The battle of Megiddo in 1457 BCE is the first battle in world history where modern scholars have an accurate depiction of the strategy, tactics, and logistics used by the ancient Egyptians against their northern neighbors for control of the strategically key area. In what is today northern Israel, the hilltop fortress of Megiddo and its immediate surroundings would be the location of numerous battles throughout history, from biblical times to the First World War. It is also the site prophesied by early Christians as the location of the final battle between God and Satan (Book of Revelation 16:16). In the late Bronze Age, it would be the site of an important engagement between the emerging power of Egypt and the kingdom of Qadesh and their allies for control of the central Levant. Our understanding of this battle comes from detailed inscriptions found at the Temple of Karnak in Egypt associated with the reign of the Pharaoh Thutmose III (r.1479-1426 BCE).

The Hyksos invasion and conquest of ancient Egypt in the seventeenth century BCE introduced state-of-the-art military technologies from Mesopotamia to the people of the Nile for the very first time. The Semitic-speaking Hyksos were originally from the Arabian Peninsula, moving into northern Mesopotamia, Syria, and Palestine in the first centuries of the second millennium BCE. The Hyksos infiltrated Egypt in the seventeenth century BCE, dominating much of Egypt for nearly one hundred years.  During their occupation, the Hyksos introduced new ways of making war to the Egyptians, including the horse-drawn war chariot, a heavier bronze sword, the distinctive sickle-shaped khopesh, and the powerful composite bow. Eventually, the Egyptians made use of these new martial technologies to throw off foreign domination, expelling the Hyksos and founding the New Kingdom around 1570 BCE.     

During the period of the New Kingdom Egypt (c.1570-c.1069 BCE) became the most powerful state in the ancient Near East. Palestine and Syria were occupied, and local princes were permitted to rule, but under Egyptian suzerainty. At times, these client kings rebelled against their Egyptian landlords, precipitating military expeditions to deal with the uprisings. In 1457 BCE, Thutmose III decided to deal directly with the growing problems in Syria-Palestine that threatened the integrity of Egypt’s northeastern frontiers. Historians consider Thutmose III to be one Egypt’s greatest warrior-pharaohs because of his successful military campaigns. He completed seventeen military campaigns and captured 350 cities during his reign, expanding Egyptian rule in Nubia, the Levant and along the Euphrates River, turning Egypt into a regional power. The ruler of the small kingdom of Qadesh hoped to take advantage of the change in leadership in Thebes by moving south from Syria, allying with local princes, and seizing the strategic city of Megiddo in Palestine. The strongly fortified site of Megiddo dominated the main line of communication overland between Egypt and Mesopotamia.

To counter the king of Qadesh’s strategy for Megiddo, Thutmose advanced rapidly north with his army in the hope of surprising and defeating the Syrians in a battlefield engagement. It took Thutmose only nine days to travel from Egypt to Gaza, a pace that rivaled Alexander the Great’s marches and demanded a very lean and sophisticated logistical system. When the pharaoh reached Aruna in the vicinity of Megiddo, he summoned his generals to discuss the final approach to the city.  There were three routes to the fortress: through the narrow and steep Musmus Pass leading directly to Megiddo, and less difficult routes from the north and south. His generals argued against taking the direct route because it would be necessary for the Egyptians to march through the pass in column against a defending force waiting for them arrayed for battle.  According to Thutmose’s military scribe the generals asked:

"What is it like to go on this road which becomes so narrow? It is reported that the foe is there, waiting on the outside, while they are becoming more numerous.  Will not horse have to go after horse, and the army and the people similarly?  Will the vanguard of us be fighting while the rear guard is waiting here [behind] in Aruna, unable to fight?"    

But Thutmose decided to disregard the advice of his war council and take a direct approach to Megiddo.  This decision proved a sound one, for the king of Qadesh, believing the pharaoh would attack from one of the easier routes, split his forces into a northern coalition and southern coalition to guard the other approaches and the citadel itself. As Thutmose neared the end of the narrow Musmus Pass, his generals urged him to halt the advance and wait for the column to catch up: 

"Let our victorious lord listen to us this time and let our lord guard for us the rear of his army and his people.  When the rear of the army comes forth for us into the open, then we shall fight against these foreigners, then we shall not trouble our hearts about the rear of an army."

 This time, the pharaoh heeded his generals’ advice, concentrating his forces in column. The Egyptian army then exited the pass and executed the extremely difficult maneuver of deploying from line of column to line of battle without enemy interference. It took seven hours for the end of the column to reach the mouth of the valley and deploy into position. Once on the plain of Megiddo, Thutmose divided his army into three divisions, sending his infantry divisions to take position in the north and the south, while arraying his war chariots in the center, across from the main elements of the enemy encamped in front of Megiddo.  There are no reliable estimates of the size of the armies involved in the engagement, but the battle of Megiddo stands as the first battle in Western Civilization where historians have a description of the general tactics involved.

The battle began at dawn with Thutmose ordering his infantry on the right to stay in place behind the steep banks of the Kina Brook, while the rest of the army struck in the center and the left. The Egyptian center pressed their attack, pinning the Syrians against their own camp. At the same time, a chariot force penetrated between the Syrian right and center, rolling the Syrian center upon itself and its camp. The chariot missile-shock attack was devastating, and the enemy army lost its integrity and routed all along its lines. But Thutmose was unable to capitalize on his battlefield victory.  Instead of pursuing the fleeing enemy as they scampered back to the safety of the walls of Megiddo, the Egyptian army, including the chariot corps, stopped to plunder the Syrian camp, providing time for the fleeing troops to be rescued, with many pulled up the city’s walls to safety. The chance to crush the enemy coalition on the battlefield was lost, and Thutmose was forced to reduce Megiddo in a seven-month siege. Still, despite the lost opportunity to bring the war to a rapid conclusion through a set-piece battle, the Egyptian victory at Megiddo guaranteed security and control over southern Palestine and extended the Egyptian frontier to the Orontes River in Syria and up against the expansionistic Hittites from the Anatolia peninsula (modern Türkiye) for future pharaohs to contend with.

Suggested Readings:

Primary sources

Pritchard, James B., ed. Ancient Near Eastern Texts relating to the Old Testament with Supplement. Princeton University Press, 2016.

Secondary sources

Carey, Brian Todd, Joshua B. Allfree, and John Cairns. Warfare in the Ancient World. Pen and Sword, 2006.

Elliott, Paul. Warfare in New Kingdom Egypt. Fonthill Media, 2017.

Seevers, Boyd. Warfare in the Old Testament: The Organization, Weapons, and Tactics of Ancient Near Eastern Armies. Kregel Academic, 2013.

Shaw, Ian.  Ancient Egyptian Warfare: Tactics, Weaponry, and Ideology of the Pharaohs.  Casemate, 2019.

Spalinger, Anthony. 2004. War in Ancient Egypt. Blackwell Publishing.

Yadin, Yigael. The Art of Warfare in Biblical Lands in the Light of Archaeological Discovery.  Hassell Street, 2021.