To War History Network members familiar with George Washington and a few Revolutionary War battles, the introductory, theme setting statement: “There was in the end no way in which the Americans could have ultimately been denied their independence; but the war that was fought to achieve it was substantially a naval war, and it was at sea that it would be decided” can be stunning.  Follow that with the quote from Washington: “Whatever efforts are made by the land armies, the navy must have the casting vote in the contest” and readers know that they will be in for a different history of the War that broadens most people’s visions of the American Revolution by placing it in the context of a world war.  It achieves this by illustrating the role of navies in the War and how combat in other theatres affected the Revolution and was affected by it.

The tale begins by a recognition that the Royal Navy that had been shaped by two centuries of successful European war largely against the Spanish, Dutch and French, in home waters, was ill-suited for its role in the American Revolution.  Its fleet of mostly ships of the line was irrelevant to the tasks of transporting men and supplies across the Atlantic.   The Royal Navy’s was challenged, American, French and Spanish navies and privateers in four theatres: home waters; North America; West Indies; and Gibraltar.  Shifting demands on resources would play roles in the course of battle and its outcome.

This work casts the glorious victories of Minutemen, John Paul Jones (who is not even mentioned in this tome) and George Washington in a more subdued light.  Speaking of 1778, the text opines “In many ways the West Indies now ranked as the most important overseas theatre.  It was widely believed that they were crucial to the British economy and commerce, while the French islands represented a target of considerable importance.  Their loss would be a damaging blow to France, and the King was willing, in order to avenge ‘the faithless and insolent conduct of France’ to come to terms with the colonists if it enabled the conquest of the French islands.” (P. 49)  Looking ahead to the peace terms, the American colonies were merely one part of the puzzle. on which peace was agreed.  The United States received their independence, true, with the chance to return to Mother England, but other interests were also resolved.  Spain relinquished its claim to Gibraltar, but retained Minorca and West Florida, which it had captured from the British, and gained East Florida, while returning the Bahamas to Britain.  The Dutch regained Ceylon and kept the Cape of Good Hope, but lost Negapatam (southern India) to the British and conceded trading rights with the Spice Islands to them.  France weakened Britain through the loss of her American colonies, and also recovered St. Lucia, Saint-Pierre and Miquelon (and extended their fishing rights there) and possessions in India, along with retaining Tobago that it had taken during the war.

After an overview of the American War, the following chapters focus on individuals and battles that played roles in the war in America and the West Indies.  Although the subtitle highlights the Royal Navy, chapters are devoted to Comte d’Estaing and Comte de Grasse of the French Navy.  Not all of the battles occurred on American soil or in its waters, as chapters entitled “Martinique” and “St. Eustatius” illustrate.  American battles such as King’s Mountain, Cowpens and Yorktown are presented.  Throughout, author Quintin Barry skillfully weaves the stories of the naval forces into those of the land battles.  Early in the war breaches of the blockade were punished by a naval raid on the Rnglishtown of Falmouth. He shows how the arrival of British and French fleets from the West Indies determined that American offensives should be directed toward the southern colonies, rather than New York and how the French superiority in the Chesapeake compelled the surrender of Cornwallis’ Army.

Although I greatly enjoyed this book, I am always suspicious when I can identify an error.  The portrait that is identified as that of John Byron Cooper on page 53 is repeated as that of Sir Thomas Graves on page 95.  Hopefully this is an isolated mistake and not an obvious example of a pattern.

This is a fairly short book that should be read slowly for understanding.  This volume greatly enhanced my understanding of the American Revolution.  Quintin Barry has placed the movements of armies and roles of navies into a sequence that explains their interrelationships, rather than as merely disjoined bombs bursting in air that light the path to victory at Yorktown and the end of the war.  For Americans, it presents an opportunity to “see the other side”.  For Loyalists or British, it presents examples of where their champions, both generals and admirals in the New World and politicians in the Old, made errors and why.  The bibliography is a guide to further reading, both in popular and specialist genres.  The index is also helpful.

I recommend Crisis At The Chesapeake to War History Network members  interested in the American Revolution, the Royal Navy of the late Eighteenth Century or the interplay between the Revolution and other concurrent theatres of combat.