Byzantine military manuals, known in medieval Greek as Strategika or Taktika, date back to the early medieval era, however, they build upon lessons learned in the military arts and sciences of the classical world dating back to the Hellenic Greece (c.500-338 BCE) when Western warfare was going through great changes.  Greek and then Roman military theorists continued to build on these early military principles, with Byzantine authors inheriting their work when the Eastern Roman Empire transitioned into the Byzantine Empire (337-1453).  These military manuals were often written with a specific Byzantine adversary in mind (Avars, Slavs, Persians, Arabs, Bulgars, Turks) during a time of intense military activity when Byzantium was in a posture of strategic defense (seventh and early tenth centuries) or aggressively expanding their territories (mid-tenth and eleventh centuries). These military instructions were always built on the scholarship of previous editions, sometimes separated by centuries, proving the universality of certain military principles no matter who the Byzantines fought.  The most well-known examples of these military treatises are Emperor Maurice’s Strategikon (c.590), Emperor Leo VI’s Taktika (c.895-908), Emperor Nikephoros II Phokas’ Praecepta Militaria (c.965), and the Taktika of Nikephoros Ouranos (c.1000), a brilliant general who served Emperor Basil II, although numerous other examples exist often focusing on different aspects of the military art.  The Byzantines mostly lost interest in writing these military manuals in the late eleventh century after their catastrophic defeat by Seljuk Turks at the battle of Manzikert in 1071, however, the last of these manuals represent a synthesis of fourteen centuries of Greek, Roman, and Byzantine military theory and practice.

Photo at right: The Isola Rizza Dish. Silver plate with combat scene showing Byzantine cataphract and Lombard. From the Isola Rizza Treasure, c. 510 CE. Source: Wikimedia.

Classical Greek and Roman Influences

The Byzantine authors mentioned above owed a great deal to centuries of Greek and Roman military philosophy, dating back to the writings of the Greek general Aeneas Taktikos in the mid fourth century BCE through the publication of Publius Vegetius Renatus’ De Re Militari in the fourth century CE. The art of war in Hellenic Greece evolved with the Greeks’ elevating it to a science through the introduction of “professors of tactics,” military practitioners who either inspired others due to their military acumen or put quill to scroll in order to develop better martial skills in offensive and defensive operations on the battlefield, when defending or sieging cities, and overall generalship. The first of these Greek military writers was Aeneas Taktikos (fourth century BCE) who wrote On the Defense of Walled Cities in 357 BCE. Aeneas Taktikos was an experienced soldier operating in the Peloponnesus and western Anatolia, who proved influential to later authors. Mercenary commanders like Xenophon (c.430-c.354 BCE), Iphicrates (c.412-353 BCE), and Chabrias (c.420-356 BCE) translated their experience on the battlefield into military reforms, and in the case of Xenophon, treatises on generalship, tactics, and horsemanship.  Xenophon’s most famous work, the Anabasis (“The March Up Country”), details his time serving as a young mercenary in the Greek “Army of Ten Thousand” for the Persian pretender Cyrus the Younger and their treacherous journey marching upriver from Mesopotamia to northern and then western Anatolia. He also wrote short treatises on how to break, train, and care for horses and the duties of cavalry officers in a type of detail emulated later in Byzantine manuals. Greek military theorists continued to write under Roman occupation, with the first century CE’s Onasander describing the duties of a commanding general and Claudius Aelianus (more commonly Aelian, c.175-c.235 CE) basing his tactical theories on earlier Hellenistic models. Both Greek authors influenced the writings of later Byzantine authors, especially Emperor Leo VI (“the Wise” r.866-912) views on generalship.  Roman authors writing in Latin also contributed to military philosophy during the Roman imperial era. Sextus Julius Frontinus (c.40-103 CE), a prominent civil engineer, soldier, and senator, wrote Strategemata (c.84 CE) describing successful strategies and tactics of prominent Greek and Roman generals, seen through the eyes of an experienced commander and civil servant.  And the most famous Roman military theorist, Publius Vegetius Renatus (c.365-450 CE) penned his influential work De Re Militari (alternatively known as Epitoma Rei Militaris) as a critical analysis of the Roman military of his own day, by providing written guidance on the workings of the earlier Roman military of the late Republic and early Empire, at time when it was operating at its greatest efficiency. This work would have been known to later Byzantine authors but was incredibly influential in Catholic Europe throughout the medieval era.

Emperor Maurice’s Strategikon (c.590 CE)

The Byzantine military authors studied below inherited both Greek and Roman treatises dating back nearly a thousand years and use those works of military philosophy as a foundation for their own military manuals for the next half millennium to fight different kinds of adversaries emphasizing different forms of warfare. Emperor Maurice (r.582-602 CE) faced the rapid contraction of territories won during the reign of Emperor Justinian (r.527-565 CE), requiring a defense-minded grand strategy and new tactical approaches to ward off the approaching enemies. After Justinian’s death in 565 CE the Byzantine’s lost land in the Balkans to the Avars and southern Slavs, and in Italy to the Lombards. Byzantium’s eastern enemy, the Sassanian Persians, seized Syria, Palestine, and Egypt from the Eastern Roman Empire.  In response to this increased threat environment, Maurice, or perhaps one of his generals, penned a manual to help the beleaguered Byzantine army, asserting in the Strategikon’s prelude:

“The state of the armed forces has been neglected for a long time and has fallen so completely into oblivion, so to speak, that those who assume the command of troops do not understand even the most obvious matters and run into all sorts of difficulties….”

Photo at right: Gold solidus of Byzantine Emperor Leo VI “the Wise.” Leo’s Taktika incorporated the writings of Greek and Roman military theorists, as well as earlier Byzantine manuals. Source: Wikimedia.

Maurice’s Strategikon dates to around 590 CE and consists of twelve chapters organized as "books" on the strategy and tactics employed by the Byzantine army during the sixth and seventh centuries. It primarily focuses on cavalry tactics to counter the excellent Persian equestrian tradition. The Strategikon also includes several chapters on infantry warfare, fortification and siegecraft, logistics, and the training of new recruits, as well as advice to commanders in the form of specific instructions and military maxims designed to assist against specific enemies. A central theme in the Maurice’s manual, written at a time when the empire’s military resources were spread too thin, is the importance of military intelligence, careful planning, and economy of force, over reckless offensive, stating it was preferable to “hurt the enemy by deceit, by raids, or by hunger” than lose a large decisive battle. 

Emperor Leo VI’s Taktika (c.895-908 CE)

Byzantium’s strategic position continue to deteriorate after the death of Maurice with the rapid expansion of Islam out of Arabia and across Byzantine territories in the Levant and North Africa. By 800, the Byzantine Empire only retained Constantinople, Asia Minor and parts of the Balkans and the Italian Peninsula. The loss of wealthy cities like Damascus, Alexandria, Antioch, and Carthage to Islam weakened Byzantine finances. Emperor Basil I (r.867-886) began the Macedonian Dynasty (867-1056 CE) that eventually expanded Byzantine territory, revitalized imperial cities, supported a rich literary and artistic revival, and converted Slavic peoples to Eastern Orthodox Christianity.  However, when Basil’s successor, Leo VI (“the Wise,” r.886-912 CE) became emperor in 886, he lamented at the state of the military he inherited, believing sound instructions could revive Byzantine military institutions. Leo’s Taktika was either written by or on behalf of the emperor, and was later edited by his son, Constantine VII (r.913-959 CE). Drawing on the military treatises of the Aelianus, Onasander and the Strategikon of emperor Maurice, this manual was organized into two parts, the first concentrating on contemporary military practices (twenty chapters or “constitutions) and an epilogue, and the second on classical Greek and Roman military practices (twelve “constitutions”). The Taktika also includes a section on naval warfare. But perhaps most notable is Leo’s inclusion of “cultural intelligence” sections to his manual, designed to assist commanders in understanding their enemy better from more than just a military perspective. Leo VI’s Taktika is another of the major works on Byzantine military tactics, written on the eve of Byzantium's "Age of Reconquest" during the reign of the Macedonian emperors, and no doubt was a contributing reason for his successors’ military successes.

Emperor Nikephoros II Phokas’ Praecepta Militaria (c.965 CE)

Known most often by its Latinized title, the Praecepta Militaria was also written either by or on behalf of a Byzantine emperor, in this case the short-reigned Nikephoros II Phokas (r.963-969 CE) who wanted a military manual to instruct his armies on how to fight the Arab Abbasid caliphate (750-1258 CE) in Cilicia (the southern coast of Anatolia) and Syria in a return to Byzantine offensive campaigns to expand imperium.  Influenced by the anonymously authored Sylloge Tacticorum dating from the early tenth century, the Praecepta Militaria is only six chapters long, spending four of those chapters on refining Byzantine infantry and cavalry in combined arms operations featuring new heavy infantry menavlatoi, traditional heavy cavalry kataphraktoi (cataphracti) and even heavier cavalry klibanophoroi (clibanarii). The final two chapters deal with creating a secure encampment on campaign and the importance of gathering military intelligence through the use of spies. Nikephoros’ brother, Leo, is believed to have penned a twenty-five-chapter treatise entitled De Velitatione (“On Skirmishing”) dedicated to prosecuting a border war, with content emphasizing reconnaissance, signaling, guerrilla warfare, delaying actions, and night fighting, once again with a premium placed on indirect warfare over decisive engagement.

Photo at right: Image from Skylitzes Illuminated Manuscript depicting a Byzantine siege of a citadel, eleventh century. Notice the Byzantine soldiers manning a beam-sling catapult using ropes and human power to sling the projectile. Source: Wikimedia.

Although short reigned, Nikephoros was a successful soldier-emperor, putting these military maxims to good use. He continued the reconquest of southeastern Anatolia, defeating the emir of Tarsus and recapturing Cyprus in 964 and reorganizing these lands into new themes.  He went on to expel any Muslim who did not convert to Christianity and then invited Armenian and Syrian Christians to homestead in the newly depopulated but fertile lands.  Nikephoros used these new bases to invade northern Syria, conquering both Edessa and Antioch, while his Christian Armenian allies raided and sacked the capital of Muslim Armenia. However, successes along the Eastern frontier were balanced by souring relations with the Bulgars, requiring the attention of his indirect successor, Basil II (“the Bulgar-Slayer”, r.976-1025). Basil inherited the sound military principles expressed in the Praecepta Militaria and De Velitatione and applied them to his campaigns of expansion into the Balkans, Mesopotamia, Armenia, and Georgia in what would be the last major period of imperial expansion in Byzantine history. 

Taktika of Nikephoros Ouranos (c.1000 CE)

The Taktika of Nikephoros Ouranos is a vast collection of military scholarship compiled around 1000 CE by a brilliant Byzantine general during the reign of Basil II. It represents and last and longest of the Byzantine manuals and incorporates material from classical Greek, Roman and Byzantine military literature dating back to Aeneas Taktikos in the fourth century BCE to Nikephoros II Phokas’ Praecepta Militaria in the tenth century CE, modified and supplemented by Nikephoros’ own observations as a commanding general in Basil’s campaigns against the Bulgarians in the Balkans and the Arabs in Syria. Pulling fourteenth centuries of military thought into one volume, Nikephoros Ouranos’ Taktika consists of 178 chapters, much of it paraphrasing Leo VI’s Taktika and Nikephoros II Phokas’ Praecepta Militaria, however, there are unique additions on raiding into enemy territory and the peril of breaking camp in close proximity to the enemy. He also has a chapter dedicated to the psychological aspects of siege warfare, where he offers the advice of alternating clemency and severe punishment when negotiating with besieged defenders. And again, the importance of military intelligence is highlighted: “The commander of the army must first make investigations through spies, prisoners, and defectors and find out the situation of each enemy area.…” Most notably, this work represents the apex of Byzantine military thought during a time of Byzantium’s resurgence. The second half of the eleventh century witnessed Byzantine Italy overwhelmed by the Norman adventurer Robert Guiscard’s (c.1015-1085) expansion southward, Turkish incursions into eastern Anatolia, and an inordinate amount of court intrigue in Constantinople. These forces combined to roll back recent territorial gains and weaken Byzantium’s overall strategic position. In August 1071 Romanus IV Diogenes (r.1068-1071 CE) was defeated by the Seljuk Turks at the battle of Manzikert, leading to the collapse of Byzantine defenses in Anatolia and a loss of most of the peninsula to Turkish invasion and ultimately migration and settlement. The Byzantine Empire would be fighting mostly defensive wars for the remainder of its existence until the fall of Constantinople in May 1453 to the Ottoman Turks. 

Common Characteristics of Byzantine Military Manuals

Each of the Byzantine military manuals mentioned above have similar characteristics.  The authors served in the Byzantine military in positions of authority, either as soldier-emperors or high-ranking officers, and each of the authors understood the importance of building on tradition with the inclusion of important information from previous manuals. Indeed, each author looked to the past with reverence and included examples of superior generalship and military organization from the classical Greek and Roman worlds, or more recent Byzantine military experience. Moreover, these manuals were written at a time of intense military activity when the Byzantine Empire was either fighting for its very existence in defensive wars, or on the verge of successful offensive action to expand imperial possessions. Common themes included implementing or reinforcing training and drilling to instill discipline, as well as military justice when order and discipline breaks down. Security on the march and when making and breaking camp, effective use of infantry and cavalry in combined arms operations, and coherent unity of command are also frequent topics.

Photo at right: Map of the Byzantine Empire at the death of Basil II, c.1025. Source: Wikimedia.

Each author adapted his manual to the geopolitical realities of time and place and the martial capabilities of specific adversaries. All Byzantine treatises emphasize the relationship between an innovative military organization and successful strategies and tactics, and the role of superior generalship in implementing both. The functions of reconnaissance, military intelligence, and spy craft to prepare the battlefield is also stressed. Fortification and siegecraft is discussed, with some works including chapters on naval warfare.  And significantly, military logistics is treated as a science by Byzantine writers, with a clear understanding of its role in sustaining morale and moving, supplying, and maintaining an army in friendly and enemy territory.

Legacy

The military manuals mentioned above helped shape Byzantine military theory and practice throughout the medieval era but were not well known in Catholic Europe. In this region Vegetius’ De Re Militari dominated Western military thinking for a thousand years, with his work translated into multiple vernacular languages throughout the Middle Ages and new editions adding very little useful commentary. However, in the Byzantine East, warfare was studied as art and science in a manner quite recognizable to a modern professional Soldier, Sailor, or Marine, with each manual testing, revising, and building on the maxims and conclusions of earlier works. In this way, these Byzantine military treatises share much in common with current field manuals. The table of contents of the United States Marine Corps Small Wars Manual, first published in 1940, looks very similar to the table of contents of the De Velitatione, adjusting for twentieth century military technologies. The USMC’s Warfighting manual (MCDP 1), first published in 1989, draws on the writings of respected military theorists to introduce chapters, from Sun Tzu to Clausewitz, in a manner similar to how Byzantine writers pulled from the writings of Greek and Roman military theorists to inform their own works.  Modern military manuals, like their Byzantine antecedents, blend tradition with innovation, always attempting to strike the right balance between military theory and practice to forge the best fighting force.  Maurice, Leo, and the two Nikephoroses would be proud.

Suggested Readings:

Primary sources

Chatzelis, Georgios. Byzantine Military Manuals as Literary Works and Practical Handbooks: The Case of the Tenth Century Sylloge Tacticorum, Routledge, 2019.

Dennis, George T. The Taktika of Leo VI: Revised Edition. Dumbarton Oaks, 2014.

Dennis, George T. Maurice's Strategikon: Handbook of Byzantine Military Strategy. Dumbarton Oaks, 2001.

Dennis, George T. Three Byzantine Military Treatises.  Dumbarton Oaks, 1985.

Haldon, John. A Critical Commentary on the Taktika of Leo VI. Dumbarton Oaks, 2014.

Sullivan, Dennis F. Siegecraft: Two Tenth-century Instructional Manuals. Dumbarton Oaks, 2000.