudia’s ships failed to appear off the coast, their departure date was extended. To guarantee their departure, hostages were left with Yucatecan authorities. By mid-May all of the forces sent to force a coup in Merida had withdrawn from the peninsula. Meanwhile, in Campeche the siege continued but Ampudia was forced to reluctantly seek terms and saved face for ceasing hostilities by renewing the original negotiations for Yucatecan reincorporation into Mexico. Yucatecan authorities agreed to send commissioners to Mexico City if centralist forces were completely withdrawn from the peninsula.[5] 

Right: The brig Wharton depicted on Texan currency. The Texan brig Wharton, a two-masted vessel, was part of the Second Texas Navy from 1839 to 1846, alongside its sister ship, the Archer. In May 1843, the Wharton, in concert with the Texas flagship Austin, was pivotal in overcoming a much larger fleet of Mexican Navy steamships at the Naval Battle of Campeche. In 1846, the brig was transferred to the United States Navy and was later sold for $55. Source: Wikimedia.

Texas Navy and Battle of Campeche 

On April 18, while anchored at the old French fort of La Balize, near the mouth of the Mississippi River, Commodore Edwin Ward Moore of the Texas Navy received information that Mexican forces outside of Merida had capitulated and the Mexican steam-powered frigate Montezuma was anchored somewhere off the coast at Telchac. Soon after, the flagship Austin, along with the 16-gun brig Wharton, sailed directly to Yucatan facing headwinds and arrived one day after the Montezuma left. After learning from the Yucatecans at Sisal that the Montezuma had passed the port, Moore continued along the coast until he arrived near Lerma on April 29. The following morning, as the first rays of sun appeared, the Texans rose to find Mexican vessels heading in their direction. At 7:35 the first shots were fired. Back and forth cannon fire killed two men aboard the Wharton and more than a dozen Mexican sailors aboard their heavily manned vessels – including the iron-hulled frigate Guadalupe.[6] 

Over the course of several days the two sides kept their distance with Moore stationed in and around Campeche and the Mexican ships at Lerma. At Campeche it was learned that the confrontation on April 30 had prevented the centralists and federalists from completing an armistice because the Mexicans demanded the Texans withdraw as a precondition for talks. Apparently, this did not bother Yucatecan authorities because Moore left port after being offered two long 18-pound cannons for the Austin and a long 12-pound cannon for the Wharton. These additions were welcomed, since both Mexican steamers, the Guadalupe and Montezuma, contained two massive 68-pound Paixhans guns each. On May 16 the two squadrons faced off again at mid-morning for a few hours resulting in damages to both the Montezuma and Guadalupe and the Mexicans mounting serious casualties. The Austin also received considerable cannon fire and took on water, but deaths were limited to three men and nearly three dozen wounded. Although Moore apparently defied the odds, the Texan victory was attributed to an astute use of long-range firing with perhaps an amount of luck in avoiding a direct hit from a Paixhan. Seven dead sailors on the Texan side and some thirty on the Mexican side meant Moore could return to Galveston a victor.[7] U.S. newspapers hailed the “gallant little Texan navy” and proclaimed the “lustre of the lone Star has been rendered more brilliant as a result.” The New York Herald cited a report from New Orleans that the “walls and churches in Campeachy were crowded… and thousands of brunettes waved their snow white handkerchiefs a los bravos Texanos.”

Footnotes

[1] Benjamin J. Swenson, Wars of the Mexican Gulf: The Breakaway Republics of Texas and Yucatan, US Mexican War, and Limits of Empire (Barnsley, UK: Pen and Sword, 2024).

[2] John L. Stephens, Incidents of Travel in Yucatan, vol. 1 (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1843), 461; Eligio Ancono, Historia de Yucatán, desde la época más remota hasta nuestros días, vol.3 (Mérida: M. Heredia Argüelles, 1879), 411-413. 

[3] Ancono, Historia de Yucatán, vol.3 411-413, 419-26; “From Campeachy” Picayune, Feb. 8, 1843. 

[4] “From Havana” New-York Daily Tribune, April 26, 1843. (via New Orleans Bulletin, report from Mexico dated March 18); Ancono, Historia de Yucatán, vol. 3, 431-6. See: Richmond Enquirer, June 20, 1843 (via New Orleans Herald, June 20), Reports of Mexican complaints “that the Yucatecos have armed the Indians, and availed themselves of the services of savages.”

[5] Ancono, Historia de Yucatán, vol. 3, 437-441; “Later from Yucatan,” Picayune, July 6, 1843.

[6] Dienst, The Navy of the Republic of Texas (Temple, TX, 1909), 128-130.

[7] Dienst, The Navy of the Republic of Texas, 130-132. “Late from Campeachy” Charleston Courier, June 2, 1843; “Important from Campeachy” New York Herald, June 6, 1843 (via New Orleans Republican, May 27)