The Battle of Kasserine Pass in Tunisia was a significant moment during World War II as it marked the first major engagement between American and German forces. The Kasserine Pass was a critical point of convergence for the Allied supply lines, which were essential for the success of the North African campaign. The battle took place in Tunisia on 14 February 1943 and was a resounding defeat for the United States Army. The German offensive, led by Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, was a prelude to a series of clashes that became known as the Battle of Kasserine Pass, which lasted for one week. The battle was a sobering moment for the Allied forces, as it exposed the weaknesses in their strategy, chain of supply, and military tactics.

The war in North Africa had been going well for the Allies until the Battle of Kasserine Pass. In November 1942, British Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery defeated Rommel at the Second Battle of El Alamein and was chasing him out of Egypt and Libya. Around the same time, British and American troops seized control of Morocco and Algeria, opening up another front and pushing east. Until February, the Americans had only fought Vichy French forces, who were largely ambivalent about fighting, but on occasion, they fiercely resisted. Just days after the Anglo-American invasion, the leader of the Vichy French forces agreed to switch sides, allowing the Allies to enter Tunisia and head straight towards Tunis, Rommel's main supply base.

Hoping to relieve the pressure on his western flank to better fend off Montgomery's Eighth Army in southern Tunisia, Rommel crafted a plan to attack the thinnest part of the Allied line in Tunisia, which was manned by mostly untested American forces. U.S. forces were positioned along the Eastern Dorsal of the Atlas Mountains, which ran in a roughly north-south axis through northern Tunisia. Rommel intended to drive through the American lines and push on past the Kasserine Pass, which was in a range known as the Western Dorsal. By breaking through those lines, Rommel would've been able to destroy American forces, capture their supplies, and disrupt Allied efforts to concentrate and resupply their forces along the Algeria-Tunisia border.

The inexperienced American Army at Sidi Bou Zid were no match for the battle-hardened soldiers of Rommel's Afrika Corps, who outmaneuvered and almost wiped them out within a few days. Experienced Germans in superior tanks, particularly the Panzer IV and Tiger models, smashed through American lines. Coordinated attacks by Stuka dive-bombers also wrought havoc, especially on U.S. units sent in as reinforcements. One American unit alone lost 40 of its 47 tanks.

Top photo: North Africa, Tunis.- Field Marshal Erwin Rommel (saluting with marshal's baton) and Lieutenant Colonel Fritz Bayerlein, standing in the car, passing motorized troops, including soldiers in captured American half-track M3. Source: Wikipedia, Public Domain. Click to enlarge.

Bottom photo: American infrantry squad at the site of a destroyed German tank. Source: U.S. National Archives, Public Domain. Click to enlarge.

The Germans then drove on to Sbeitla (or Sufetula), just east of Kasserine, where they dug in for an expected American counterattack. With the Americans repositioning to support the engagement at Sidi Bou Zid, Rommel launched a second thrust with some 160 tanks, half-tracks, and guns against the city of Gafsa far south.

Rommel then took the town of Feriana, between Gafsa and Kasserine, capturing American supply depots and airfields along the way. With their lines broken and their forces in disarray, the Americans retreated to Kasserine Pass. On 19 February, Rommel's two pincers clashed with the inexperienced Americans guarding the pass. The Americans put up stiff resistance but couldn't hold the line, as American 37 mm anti-tank guns, mounted on jeeps, half-tracks, and M3 Stuart tanks were woefully inadequate, earning the nickname "squirrel rifles." The Germans smashed through Kasserine Pass, leaving a battlefield littered with American tanks and half-tracks. German thrusts through the Pass pushed the Americans more than 50 miles back from their original lines.

Rommel's victory was only a brief respite for the Germans, as the Americans regrouped and their artillery and airpower arrived in force, Rommel's thrusts were beaten back. With Montgomery fast approaching from the south and the German supply lines extended, Rommel ordered his forces to withdraw on February 23. Rommel had inflicted serious casualties on the Americans. The losses sustained by the American forces were staggering with "over six thousand Americans had been killed and wounded in the fighting, and a further three thousand taken prisoner. The biggest casualty had been 1st Armored Division, which had lost around half its number." (Holland 2006, 572)

Carlo D'Este, in his review of Dwight Eisenhower's leadership at Kasserine, writes of Lieutenant General Lloyd Fredenhall's belief that fault and blame for the route fell to Lieutenant General Kenneth Anderson, commander of the British First Army and 1st Armored Division commander, Major General Orlando Ward. Fredenhall asserted that "'Kasserine was Eisenhower's first real battle; taking it all in, his performance was miserable. Only American firepower, and German shortages, had saved him from a humiliating defeat.' The only faintly positive postscript to this fiasco came from Rommel, who was not deceived by the poor American performance and beleived that, once matured by combat, the U.S. Army would prove a formidable foe." (D'Este 2003, 394)

The financial cost of the Allied losses was also immense. The US II Corps lost 183 tanks, 104 half-tracks, 208 guns, and 512 trucks and motor vehicles. The Germans captured some of these materials, which was a significant gain for them. Additionally, the Allies lost crucial supplies and fuel, with the Germans seizing over 215 cubic meters of gasoline and lubricants, along with 45 tons of ammunition.

The Germans suffered less "than 1,000 casualties including 201 dead" and lost "183 tanks, 104 half-tracks, more than 200 guns, and 500 jeeps and trucks." Decades after the battle, Gen. Omar Bradley described it as a "complete disaster." "Even these many years later, it pains me to reflect on that disaster," Bradley said in an autobiography published in the 1980s. "It was probably the worst performance of U.S. Army troops in their whole proud history."  (Atkinson 2007, 389) 

Bibliography

Atkinson, Rick. An Army at Dawn: The War in North Africa, 1942-1943, Volume One of the Liberation Trilogy. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2007.

D'Este, Carlo. Eisenhower: A Soldier's Life. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2003.

Holland, James. Together We Stand: North Africa 1942–1943: Turning the Tide in the West. London: HarperCollinsPubishers, 2006.

Moorehead, Alan. Desert War: The Classic Trilogy on the North Africa Campaign 1940-1943. London: Aurum Press, 2001.