War History is not limited to the exploits of generals, admirals and GI Joes.  As von Clausewitz remarked “War is nothing but a continuation of politics with the admixture of other means.”  As War History Readers know, war is admixed with domestic politics.  “Uniting America” is the extraordinary tale of Democrats and Republicans who joined to win World War II.  The main actors were President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Army Secretary Henry Stimson and Navy Secretary Frank Knox.  Neither RINOS nor mere tokens, Henry Stimson had served as United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York under Theodore Roosevelt, unsuccessful candidate for governor of New York, Secretary of War under William Howard Taft, Governor General of the Philippines under Calvin Coolidge and Secretary of State under Herbert Hoover.  Newspaperman Frank Knox had been the Republican nominee for vice-president in 1936.

Though both were involved in New York politics for decades, Stimson and FDR first met, at the president-elect’s request, at Hyde Park on January 9, 1933.  In what probably sufficed as the presidential transition of 1932, the two exchanged thoughts on issues, resulting in Roosevelt’s adoption of Stimson’s declaration that Japan’s annexation of Manchuria violated international law.  Thus, began perhaps the most important bipartisan political alliance in American political history. 

Timing of their moves was crucial.   Stimson and Knox’s acceptance of their appointments just before the Republican National Convention of 1940 sent a challenge to the isolationist wing of their party and may have affected the election of that year.  As amazing as GOP stalwarts joining a Democratic administration, was FDR’s willingness to turn leadership of the war making arms of government over to the very loyal opposition.  During and after the campaign, Stimson served as a back-door conduit to Republican 1940 presidential nominee, Wendell Willkie in obtaining support for, or at least preventing open opposition to crucial legislative initiative.  Willkie’s support for a form of selective service and silence on the deal to transfer destroyers to Britain facilitated approval of programs on which American preparedness depended.  

Controversy could not be avoided.  Stimson’s correspondence to Republican Sen. Henry Cabot Lodge noting that his knowledge and experience “will greatly enhance your usefulness to the country as a a United States Senator” through FDR into a rage.  When Stimson issued a ruling that active-duty Army personnel could not seek political office, Republicans claimed it attempted to prevent a presidential run by Gen. MacArthur.  

Wielding the investigator’s equivalent of a jewelers’ magnifier, Author Peter Shinkle searches each facet and detects every flaw to account for impacts of the Roosevelt-Stimson partnership.  Though initially opposed, Stimson admitted that the President’s project that materialized in the Doolittle raid had positive morale results domestically and internationally, but also produced Japanese reprisals in China.  Despite Chiang’s objections, Stimson appointed Gen. Joseph Stillwell to Command in Burma, frustrated the President’s plan to name New York mayor Fiorello LaGuardia a general, employing him instead in Italian-language radio broadcasts to Italy, and persuaded FDR to insist on an American commander of Overlord over a Briton with flagging enthusiasm for the invasion.  President and Secretary cooperated in a partially successful proposal for federal ballots for soldiers and sailors that ran into partisan and racially motivated opposition.  Chapters are devoted to struggles over rights for black Americans and the forced internment of Japanese-Americans and their impact on the reputations of Roosevelt Stimson and Knox.  Perhaps their most prescient initiative was for party realignment, with liberals migrating to the Democratic Party and conservatives to the Republican.  Neither would live to see it, but we have.  Are we better off today than we were in an age in which partisans saw cooperators across the aisle, rather than exclusively within their own parties? 

The ascension of Harry Truman brought a diminished role for Stimson.  Perhaps reflecting his preference for officials tested in electoral strife and limited confidence in his own abilities, the new president turned to Secretary of State James Byrnes for advice on issues of peace.  War History Network reads will appreciate Shinkle’s excellent account of the internal debate over whether to permit Japan to retain the Emperor in a peace settlement or to continue to demand unconditional surrender and use the atomic bomb to end the war.  Truman followed Byrnes until after the bombs had been dropped, only to accept surrender with the Emperor as Stimson had been recommending for months. 

Some reviewers have criticized the Epilogue for its unfavorable comparison of President Trump and other contemporary figures to the Roosevelt-Stimson team.  I view the Epilogue as the author’s attempt to tie historical precedent to current challenges.  Readers and reviewers should be cognizant of the message of this work which is, as stated by the author, “we did it before, we can do it again.”  Those agreeing with the description of recent events will enjoy this to the end.  A different view of the Epilogue is fair, but should not diminish appreciation for an excellent and, in my experience unprecedented, historical study of an otherwise overlooked segment of our history.