The Battle of Hue, also known as the Siege of Hue, was one of the most significant and bloody events of the Vietnam War. The intense fighting between the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong forces, and U.S. Marines and Army soldiers and ARVN (South Vietnamese troops) lasted from 31 January to 2 March 1968, resulting in the death of thousands of soldiers and civilians. This battle challenged the confidence of the American public, who increasingly questioned the U.S. military involvement in the conflict.

The battle for the city of Hue was a significant moment in the larger military operations that were being conducted across Vietnam. The city was a vital transportation hub on the vital coastal Highway 1, which was essential to the supply routes used by both the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) and the United States military. Subsequently, controlling Hue was a high priority for the North Vietnamese. Strategically, control over the city would have been a significant blow to the Allied efforts in the region.

The allies comprised around 15,000 troops, including 11 ARVN battalions, 4 U.S. Army battalions, and 4 U.S. Marine Corps battalions, with support from the U.S. Air Force. On the other hand, the enemy forces were composed of 10 PAVN and VC battalions, numbering approximately 7,000 men. The allies had their bases in the vicinity of the city, with the Marine's Phu Bai Combat Base located 11 kilometers south of Hue, while the U.S. Army 1st and 3rd Brigades, 1st Cavalry Division and the 2nd Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, operated out of a series of firebases and landing zones between Phu Bai and Quang Tri. The allies, however, were not as well-prepared as they could have been, with both the Marine and the airmobile units operating near Hue in a state of flux as the Tết holiday began.

The enemy forces, on the other hand, had their headquarters in Base Area 114, approximately thirty kilometers southwest of Hue, where at least two PAVN regiments, two sapper battalions, and an assortment of VC local forces were stationed. Additionally, several local force companies operated in the districts surrounding Hue. However, unknown to allied intelligence, the enemy had recently transferred several more regiments and support units from Quang Tri Province to the vicinity of Hue. Among the new arrivals was the 7th Battalion of the 29th Regiment, 325C Division, and the 5th Regiment, a three-battalion unit that normally operated from Base Area 101 near Quang Tri.

In January 1968, during the Tet Lunar New Year celebrations, the North Vietnamese launched the Tet Offensive, which included a surprise attack on Hue. Prior to the attack, Hue had been lightly defended, with many of the ARVN troops taking leave to celebrate the holiday. The North Vietnamese and Viet Cong troops rapidly gained control of most of the city, causing chaos and panic in the streets as residents fled for their lives.

The ensuing battle was fierce, with the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong using the narrow streets and fortified buildings to their advantage. The American and South Vietnamese troops responded with a combination of artillery, tanks, and airstrikes, but the battle was fought by small groups of infantry and Marines engaging in close quarter combat. The fighting was slow and intense, resulting in heavy casualties and destruction of much of the city.

Top photo: Hue, South Vietnam, 4 February 1968: U.S. Marine infantry firing from cover behind a wall, keeping low from NVA sniper fire. Possibly at the Citadel. Public Domain, click to enlarge.

Middle photo: Hue, South Vietnam, 13 February 1968: U.S. Marine rifle squad advancing behind the security of a Marine Corps tank. Public Domain, click to enlarge.

Bottom photo: Hue, South Vietnam, 16 February 1968: U.S. Marines of 1st Battalion, 5th Marines dig out PFC Thomas A. Zwetow from the rubble of the collapsed Dong Ba tower he was standing on. PFC Zwetow survived the battle and although seriously wounded the young marine made it home. He passed on 19 January 1998. Public Domain, click to enlarge.

Photo album: Battle of Hue

On 28 January, the enemy units tasked with attacking the new city began moving into position 48 hours earlier than the northern wing tasked with attacking the Citadel. The southern wing, having a longer distance to march and more difficult terrain to cross, comprised the 804th Battalion, 4th Regiment, which marched from Phu Loc to a mountain camp twenty kilometers south of Hue, where most of the southern wing was gathered. On 29 January, the main body of the southern wing, the 804th Battalion, the 1st Sapper Battalion, the 815th and 818th Battalions of the 5th Regiment, the southern wing command group, and various supporting units descended from their mountain staging area and headed for the Ta Trach River, which stood between the attacking force and Hue. The units intended to use a ferry station ten kilometers south of the city to cross the river.

The North Vietnamese Army and Vietcong executed a well-coordinated and extensive offensive during the 1968 Tet holiday in Vietnam, which commenced on 30 January 1968. This assault had been in the making for several months, as the enemy forces had been diligently mobilizing resources and preparing. The attack was launched at varied South Vietnamese targets, including military and civilian installations.
The Khe Sanh combat base was under an ongoing siege by an enormous force of about 20,000 NVA troops that had commenced on 21 January. The enemy relentlessly attacked every provincial city, including the South Vietnamese capital of Saigon.

The primary target of the enemy's attack in this offensive was Hue, and they had amassed fourteen battalions initially, with another fifteen to eighteen battalions joining the fray subsequently. The 6th NVA Regiment was charged with seizing control of the Citadel, receiving numerous tactical commands on sites located on the northern side of the river, including such targets as the Mang Ca complex, Tay Loc Airfield, and the Imperial Palace. The 4th NVA Regiment had the objective of taking the southern city of Hue, with explicit instructions to capture various targets.
Remarkably, the NVA and Vietcong had superior intelligence on the impending fight, primarily through Human Intelligence that infiltrated the city, which gave them an edge over their unsuspecting American counterparts. Conversely, the American commanders were entirely ignorant of enemy plans and were caught off guard. Notably, the US underestimated the magnitude of the enemy's force at Hue, which the enemy took maximum advantage of.

One of the key issues that emerged during the Battle of Hue was the inadequacy of intelligence and coordination in planning. The North Vietnamese and Viet Cong forces were expected to be limited in size and scope, and the Allies were caught off guard by the scale of the attack. The battle also highlighted the lack of coordination among different branches of the Allied forces, resulting in separate, uncoordinated battles that made it difficult to achieve a unified victory.

In the end, the Allied forces recaptured Hue, but at a significant cost. The city had been destroyed, and the loss of life on both sides was severe. Estimates of civilian deaths ranged from 2,800 to 5,800, with over 1,600 reported as executed by North Vietnamese and Viet Cong forces. Military casualties were also high, with over 668 Allied forces killed and 3,707 wounded. The North Vietnamese and Viet Cong forces suffered losses of between 1,042 and 5,133, but the exact figures remain unknown.

The battle was significant because it was one of the longest and bloodiest of the Vietnam War, but also because it marked a turning point in public opinion towards the conflict. The intensity of the battle and the devastating impact on the city and its residents shocked the American public, who had grown increasingly disillusioned with the war. The media coverage of the battle contributed to the growing anti-war sentiment and helped to galvanize the peace movement in the United States.

The American public, already weary and skeptical of the war effort, became sharply disillusioned by the offensive. The media coverage of the attack brought the brutality of the conflict to the forefront of public consciousness and turned public opinion against the war.

Walter Cronkite, the trusted news anchor of CBS at the time, famously stated during a broadcast that the U.S. was "mired in stalemate" and suggested that negotiations were the only viable solution to the conflict. This statement was particularly significant, as Cronkite was known to be a respected and unbiased journalist. Johnson was known to trust Cronkite's opinion, and his proclamation was widely considered to be influential in shaping the president's decisions regarding the war.

By March of 1968, Johnson was grappling with the dilemma of how to extricate American troops from the war without appearing to concede defeat. The pressure from government officials and the general public was mounting, with only 26 percent of Americans approving of the president's handling of the war, and 63 percent disapproving. The president's decision to increase troops by only 22,000 despite the Joint Chief's recommendation for ten times that number, demonstrated his awareness of the public's dissatisfaction with the conflict.

As the situation grew increasingly dire, Clark Clifford, Johnson's new Defense Secretary, spoke frankly of the war's futility and stated that the U.S. needed to cut its losses and withdraw its forces. Johnson was secretly desperate to find an honorable end to the war by March of 1968. To this end, he spoke to the nation on March 31st about "Steps to Limit the War in Vietnam." He announced an immediate halt to the bombing of North Vietnam and his intention to engage in peace talks towards ending the conflict. At the conclusion of the speech, Johnson took the unprecedented step of declaring that he would not seek or accept the nomination of his party for another term as president, indicating his recognition of the unpopularity of his policies on the war.

Bibliography

Bowden, Mark. Hue 1968: A Turning Point of the American War in Vietnam. New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2017.

"Document – Walter Cronkite, “We Are Mired in Stalemate” CBS Evening News Broadcast (February 27, 1968)." Learning Link. Accessed November 10, 2023. https://learninglink.oup.com/access/content/schaller-3e-dashboard-resources/document-walter-cronkite-we-are-mired-in-stalemate-cbs-evening-news-broadcast-february-27-1968.

Karnow, Stanley. Vietnam: A History. New York, N.Y., U.S.A.: Penguin Books, 1984.

Lange, Katie. "Highlighting History: How "Tet" Began the End of Vietnam." U.S. Department of Defense. Last modified February 7, 2023. https://www.defense.gov/News/Feature-Stories/story/Article/3291950/highlighting-history-how-tet-began-the-end-of-vietnam/.

Laurence, John. The Cat From Hue: A Vietnam War Story. New York: PublicAffairs, 2008

Lawler, Andrew. "The Battle for Hué City." U.S. Naval Institute. Accessed November 9, 2023. https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/1999/july/battle-hue-city.

Sheftick, Gary. "Trapped, Soldiers Endure Brutal Firefight During Siege of Hue." www.army.mil. Last modified January 31, 2019. https://www.army.mil/article/216790/trapped_soldiers_endure_brutal_firefight_during_siege_of_hue.

"The Struggle for Hue: The taking of the Citadel and Aftermath." Marines.mil - Official Website of the United States Marine Corps. Accessed November 8, 2023. https://www.marines.mil/Portals/1/Publications/US%20Marines%20In%20Vietnam%20The%20Defining%20Year%201968%20%20PCN%2019000313800_4.pdf.