The most influential military theorist in East Asian history is Sunzi (more commonly Sun Tzu in the Wade-Giles transliteration), author of The Art of War, a title translated as bingfa in Chinese literature. Chinese history records numerous bingshi or “art of war” treatises written by different authors across the ages. Tradition maintains Sunzi lived between 544-496 BCE during the long-lived Zhou Dynasty’s (1046-256 BCE) Spring and Autumn period (c.770-475 BCE), a historical era described by Confucius in his Annals as a period of political fragmentation and cultural achievements. However, most modern scholars place his lifespan during the early part of the following “Warring States Period” (475-221 BCE) based on his writing style and references to Chinese warfare. There is still a considerable amount of debate concerning the life and authorship of this military treatise, both in and out of modern China, with traditionalists maintaining that Sunzi was the author, while other scholars maintain that there are too many historical anachronisms in the text to be authored by the historical Sunzi during the late fifth century BCE.[1] Of the historical Sunzi himself (the term “Zi” or “Tzu” attached to the name is an honorific title meaning "master") little is known about his birthplace. Some ancient sources say he was born in the northern kingdom of Qi, while others maintain he was born in the small eastern kingdom of Wu. According to tradition, he was a military advisor to King Helu of Wu at the end of the sixth century BCE when China was divided into multiple small kingdoms, many of which were beginning to engage in wars of expansion or self-preservation which devolved into China’s Warring States Period.[2] Although precisely when Sunzi actually lived may never be known for certain, the military work that is attributed to him, The Art of War, is considered by many modern strategists to be the best single treatise on warfare ever written, influencing the art of war in both Eastern civilization over the past 2,400 years, and Western civilization over the past two-and-a half centuries.

RIGHT: A Qing Dynasty (1644-1911) portrait of the Chinese military philosopher Sunzi. Source: Wikimedia Commons.

The two and a half centuries between 475 and 221 BCE is called the Warring States Period because the region of China during the Zhou Dynasty was divided between seven states (Qi, Chu, Yan, Han, Zhao, Wei, and Qin). During the Warring States Period the fighting was often fierce with some kings fighting to survive or retain power, while other kings wanted more power and territory. During the first half of this era, the boundaries between the states remained about the same. Of the seven states, two states dominated the era, the Chu and the Qin. Chu was the biggest state, controlling the southern third of the entire region of the Warring States region. Qin, positioned in the west, also controlled about a third of the territory, while the remaining five states filled in the northeastern third of China. Over time, Qin rulers consolidated their control of their own borders against nomadic tribes, using the latest military technologies which included chariots, iron weapons, and crossbows.[3] These states were frequently at war until 221 BCE when the Qin ruler Shi Huang (r.221-210 BCE) vanquished the final kingdom of Qi and unifying China for the first time under the short-lived Qin Dynasty (221-206 BCE). By this time Qin field armies consisted of hundreds of thousands of infantry, accompanied by cavalry and chariots as it consolidated the rule over the other seven states, tearing down internal defensive walls between the states, while expanding defensive fortification along the northern frontier in what would later become known as China’s Great Wall.[4]

This era in Chinese history is also known for the formation of three important philosophies that would shape Chinese history and military thought from this point forward--Daoism, Confucianism, and Legalism. The nature-emulating Daoism played an important role in Sunzi’s military philosophy, while Legalism shaped the harsh rulership philosophy of the unifying Qin Dynasty. Confucianism formed the backbone of China’s ethical and legal systems for most of its imperial history, and was exported to other regions of East Asia, including Korea, Japan, and Vietnam, creating what is referred to as Confucian East Asia. After the establishment of imperium under the Qin Chinese political, economic, military and cultural hegemony would dominate East Asia for millennia, with China seeing and describing itself as the “Middle Kingdom” (Zhongguo), the central and superior state in the region, surrounded by satellites kingdoms and barbarian peoples.[5]  Moreover, imperial China but also embark on what modern scholars refer to as numerous historical “dynastic cycles” usually described as having five distinct phases. A new dynasty starts with a strong leader unifying the country after chaos. It then enjoys peace, stability, and economic growth. Over time, corruption and strife weaken the dynasty, causing public discontent and natural disasters. Eventually, the dynasty loses the Mandate of Heaven (tianming) and falls due to rebellions and invasions. Chaos follows until a new leader rises to begin the cycle anew.[6] 

Sunzi’s The Art of War, c. 5th Century BCE

Sunzi’s approach to warfare, unlike that of later European military theorists, does not put military force at the center of strategy. In fact, the Chinese character li (force) occurs only nine times in The Art of War’s thirteen chapters. For Sunzi, securing victory or defeat in war was fundamentally a psychological pursuit. He saw war not so much as a matter of destroying the enemy materially and physically (although that may play a role in victory), but of undermining the enemy psychologically while forcing its leadership and society from a condition of “cosmic harmony” or (dao), in which they could resist effectively, toward one of chaos (luan), and thereby creating the conditions for defeat.[7] For Sunzi, the preferred victory is achieved through an indirect strategy attacking the enemy’s will and his alliance system using diplomacy, psychological warfare, and economic pressure rather than direct military engagement. Sunzi approached warfare with this Daoist frame of mind, giving his writings a certain mystery and elegance unseen in Western treatments of war, while also making his proclamations, at times, difficult for Western interpreters to understand as his strategies are presented in an idealized paradigm, one where war can be seen as an intellectual or metaphysical exercise by Western readers. Expressed in these Daoist terms, Sunzi believes the proper application of the art of war is through negotiating both the knowable and unknowable conditions which shape warfare through careful preparation and a cautious approach.[8]  This Eastern concept anticipates the nineteenth century Prussian theorist Carl von Clausewitz’s (1780-1831) own description of operational uncertainty, described as the “fog of war.” Sunzi’s martial philosophy can best be seen through an examination of the major themes in The Art of War’s thirteen distinct sections, often translated as chapters in the West and presented as a dialogue between the master and his students, with the students adding additional commentary to clarify the master’s point or add historical context. 

LEFT:  Statue of the Chinese military philosopher Sunzi in Yurihama, Tottori, in Japan. The first translations of Sunzi’s The Art of War arrived in Japan in the sixth century CE, and were widely read for centuries, shaping Japanese strategy and tactics. Source: Wikimedia Commons.

At the beginning of chapter one: “Estimates” Sunzi explains succinctly the stakes of going to war and why studying warfare is essential. “War is a matter of vital importance to the State; the province of life or death; the road to survival or ruin. It is mandatory that it be thoroughly studied.”[9] He identifies the five fundamental factors shaping warfare: moral influence (described in as qi or chi, meaning an “army’s spirit”), weather, terrain, command and doctrine. 

“By moral influence I mean that which causes the people to be in harmony with their leaders, so that they will accompany them in life, and unto death without fear of mortal peril. By weather I mean the interaction of natural forces, the effects of winter’s cold and summer’s heat and the conduct of military operations in accordance with the seasons.By terrain I mean distances, whether the ground is traversed with ease or difficulty, whether it is open or constricted, and the chances of life or death. By command I mean the general’s qualities of wisdom, sincerity, humanity, courage, and strictness.By doctrine I mean organization, control, assignment of appropriate ranks to officers, regulation of supply routes, and the provision of principal items used by the army.”[10]

By identifying, assessing and comparing these points, a wise general can calculate his chances of victory. Failing to understand these fundamental factors will ensure failure through improper action. “These are the strategist’s key to victory.”[11] The chapter stresses that war is a very serious matter for the state and must not be initiated without weighing cost and benefits.

Chapter two, “Waging War” explains the relationship between a state’s economy and waging war and how success requires winning decisive engagements quickly. “Victory is the main objective in war.  If this is long-delayed, weapons are blunted and morale depressed.  When troops attack cities, their strength will be exhausted.  When the army engages in protracted campaigns the resources of the State will not suffice.”[12] Here, he advocates whenever possible fighting the enemy on his territory and using his resources.  “Hence, the wise general sees to it that his troops feed on the enemy, for one bushel of the enemy’s provisions is equivalent to twenty of his; one hundredweight of enemy fodder to twenty-hundredweight of his.”[13]  This section advises that successful military campaigns require a commander to understand the material and psychological costs of warfare and not to pursue ruinous campaigns.  Finally, the chapter ends with a discussion on how to handle prisoners of war.  “Treat the captives well, and care for them,” recognizing prisoners of war can become military assets in future campaigns.[14]

The Art of War's third chapter, “Offensive Strategy” opens with the preferred goal of a military campaign. “Generally, in war, the best policy is to take a State intact; to ruin it is inferior to this.”  To accomplish this feat, Sunzi prioritizes military strategy as follows:

“Of supreme importance in war is to attack the enemy’s strategy. Next, the best is to disrupt his alliances. The next best is to attack his army. The worst policy is to attack cities.  Attack cities only when there is no alternative. Thus, those skilled in war subdue the enemy’s army without battle.  They capture his cities without assaulting them and overthrow his State without protracted operations.”[15]

Sunzi also offers advice on how to engage an army of inferior or superior size and capabilities. “The art of using troops is this: when ten to the enemy’s one, surround him; when five times his strength, attack him; if double his strength, divide him.  If equally matched, you may engage him.  If a weaker numerically, be capable of withdrawing.  And if in all respects, unequal, be capable of eluding him, for a small force is but booty for one more powerful.”[16] 

The Art of War continues with a discussion of five circumstances where victory can be predicted based on a general’s strategic acumen, stating that “It is in these five matters that the way to victory is known”:

“He who knows when he can fight and when he cannot will be victorious. He who understands how to use both large and small forces will be victorious. He whose ranks are united in purpose will be victorious. He who is prudent and lies in wait for an enemy who is not, will be victorious. He whose generals are able and not interfered with by the sovereign will be victorious.”[17] 

Sunzi ends the chapter with pearls of strategic wisdom which have reverberated down the ages. “Know the enemy and know thyself; in one hundred battles you will never be in peril.  When you are ignorant of the enemy, but know yourself, your chances of winning or losing are equal.  If ignorant both of your enemy and of yourself, you are certain in every battle to be in peril.”[18]

Chapter four, “Dispositions” opens with an observation relating to both individual soldiers and the army as a whole, alluding to both the strategic circumstances of the engagement and the mental resilience of the combatants.  “In ancient times, skillful warriors first made themselves invincible and then watched for vulnerability in their opponents.”[19] Sunzi continues with a discussion of the advantages of defensive and offensive operations. “Invincibility lies in the defense, the possibility of victory in the attack.  One defends when his strength is inadequate; he attacks when it is abundant. Therefore, the skilled commander takes up a position in which he cannot be defeated and misses no opportunity to master his enemy.”[20] The chapter emphasizes the importance of defending existing positions until a general is capable of advancing in safety. It stresses the importance of recognizing strategic opportunities and teaches not to create opportunities for the enemy. However, when those opportunities arise, a wise general will use deception, strategic initiative, and momentum to press his advantage.

“Therefore those who skillfully move opponents make formations that opponents are sure to follow, give what opponents are sure to take.  They move opponents with the prospect of gain, waiting for them in ambush. Therefore good warriors seek effectiveness in battle from the force of momentum, not from individual people. Therefore, they are able to choose people and let the force of momentum do its work. Getting people to fight by letting the force of momentum work is like rolling logs and rocks. Logs and rocks are still when in a secure place, but role on an incline; they remain stationary if square, they role if round.  Therefore, when people are skillfully led into battle, the momentum is like that of round rocks rolling down a mountain—this is force.”[21]  

In chapter five, “Energy” Sunzi builds on the themes of his previous chapter and explains how a general evaluates and manages his own army, using creativity, timing, and proven military methods to build momentum towards strategic victory. He begins the chapter by stating “Generally, management of many is the same as management a few.  It is a matter of organization…. And to control many is the same as to control few.  This is a matter of formations and signals.”[22]  He continues to elaborate on this topic with analysis of unit cohesion, morale in battle, and the importance of seizing and maintaining initiative.

“Order or disorder depends on organization; courage or cowardice on circumstances; strength or weakness on dispositions. Thus, those skilled and making the enemy move do so by creating a situation to which he must conform; they entice him with something he is certain to take. Therefore, when using troops, one must take advantage of the situation exactly as if he were setting a ball in motion on a steep slope.  The force applied is minute, but the results are enormous.”[23]

RIGHT: An iron sword and two bronze swords from the Chinese Warring States Period. Shannxi Provincial Museum, People’s Republic of China. Source: Wikimedia Commons.

Chapter six of The Art of War , “Weaknesses and Strengths,” explains how an army's victory come from opportunities during the course of battle caused by the relative weakness of the enemy and how a wise general should act in a fluid battlefield environment.  Preparation of the battlefield is key to victory in Sunzi’s theory: “Generally, he who occupies the field of battle first and awaits his enemy is at ease; he who comes later to the scene and rushes into the fight is weary. And therefore, those skilled in war bring the enemy to the field of battle and are not brought there by him.”[24]  The author also discusses the importance of harassing the enemy to keep him off balance, while ascertaining his strengths and weaknesses.

“When the enemy is at ease, the able to weary him; when well fed, to starve him; when at rest, to make him move. Agitate him and ascertained the patterns of his movement.  Determine his dispositions and so ascertained the field of battle.  Probe him and learn where his strength is abundant and were deficient.”[25]

In chapter seven, “Maneuver,” Sunzi discusses the dangers of direct military engagement and how to win those confrontations when they are forced upon the general. He begins with a rumination on the unity of command and mustering of the army in classical Chinese warfare. “Normally, when the army is employed, the general first receives his commands from the sovereign.  He assembles the troops and mobilizes the people. He blends the army into a harmonious entity and encamps it.”[26] He continues describing the indispensable skill and difficulty of mastering both strategic and tactical maneuver, often using Daoist nature imagery:

“Nothing is more difficult than the art of maneuver. What is difficult about maneuver is to make the devious route the most direct and to turn misfortune to advantage. Thus, marked by an indirect route and divert the enemy by enticing him with bait.  So doing, you may set out after he does and arrive before him.  One able to do this understands the strategy of the direct and the indirect. War is based on deception. Move when it is advantageous and create changes in the situation by dispersal and concentration of forces.  When campaigning, be swift as the wind; in leisurely march, majestic as the forest; in raiding and plundering, like fire; in standing, firm as the mountains. As unfathomable as the clouds, move like a thunderbolt. When you plunder the countryside, divide your forces.  When you conquer territory, divide the profits.  Weigh the situation, then move. He who knows the art of the direct and the indirect approach will be victorious. Such is the art of maneuvering.”[27] 

When discussing battlefield communication, he says, “In night fighting use many torches and drums, in day fighting many banners and flags in order to influence the sight and hearing of our troops.” He also addresses the best time to engage the enemy on the battlefield.

"During the early morning spirits are keen, during the day they flag, and in the evening thoughts turn toward home.  And therefore those skilled in war avoid the enemy when his spirit is keen [mornings] and attack him when it is sluggish and his soldiers homesick [afternoon or evenings].  This is control of the moral factor.”[28]

In chapter eight “The Nine Variables” Sunzi focuses on an army’s the need for strategic and tactical flexibility when operating on various terrains, described by him as “grounds.” He explains how a wise general successfully responds to shifting strategic and tactical circumstances, presenting the idea that every situation is unique but also combines familiar elements. While a general must be creative and flexible, he must also work within the rules of warfare and not react out of ignorance. Interestingly, despite being the title of the chapter, the “nine variables” are never fully explained in this section, possibly pointing to lost material. Once the sovereign has placed his confidence in his choice of a general, the general must retain complete autonomy and authority on the battlefield. Otherwise, his attention to rapidly changing battlefield conditions is hindered, and the enemy is given a chance to regain momentum and seize the initiative. Ultimately it is up to the general to make the decision regarding what ground to take, when to take it, and how to execute the operation. Additionally, he expounds on the role of terrain in strategic analysis through a brief explanation of five different kinds of “grounds” an army traverses on campaign. These include: low-lying ground (in which an army should not camp), communicating ground (in which allies may be joined), desolate ground (to be moved through as quickly as possible), enclosed ground (requiring resourceful solutions to get out of), and death ground (in which the only option is to fight).[29]  Terrain continues to be a major focus over the next three chapters. Sunzi also discussed the attributes of an enemy general which can be exploited

“Therefore there are five traits that are dangerous in generals: those who are ready to die can be killed; those who are intent on living can be captured; those who are quick to anger can be shamed; those who are puritanical can be disgraced; those who love people can be troubled.”[30]

In “Marches,” the ninth chapter in Sunzi’s The Art of War, he describes different tactical situations in which an army finds itself as it moves through enemy territory, with detailed explanation on how to respond to these situations. Much of this section focuses on evaluating the intentions of enemy forces. He begins the section with sound advice on how to march through mountains and array for battle, always taking into consideration the location of the sun, and the army’s relationship with terrain, specifically rivers, salt marshes, and level ground.

“Generally, when taking up a position and confronting the enemy, having crossed the mountains, stay close to valleys.  Encamp on high ground facing the sunny side. Fight downhill; do not ascend to attack. After crossing the river, you must move some distance away from it. When an advancing enemy crosses water, do not meet him at the water’s edge.  It is advantageous to allow half his forces to cross and then strike. Cross salt marshes speedily.  Do not linger in them.  If you encounter the enemy in the middle of the salt marsh you must take position close to grass and water with trees to your rear. In level ground occupy a position which facilitates your action.  With heights to your rear and right, the field of battle is to the front and the rear is safe.”[31]

Sunzi continues with the discussion on how to identify enemy ruses, and how to observe and interrogate enemy envoys.

LEFT: A copy of Sunzi’s The Art of War written on bamboo strips. This copy of The Art of War (on the cover, "孫子兵法") by Sunzi is part of a collection at the University of California, Riverside. The cover also reads "乾隆御書", meaning it was either commissioned or transcribed by the Qianlong Emperor (1736-1795). Source: Wikimedia Commons.

Sunzi returns to the theme of how topography shapes the campaign in chapter ten, “Terrain.”  Here, he describes six types of ground positions (accessible, entrapping, indecisive, constricted, precipitous, and distant), explaining how circumstance offers certain advantages and disadvantages to the general, with each situation having one and only one correct response in what is perhaps his most prescriptive chapter.

"Ground , which both we and the enemy can traverse with equal ease is called accessible.  In such ground, he who first takes high sunny positions convenient to his supply routes can fight advantageously. Ground easy to get out of the difficult to return to is entrapping.  The nature of this ground is such that if the enemy is unprepared and you Sally out.  You may defeat him.  If the enemy is prepared, and you go out and engage, but do not win, it is difficult to return.  This is unprofitable. Ground equally disadvantage for both the enemy and ourselves to enter is indecisive.  The nature of this ground is such that although the enemy holds out a bait I do not go forth but entice him by marching off.  When I have drawn out half his force, I can strike him advantageously. If I first occupy constricted ground.  I must block the passes and await the enemy.  If the enemy first occupy such ground and blocks the defiles I should not follow him; if he does not block them completely, I may do so. In precipitous ground I must take position on the sunny heights and await the enemy.  If he first occupy such ground I lure him by marching off; I do not follow him.When at a distance from an enemy of equal strength.  It is difficult to provoke battle and unprofitable to engage him in his chosen position.”[32]

He continues with a discussion on the importance of quality officers and troops for if one or the other is not sufficient, the fighting force is vulnerable.  Therefore, it is up to the general to pay close attention to the capabilities and morale of his officer corps and troops. The chapter concludes with six conditions a general must remain vigilant against, as they are signs of defeat. These include the physical terrain on which a battle is fought and the capacity of the commander to estimate the situation relative to both his own and his opponent's forces. Here, he emphasizes the importance of advanced reconnaissance. “Confirmation of the ground is of the greatest assistance to battle.  Therefore, to estimate the enemy situation and calculate distances and the degree of difficulty of the terrain so as to control victory are virtues of the superior general.  He who fights with full knowledge of these factors is certain to win; he who does not will surely be defeated.”[33] The discussion next moves to the metaphoric "terrain" of the army structure, starting with the right of the general to disobey a sovereign's orders for the good of the State if the strategic circumstances are right. Sunzi stresses the importance of the general’s overall decorum as it sets the tone for his subordinates.  Interestingly, this chapter also references Chinese special forces, described by his student commentator as “Leapers and Agitators,” although little else is stated about their capabilities other than their importance in winning battles.[34] He ends the chapter with a simple refrain, “Know the enemy, know yourself; your victory will never be endangered.  Know the ground, know the weather; your victory will then be total.”[35]

Chapter eleven, “The Nine Varieties of Ground,” explores the nine common situations (or stages) a general will encounter during a military campaign, once again described by Sunzi as “grounds.”  These include: dispersive ground; frontier ground; key ground; communicating ground; focal ground; serious ground; difficult ground; encircled ground; and finally death ground. He also includes specific strategies to successfully navigate them.

“When a feudal lord fights in his own territory, he is in dispersive ground. When he makes but a shallow penetration into enemy territory he is in frontier ground. Ground equally advantageous for the enemy or me to occupy is key ground. Ground equally accessible to both the enemy and me is communicating ground. When a state is enclosed by three other states its territories is considered focal ground.When the army has penetrated deep into hostile territory, leaving far behind many enemy cities and towns, it is in serious ground. When the army traverses mountains, forests, precipitous country, or marches through defiles, marshlands or swamps, or any place where the going is hard, it is in difficult ground. Ground to which access is constricted, where the way out is tortuous, and were a small enemy force can strike my larger one is called encircled ground. Ground in which the army survives only if it fights with the courage of desperation is called death ground. And therefore, do not fight in dispersive ground; do not stop in frontier borderlands.  Do not attack an enemy who occupies key ground: in communicating ground.  Do not allow your formations to become separated. In focal ground, ally with neighboring states; indeed ground, plunder. In difficult ground, press on; in encircled ground, devise stratagems; in death ground, fight.”[36]

Sunzi continues with advice on why a general must take care of his troops, stating he must see to it that they are well fed, rested, and disciplined. “Pay heed to nourishing the troops; do not unnecessarily fatigue them. Unite them in spirit; conserve their strength.”[37] He also elaborates on the qualities of a good general.

“It is the business of a general to be serene and inscrutable, impartial, and self-controlled. He should be capable of keeping his officers and men in ignorance of his plans. He prohibits superstitious practices and so rids the army of doubts. He changes his methods and alters his plans so that people have no knowledge of what he is doing.” [38]

The next chapter, “Attack by Fire,” is a short discussion on the role of both incendiary attacks in Chinese warfare, while also describing fire as an attribute of a weak or impetuous general. When addressing fire as a physical weapon, he describes five attack methods against enemy troops and or logistical support, even directly referencing the use of fire arrows or fire bolts cast from bows or crossbows. “The first is to burn personnel, the second, to burn stores: the third, to burn equipment; the fourth, to burn arsenals; and the fifth, to use incendiary missiles.”[39]  He also examines how environmental factors (humidity and wind direction) effect these attacks, before ending with a discussion of the psychological effects of using fire in war.

RIGHT: Map showing states in the early Warring States period of Eastern Zhou Dynasty in Chinese history. Source: Wikimedia Commons.

The thirteenth and final chapter of Sunzi’s The Art of War, “Employment of Secret Agents” focuses on the importance of developing good information sources and specifies the five types of intelligence agents (native, inside, double, expendable, and living ) and how to best manage each of them.

“Native agents are those of the enemy’s country people whom we employ. Inside agents are enemy officials whom we employ. Double agents are enemy spies, whom we employ. Expendable agents are those of our own spies who are deliberately given fabricated information. Living agents are those who return with information.”[40]

Sunzi holds secret agents and their role in military operations in high regard. “Of all those in the army close to the commander, none is more intimate than the secret agent; of all rewards, none more liberal than those given to secret agents; of all matters, none is more confidential than those relating to secret operations….  Secret operations are essential in war; upon them the army relies to make its every move. ”[41]

For Sunzi, victory in warfare is achieved through superior knowledge of the enemy, and as we see above, he places great emphasis on the gathering of intelligence using secret agents. Espionage is at the center of his military philosophy as it enables the general to pursue a campaign of deception, prioritizing the pursuit of indirect warfare over conventional military confrontation unless conditions favor the latter. Sunzi advocates military operations that target the enemy’s morale by undermining alliances, evading battle when and where the enemy is stronger, and surprise attacks to keep a superior army off balance. He discourages operations which limit a commander’s strategic options while lowering the morale of friendly forces (he dislikes siege warfare unless the conditions are right).  Sunzi does not rule out direct military confrontation, instead he is conscious of the tremendous risks inherent in losing a set-piece battle or prolonged campaign and the potentially disastrous effects a large military defeat on the stability of a state. For this reason, he urges that force is not squandered, but conserved carefully and used only when it may have decisive impact. Another foundational theme throughout The Art of War is the importance of military logistics to the success of a military campaign. Ultimately, though, for Sunzi, war should not be the first option. The best way to settle a dispute between states is through diplomacy. If diplomacy is unsuccessful, then pursue a strategy emphasizing psychological warfare to undermine the enemy’s morale and ability to fight. If war is inevitable, engage in maneuver to secure the best conditions for battle, but engage in battle only if these conditions are favorable and a decisive victory can be achieved. And if there is no other option, engage in siege warfare. For Sunzi, the ideal victory is to win without fighting, to convince the enemy’s forces to yield and if practical, switch sides rather than be annihilated.

Sunzi's The Art of War later served as a foundational writing for what would become China’s “Seven Military Classics,” a group of strategy and tactics treatises which served policy makers for centuries. Long studied by Chinese strategists, it first reached Korea during the Three Kingdoms era (57 BCE-668 CE), introduced through cultural exchanges and trade with China, shaping Korean military strategies before making its way to Japan in 516 CE.[42]  On both the Korean Peninsula and the Japanese Archipelago, Sunzi’s writing had a profound influence on numerous aspects of military operations, including strategic planning and adaptability, use of psychological warfare, and the importance of good leadership and troop discipline.[43]  Sunzi's work first became known in the West in the late eighteenth century through an imperfect French translation in 1772 by French Jesuit Jean Joseph Marie Amiot (1718-1793), and was not translated into English until 1910 by the British Sinologist Lionel Giles (1875-1958).[44] In the forward to another well-known English translation of The Art of War the prominent British strategist B.H. Liddell Hart (1895-1970) praised Sunzi’s understanding of warfare and compared him to Clausewitz, even noting that the Chinese military philosopher’s clarity could have improved the Prussian theorist’s work. Liddell Hart agreed with Sunzi on doing the unexpected and using indirect strategies—avoiding strengths and seeking weaknesses, all hallmarks of his “indirect approach” strategy.[45]  Because of its inherently conservative nature, Sunzi’s military philosophy fits well as a template for unconventional or guerrilla warfare, and its tenets were later studied in the twentieth century by the Chinese Communist leader Mao Zedong (1893-1976) in his civil war against Chiang Kai-shek (1887-1975) and the Nationalists (Guomindang), as well as by the Vietnamese leader Ho Chi Minh (1890-1969) and his leading general, Vo Nguyen Giap (1912-2013), during their war of national liberation against the French and Americans in the First Indochinese (1946-1954) and Second Indochinese (1955-1975) conflicts. Additional translations into Western languages have continued into the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, with Sunzi’s The Art of War now required reading in military universities and war colleges around the world because of the role this treatise plays in educating revolutionaries and non-state players in guerrilla and nonconventional warfare.

ENDNOTES

[1]  Nicholas Morrow, “Sun Tzu, The Art of War (c. 500-300 B.C.).” Classics of Strategy and Diplomacy. https://classicsofstrategy.com/2015/11/24/sun-tzu-the-art-of-war-c-500-300-bc/#2, accessed March 2, 2025.

[2]  For a discussion on the life date of Sunzi, see the author’s preface in Ralph D. Sawyer, The Seven Military Classics of Ancient China  (Westview Press, 1993), 149-153.

[3]  Edward L. Dreyer, “Chapter 2: Continuity and Change” in David A. Graff and Robin Hingham’s A Military History of China (Westview Press, 2002), 20-21.

[4]  Sawyer, The Seven Military Classics of Ancient China, 10-11.  For an excellent overall treatment of the Great Wall of China as a frontier defensive and economic system, see Arthur Waldron, The Great Wall of China: From History to Myth (Cambridge University Press, 1990).

[5]  Joseph Esherick,  "Chapter 8: How the Qing Became China" in Empire to Nation: Historical Perspectives on the Making of the Modern World, ed.  Joseph Esherick (Rowman & Littlefield, 2006), 232-233.

[6]  For an excellent treatment of Chinese dynastic cycles, see David A. Graff’s “Chapter 3: State Making and State Breaking” in A Military History of China, ed. David A. Graff and Robin Hingham (Westview Press, 2002).

[7]  For a discussion on the relationship between Daoism and Sunzi’s Art of War, see the translator’s notes of Thomas Cleary’s translation.  Sun Tzu, The Art of War: Complete Texts and Commentaries, trans. Thomas Cleary (Shambhala Publications, 2005), 5-20.

[8]  Morrow, “Sun Tzu, The Art of War (c. 500-300 BC).”

[9]  Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Samuel B. Griffith ( Oxford University Press, 1963), 63.  Marine Corps Brig. Gen. Samuel Griffith’s (1906-1983) translation was chosen for most of this section because the translator was an experienced war fighter, familiar with China during the mid-twentieth century. His translation reflects a special understanding of both military matters and Chinese culture in a way other more recent translations do Not. However, Thomas Cleary’s translation,  Sun Tzu, The Art of War: Complete Texts and Commentaries, is also used when a deeper understanding of Chinese philosophy is required to understand Sunzi’s prose.

[10]  Ibid, 64-65.

[11]  Ibid, 70.

[12]  Ibid, 73.

[13]  Ibid, 74.

[14]  Ibid, 76.

[15] Ibid, 77-79.

[16]  Ibid, 79-80

[17]  Ibid, 82-83.

[18]  Ibid, 84.

[19]  Here, Thomas Cleary’s translation is used for its clarity. Sun Tzu, The Art of War: Complete Texts and Commentaries, 87,

[20]  Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Samuel B. Griffith, 85, 87.

[21]  Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Thomas Cleary, 102-103.

[22]   Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Samuel B. Griffith, 90.

[23]  Ibid, 93, 95.

[24]  Ibid, 96.

[25]  Ibid, 100.

[26]  Ibid, 102.

[27]  Ibid, 102, 106.

[28]  Ibid, 108.

[29]  Ibid, 111-115.

[30]  Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Thomas Cleary, 135.

[31]  Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Samuel B. Griffith, 116-117.

[32]  Ibid, 124-125.

[33]  Ibid, 127-128.

[34]  Ibid, 127.

[35]  Ibid, 129.

[36]  Ibid, 130-131.

[37]  Ibid, 134.

[38]  Ibid, 136.

[39]  Ibid, 141.

[40]  Ibid, 145-146.

[41]  Ibid, 147, 149.

[42]  Morrow, “Sun Tzu, The Art of War (c. 500-300 BC).”

[43]  Mark Metcalf, “New Perspectives on the Sunzi (Sun Tzu) from Contemporary Chinese Military Writings” in Education About ASIA Volume 21, Number 1 Spring 2016, 14-18.

[44]  Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Samuel B. Griffith, 169.

[45]  Ibid, vi.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Primary Sources

Sawyer, Ralph D. The Seven Military Classics of Ancient China. Westview Press, 1993.

Sun Tzu, The Art of War. Translated by Samuel B. Griffith. Oxford University Press, 1963.

_____. The Art of War: Complete Texts and Commentaries. Translated by Thomas Cleary. Shambhala Publications, 2005.

Secondary Sources

Dreyer, Edward L. “Continuity and Change” in David A. Graff and Robin Hingham’s A Military History of China. Westview Press, 2002, 19-38.

Esherick,  Joseph. "How the Qing Became China" in Empire to Nation: Historical Perspectives on the Making of the Modern World, ed.  Joseph Esherick. Rowman & Littlefield, 2006.

Metcalf, Mark. “New Perspectives on the Sunzi (Sun Tzu) from Contemporary Chinese Military Writings” in Education About Asia Volume 21, Number 1 Spring 2016, 14-18.

Morrow, Nicholas. “Sun Tzu, The Art of War (c. 500-300 B.C.).” Classics of Strategy and Diplomacy. https://classicsofstrategy.com/2015/11/24/sun-tzu-the-art-of-war-c-500-300-bc/#2