If asked to name the blackest day in American military history, War History Network readers might suggest the reduction of the Alamo on March 6, 1836, the destruction of the Seventh Cavalry at the Little Big Horn on June 26, 1876 or the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.  The correct answer is November 4, 1791 when 1,500 regulars and militia, the bulk of American armed forces of the time, under the command of Maj. General Arthur St. Clair were defeated by a numerically inferior force of Native American warriors along the Wabash. 

The states were huge and the interests irreconcilable.  Settlers were determined to possess lands west and north of the Ohio River, revenue from land sales was needed to finance the U. S. government and Native Americans could choose either war or withdrawal. 

Author Steven P. Locke has crafted a work that combines breath in scope and in depth in research.  He sets the scene by explaining the American world of 1791, the military preparations and initiatives after the Revolution, the land that was contested and the Eastern Woodland Indians who inhabited it.  He introduces the characters, the American commander and Governor of the Northwest Territory, Arthur St. Clair, Indian leaders, Buckongahelas, Little Turtle and Blue Jacket and subordinate figures. 

In 1791, America lacked a ready-to-fight army.  In order to pursue its mission of establishing an American military presence in the Northwest territory, St. Clair first raised an army of volunteers preparatory to commencement of the march.  The American effort was beset by a series of misfortunes, many self-inflicted.  The St. Clair, a native Scot who came to America as an officer in the British Army, resigned his commission, joined the rebels, served as an officer in the Revolution and as President of the Continental Congress before appointment as governor.  Stricken by gout at the start of the campaign, he often traveled in a hammock suspended between horses.  He seems to have been more seriously disabled than Gen. Shafter during the Cuban campaign of 1898.  Mutual contempt between St. Clair and the second-in-command, Gen. Richard Butler, led to destructive non-communication.  Commencing with a force half the planned size, its numbers were drained by enlistment expirations and desertions, individual and en masse, and insufficient supplies.  Expecting that no large-scale attack was imminent, St. Clair has sent some of his regulars on another mission and failed to entrench the army’s last camp.  Ironically, it was Indian tribes, with centuries long histories of raids and warfare against each other, who united to repulse the American threat. 

The description of the battle is detailed, but easy to follow.  Supplemented by maps, the Indian strategy of pre-dawn attack, the American counter-attack, devastating defeat and humiliating retreat are well narrated. 

St. Clair’s defeat was similar to, and relatively close to the site, of Braddock’s in 1755.  Like any disaster, the aftermath was varied.  The Indians enjoyed a short-lived respite.  George Washington was furious.  St. Clair was forced to resign his commission but was allowed to retain his position as governor.  He was never able to revive his reputation and died in poverty, while Little Turtle was treated as successful war leader by President Washington, Vice-President Adams and Gen. Kosciuszko.  Congress investigated the massacre and authorized a larger standing army.  

The text is well footnoted, the index assists in locating topics and the bibliography is a guide to further reading. 

War Along The Wabash is an excellent introduction to the Washington Administration’s Indian policy as well as that of the post-revolutionary United States and a guide to a significant, but often overlooked battle of the early Indian Wars.