Military operations since the beginning of recorded history have relied on logistics to move men and material on campaign, providing the necessary means to supply and maintain both offensive military forces in the field and defensive postures at home. In fact, Bronze and Iron Age empire building relied on mastery of military logistics to expand empires rapidly through military conquest and consolidate gains through the construction of critical infrastructure like roads, bridges, and fortifications. In the Bronze Age, Egyptian and Mesopotamian empires expanded to create small regional states but were limited by their reliance on bronze as a strategic material. The discovery of iron smelting and smithing by the Hittites (c.1700-c.1200 BCE) in Anatolia in the twelfth century BCE quickly diffused across the Near East and Europe, initiating a new metal age and a new round of empire building. The first of these early Iron Age empires were the Assyrians, masters of the art and science of military logistics.

The Assyrians were originally a Semitic-speaking people from Arabia who settled in Northern Mesopotamia. During the Bronze Age the Assyrians were a client-kingdom to more powerful neighbors (Akkadians, Old Babylonians, and Mitanni). Freed around 1360 BCE when Hittites destroyed the Mitanni (who controlled the Assyrians as a client kingdom), Assyria briefly became powerful in the Late Bronze Age under king Tiglath-pileser (r.1114-1076 BCE). But Assyrian power declined during “The Catastrophe” (c.1200-c.1050 BCE) along with other Bronze Age empires. Assyrian monarchs long understood the precarious strategic position of their state. Centered on the three major cities of Nimrud, Nineveh, and Ashur on the upper Tigris River in what is now northwestern Iraq, Assyria was cursed with a dearth of natural resources and few natural barriers to keep out enemy invasions. Assyria lacked wood for constructing forts, temples, and dams, building stone for walls and castles and iron ore deposits to forge weapons. Assyria also lacked the large steppe grasslands necessary to support large horse herds, essential for chariots and cavalry.

A new phase of Assyrian expansion began in the ninth century BCE in the reign of Shalmaneser III (858-824 BCE). This new Iron Age Assyrian Empire is often referred to as the Neo-Assyrians to differentiate from the earlier Bronze Age empire. The Neo Assyrians were famous for using terror tactics to initially defeat enemies and rule over subject peoples. In fact, the Assyrians routinely punished revolts by reducing and razing cities and selling population into slavery. Over their three hundred years between four and five million people were deported to Assyria from conquered regions (example: Jews in 721 BCE). This created a diverse and rich culture that was racially and linguistically mixed. By Tiglath-pileser III’s reign (r.744-727 BCE), the Assyrians had expanded into Syria and Babylonia, securing their western and eastern frontiers. The Assyrians quickly mastered iron metallurgy and applied this innovative technology to military equipment and tactics. By the eighth century BCE, the Assyrians had used their large, iron equipped armies to conquer much of the Fertile Crescent, and for a brief time in the seventh century, Egypt as well. The general size, logistical capabilities, and strategic and tactical mobility of the Assyrian army was indeed impressive, even by modern standards, with the lessons learned by the Assyrians being passed on to the Persians, one of the premier empire builders in world history.

Sargon II’s (“the Great” r.721-705 BCE) campaign in 714 BCE against the kingdom of Urartu on Assyria’s northern and northeastern frontiers illustrated the military and logistical capabilities of the Assyrian army. The Urartu, the most powerful of Assyria’s eighth century adversaries, enjoyed the advantages of geography, nestled north of the Tigris River valley past the Taurus Mountains in what is now modern Armenia, a land whose rough topography has challenged foreign invaders for millennia. The two states shared hundreds of miles of common border, with the Assyrian capital of Nineveh just thirty miles away from the major mountain pass connecting the two regions.

Assyrian relations with Urartu became increasingly strained as both powers vied for dominance as the region’s new hegemon. Decades earlier in the 740s and 730s, King Tiglath-pileser III (r.744-727 BCE) expanded in northern Syria in the west and Media (modern Iran) in the east, threatening Urartu’s flanks. And though Tiglath-pileser never occupied the capital of Urartu on the shores of Lake Van, he scorched the countryside and dismantled his enemy’s fortifications, bringing the region under Assyrian control. His victory was short lived though, as local princes rebelled. Within twenty-five years, hostilities broke out again when Rusa, prince of the Urartu, began to threaten the Assyrian northern frontier. 

Sargon II inherited the Urartu problem when he came to power in 721 BCE. Twice, in 719 and 717, he sent troops north to the region near Lake Urmia to suppress local conflicts backed by Urartu troops.  In 715, the Urartu became more aggressive, seizing twenty-two fortified cities from Ullusunu, an Assyrian vassal in Armenia. Sargon responded by quickly retaking the cities, then laying waste to Urartu’s southern provinces. But Sargon realized that small punitive expeditions would not solve his strategic problem for long. The Assyrian monarch would return the following year in strength and finish what he had begun in a campaign that showcased the Assyrian military machine at war. It would be the eighth military campaign of his seven-year reign. The campaign is the subject of a letter to the god Assur, written by Sargon II’s scribes and circulated throughout the Assyrian empire. Totaling 430 lines, the account glorifies the martial prowess of Sargon, and gives thanks to the Assyrian gods for his good fortune.

When Sargon set out in 714 BCE for the rugged terrain of Armenia, he understood the logistical burdens faced by his army. The expedition would march east by northeast and travel over the Zagros Mountains to the land of the Manna, a region just south of Lake Urmia. Sargon needed to reestablish contact with his vassal Ullusunu and establish a forward operating base. But crossing the Zagros Mountains was no simple task. This high, snow-capped range separated Assyria from the region of what is today northwestern Iran, and the road Sargon traveled snaked through numerous passes and valleys, ascending to snow covered mountain passes and descending into dense forests. According to Sargon’s own correspondence, this terrain was “too rough for chariots to mount, bad for horses, and too steep to march foot soldiers,” forcing his engineers to clear obstacles and lay stone to make a suitable road. In between these steep mountains ran swift rivers that also proved an obstacle. Sargon noted that he forded one wandering stream no less than twenty-six times.  

Although no records exist for the size of the Sargon’s expeditionary force, it was certainly a combined-arms army of at least 50,000 men, the traditional size of an Assyrian field army. The army moved in line of column, with special scouts sent a head to reconnoiter the route. While in flat terrain, the king personally led the column from the basket of his war chariot, surrounded by the chariots of his commanders. The chariots were followed by cavalry, infantry, engineers, scribes, diviners, interpreters and intelligence officers, and a baggage train consisting of camels and asses. The rear of the column was guarded by light troops, mostly cavalry in open terrain and infantry in rough terrain. Because of this difficult terrain and the unlikelihood of a large chariot engagement, it is possible that the Assyrian chariot contingent was small, serving only as personal transportation for the king and his senior commanders.

When Sargon reached the land of the Manna, he ordered his vassal Ullusunu to provide him with large numbers of horses, sheep, cattle, and material supplies. Using this forward base, Sargon first secured his eastern flank by marching east and south of Lake Urmia into Median territory. The Medes were a fierce Indo-European steppe warrior people who specialized in light cavalry and lived in the region of northern Iran. Cousins to the Persians (who would later conquer them), the Median governors submitted to Sargon, providing him with the unique tribute of steppe peoples, including “prancing horses, swift mules, camels native to their land, cattle and sheep.” Steppe camels were of the two-humped Bactrian variety and were superior to their southern dromedary cousins for cold weather operations because of their thick fur and underwool and large, snowshoe-like feet. With his eastern flank secure, Sargon backtracked west to Manna.

The direct route between Mannean country and Urartu was a straight shot northwest from Lake Urmia to Tuspar (modern Van) on Lake Van. This route not only went through extremely rough terrain, but it was also guarded by a string of strong fortresses controlled by Urartu. Not wanting to march into the waiting mouth of his enemy, Sargon decided to take a more circuitous route around the northern shore of Lake Urmia near Tabriz and then straight west, by-passing the Urartu fortifications. But even this route brought the Assyrian expedition through difficult geography and hostile territory. Checking his siege train, Sargon pushed west and took twelve fortified cities and eighty-four villages, which according to the Assyrian king’s own scribes: “I destroyed their walls, I set fire to the houses inside them, I destroyed them like a flood, I battered them into heaps of ruins.” Sargon’s strategy was to secure his line of communications and leave no threatening fortresses or garrisons at his back as he marched further into enemy territory.

Meanwhile, Prince Rusa was rallying support from local princes to stop the Assyrian advance well short of its intended target, the Urartu capital on the shores of Lake Van. Rusa knew the direction of the Assyrian advance and he decided to intercept Sargon on a flat valley in the mountains southwest of Tabriz. Rusa’s strategy was to draw the Assyrians through the defile and into the valley and then smash them before they could deploy from column into a line of battle. But unknown to the Urartu pickets, Sargon’s scouts saw the Urartu deployment in the valley.

Choosing not to move his army piecemeal through the defile, Sargon did the unexpected: he moved it directly over the snow- and ice-covered ridge, descended the other side and deployed in the valley. But the forced march over the ridge took its toll on the Assyrian army, who were exhausted and running on light rations. Prince Rusa’s troops, on the other hand, were fully deployed and well rested, having arrived several days before. Sargon understood his precarious tactical situation, realizing that the fresh Urartu troops, defending their homeland, might massacre his invading army.  With no line of retreat, no reinforcements, and an enemy preparing to strike at any moment, Sargon chose to act quickly to gain the initiative. Leading a combined chariot and cavalry charge into the Urartu ranks, Sargon rode his war chariot at the head of his bodyguard, a contingent of 1,000 horsemen straight into one wing of the Urartu deployment (history does not tell us which wing), shattering it on impact. The rest of the Assyrian army, seeing their monarch plunge into battle, quickly followed.

But Rusa’s lines did not immediately rout, and at some point, during the battle the Urartu launched a counterattack. In the ensuing chaos, Rusa retreated to his fortified encampment. Sargon pursued and surrounded the king’s camp, showering it with arrows and javelins from his light troops. Rusa eventually abandoned his chariot and escaped on horseback, leaving his routing army to be slaughtered by the Assyrians. His enemy defeated Sargon then set off for the Urartu capital at Tuspar. The Assyrian monarch’s strategy was now to punish the region that had supported his enemy. He systematically destroyed every fortress, city, and town in the path of his march, leaving thousands of dead in his wake in an early classical example of a scorched earth policy. When Sargon reached Tuspar, Rusa fled into the mountains, eventually dying the king of a defeated state. Sargon entered the city triumphant, then razed it to the ground like “a smashed pot.”  During this phase of the campaign, Sargon conducted military operations in all seven of Urartu’s provinces and captured or destroyed no fewer than 430 fortified cities, towns, and villages.

 With the Urartu field army defeated and its king hiding in the nearby mountains, Sargon swung his army around the northern shore of Lake Van and headed south toward the ancient city of Khupushkia (modern Sairt). It was here that Sargon ordered his main army home to the new Assyrian fortress of Dur-Sharrukin (Fort Sargon, later Khorsabad), north of the old capital of Nineveh. Sargon stayed behind with 1,000 cavalry and struck out for the fortress city of Muzazira, the religious center of the Urartu culture. It was here in the temple dedicated to Haldia, the Urartu war god, that monarchs were crowned, and the national treasury kept. Sargon led his elite striking force east over a seemingly impenetrable mountain pass and sacked the city, returning home with 6,000 captives and Urartu’s treasures to add to his imperial coffers. The Urartu campaign demonstrates the remarkable military capabilities of an early Iron Age Assyrian army campaigning in difficult terrain and using combined arms actions in a punitive raid against a capable enemy.

Suggested Readings:

Primary sources

Dezső, Tamás. The Assyrian Army: As Reconstructed from the Assyrian Palace Reliefs and Cuneiform Sources, two volumes. Eötvös University Press, 2012.

Secondary sources

Carey, Brian Todd, Joshua B. Allfree, and John Cairns. Warfare in the Ancient World. Pen and Sword, 2006. 

Healy, Mark. The Ancient Assyrians: Empire and Army, 883–612 BC.  Osprey Publishing, 2023.