It is no secret that military troops have always prepared for war, and military readiness exercises are not something new. In some fashion, the world’s militaries have always exercised their combat capabilities. Whether the New Kingdom Egyptians, the ancient Greeks, Macedonians, or the Romans, the practice of exercising varying tactical formations abounds in military historiography. Even the Roman gladiatorial system employed specialized trainers in schools called ludi, which utilized a disciplined method to train ancient warriors for close-quarters combat (CQB) that became a foreshadowing of the “friendly versus friendly” mock combat that would develop over the centuries.[1]

RIGHT: Non-fixed-wing aircraft - UH-1E (specific to the U.S. Marine Corps) helicopter with the 2nd MEF makes its way across the Atlantic Ocean, October 1964.

Indeed, today’s modern military owes Prussian King Frederick the Great a huge debt of gratitude, as he was one of the earliest proponents of military readiness exercises. Ulrich Bräker, a soldier assigned to the 13th Prussian Infantry and veteran of the Seven Years’ War, records in his autobiography how Frederick initiated mock battles (maneuvers) involving “opposing” forces in thick forests and uneven terrain. Everything from artillery drills, bridge crossings, and flanking maneuvers encompassed what eventually became a routine practice for the Prussian army and thus birthed the practice of military maneuvers, which have since become a valuable indicator of just how ready a combat force is when the need arises to project combat power at a moment’s notice.[2]

And while Frederick the Great’s military maneuvers solely involved infantry forces, the obvious need for maritime exercises that might involve military and civilian vessels became self-evident as naval theorists pondered the writings of famed Navy strategist and philosopher Alfred Thayer Mahan, who wrote, “Seapower not only includes the arms by which the sea or any part is ruled but also the peaceful commerce and shipping from which alone a military fleet naturally and healthfully springs, and on which it securely rests.”[3]

In 1964, one of the nagging questions on the minds of United States Marine Corps combat leaders was whether a full Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) could be embarked, transported, and landed on a distant shore. After all, it had been since the Inchon landings in September 1950 that such a colossal endeavor had been attempted, and, true to Mahanian doctrine, MacArthur had relied upon some non-military naval support for the successful outcome.

A little more than a decade later, during the height of the Cold War, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) wanted the world to witness the effective intercontinental projection of U.S. naval power and, therefore, sanctioned Operation Steel Pike I (hereinafter referred to as Steel Pike).[4] This massive exercise was the largest peacetime amphibious exercise ever conducted on the shores of the Atlantic Ocean. It involved 28,000 U.S. Marines of the 2nd MEF, 2,000 Spanish Marines, 45 amphibious ships, 45 other combatant ships, 14 service ships, 7 Military Sea Transportation Service (MSTS) fleet ships, 100 helicopters, 11 submarines (two of which were nuclear-powered), and 10 U.S. Merchant Marine cargo vessels.[5]

 The overarching goal of Steel Pike was to project a force of combat-ready Marines onto three target beach areas along the southwestern coast of Spain to repel an aggressor. The secondary goal was to establish a short airfield for tactical support (or SATS) about 150 miles away at Almeria, which is on the Mediterranean coast of Spain. Similar to the World War II-era military exercise known as the GHQ Louisiana Maneuvers, in which two imaginary nations were on the brink of war, a fictitious scenario was created to add a sense of exercise realism for the participants. In this case, the imaginary [communist] nation of Luchado (Northern Spain) invaded the imaginary [noncommunist] nation of Proxima (Southern Spain) and was driving hard toward the sea.[6] 

 

In keeping with the Cold War “Domino Theory” of containing communism’s spread, the United States agreed to assist Proxima and designated an amphibious task force to do the job. The beach area southwest of Huelva was selected as the best landing site for the counter-invasion, and U.S. and Spanish Marines were tasked with storming the beaches in a modern version of Iwo Jima. And like the landings at Iwo Jima, color-coded beaches were assigned to the landing forces. Blue beach was designated for the Spanish Marines, green beach for U.S. Marines by landing craft, and yellow beach for U.S. Marines inserted via vertical envelopment using helicopters, something that had never been attempted.[7] During an interview with U.S. Marine Cpl. Bill Donohue, a veteran of Steel Pike, relayed that the use of helicopters to deploy ground infantry during this exercise was likely the “dry run” to gauge its effectiveness during the Vietnam War.[8]

LEFT: Map of the mythical nation of "Proxima."

Before Embarkation Day (E-Day), which was October 4, 1964, several exercise objectives were clarified for Steel Pike. These included the following: exercise amphibious force capability to embark, transport, and project the combat strength of the 2d MEF ashore; exercise the landing force in operations ashore; test antisubmarine warfare concepts; provide training in all phases of naval operations, and evaluate MSTS and merchant shipping.[9]

At an overall price tag costing 7 million dollars, and a distance of 3,500 miles across the Atlantic, the armada took approximately 12 days to reach its target destination, sailing at an average speed of 14.6 knots. To enhance the realism factor for validating anti-submarine warfare (ASW) tactics, eleven submarines were employed to simulate enemy submarine operations.[10]

In the gearing-up phase of this amphibious exercise, 141 U.S. Navy ships, carrying 33,000 naval personnel, departed the Atlantic Seaboard to project 28,000 Marines ashore with their heavy equipment, field gear, M-14 rifles, and associated infantry weapons, amounting to around 50,000 tons. The preparations were immense as equipment was checked, food stores loaded, and Marines based at North Carolina’s Camp Lejeune, Cherry Point, and New River Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) settled into their berths for the two-week journey across the ocean.[11]

                                                                             

Amazingly, all this tonnage was projected ashore in just 72 hours. This was due in large part to the exemplary skill of the U.S. Navy’s 8th Mobile Construction Battalion, better known as the Seabees. The Seabees constructed a 1,260-foot artificial causeway (the largest ever built by the Atlantic Fleet) to move equipment ashore. Additionally, the 4,000-foot SATS was put down in three days and was fully operational within a week, allowing 638 aircraft sorties to proceed as planned.[12]

While there was no live ammunition used during the exercise, there were significant risks involved. In a tragic turn of events, two H-34 helicopters collided during the landing, killing nine Marines and injuring 13 others. One Marine was crushed to death by a tank while he was sleeping in his sleeping bag, and a jeep driver was injured in a crash.[13] Amazingly, during one of the more harrowing activities of the exercise, there were no reports of Marines drowning or suffering injuries.

This harrowing activity involved climbing down rope cargo nets attached to the sides of transport ships. Former Marine Private First Class (PFC) Randall S. Wells Sr. (author’s father) stated in an interview that he was never even given prior training on descending a cargo net from the side of a transport ship. His first experience with such a precarious task was during the actual exercise when thousands of Marines were directed to clamber down cargo nets into waiting landing craft bobbing heavily in the sea some 20 to 30 feet below. Wells related how several Marines expressed legitimate fear as they performed a task they had never been trained for.[14] During another interview with a Steel Pike veteran, Lance Corporal Jim Elsener stated that the closest he ever came to death was climbing one of these rope ladders down the side of a U.S. Navy ship.[15]

During the overseas movement, the attack force engaged in no anti-air warfare. However, there were fighter sorties flown from the Carolinas to Spain. The jets had to refuel at the American base in the Azores Islands. Once their tanks were topped off, these jets flew on to Spain and landed at the newly constructed SATS airfield.[16] In a strange twist of irony, this author was stationed at that same base in the Azores twenty-two years after his father participated in Steel Pike.

LEFT: Private First-Class Randall S. Wells Sr. is having his M-14 inspected.

On October 26, 1964, the assault forces and helo-borne Marines began their inland trek off the beaches. Simulated combat ensued, bivouacs were established, and all the trappings of an unopposed amphibious landing took place. When it was all over, the 2nd MEF, augmented by Spanish forces, had maneuvered ashore for 4 days over an area of 170 square miles. On the afternoon of November 3, 1964, final reembarkation was completed, and the Marines prepared for a much-needed liberty.[17]

The stellar success of Operation Steel Pike would never have been possible without the assistance of the U.S. Merchant Marine and the exceptional training of the 2nd MEF. The Commander Amphibious Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet (COMPHIBLANT), Vice Admiral John S. McCain Jr., stated in a Congressional hearing that, “I would like to observe that as commander of the amphibious force of the Atlantic that I cannot execute a major amphibious assault without the merchant marine to augment the gaps that would have to be filled in the event of such an emergency.”[18]

Operation Steel Pike conclusively proved that the idea of support between national forces is both workable and sound. As in all military exercises, lessons were learned. The three significant lessons learned were: first, the concept of rapid augmentation of Navy-Marine forces with MSTS and charter ships was entirely practical. It was a great credit to all of the organizations involved during the exercise, and particularly the captains of the merchant ships, as to how well they aligned with an operation of this nature. Second, the timetables developed in the planning were realistic and were met. And, finally, the operational standards were high. This was due in large measure to the highly capable seamen embarked upon the ships, both Navy and civilian.[19]

Twenty years before Steel Pike, the planning, staging, and assembling required to place U.S. troops on European soil had taken nearly two years. During the Cold War, the United States did not have the luxury of lengthy planning and slow reaction that existed for Normandy and Okinawa. The U.S. Marines, Sailors, and U.S. Merchant Marine proved during Steel Pike that a force in readiness must be able to counter any threat in a matter of days.

 

Notes:

[1] Konstantin Nossov, Gladiator: Rome’s Bloody Spectacle (Great Britain: Osprey Publishing, 2009), 142.

[2] Ulrich Bräker, The Poor Man Of Toggenburg being The Life And Times Of Ulrich Bräker, trans. Margaret Clare Britton (London, 1788), 70.

[3] Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783 (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1890), 18, Kindle.

[4] Maj. D. A. Cavagnaro, “Steel Pike I: “Christopher Columbus Slept Here.” Leatherneck (pre-1998) 75, No. 11 (1992): 86.

[5] Hearings before the United States House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, Operation Steel Pike I, 89th Cong., 1st sess., March 16-17, 1965, 11.

[6] Harvey Hall, “Steel Pike-I.” Leatherneck (pre-1998) 49, No. 1 (1965): 19.

[7] Hearings before the United States House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 23.

[8] Cpl. William Donohue, USMC, interview by author, Palmdale, CA., August 24, 2023. 

[9] Hearings before the United States House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 26.

[10] Ibid., 53. 

[11] Hall, “Steel Pike-I,” 19.

[12] J.W. Hammond, “STEEL PIKE I.” Marine Corps Gazette (pre-1994) 49, No. 1 (1965): 51.

[13] Cavagnaro, “Steel Pike I: “Christopher Columbus Slept Here,” 88.

[14] PFC Randall Wells Sr. USMC, interview by author, Kingman, AZ., May 14, 2023.

[15] LCpl James Elesner, USMC, interview by author, Palmdale, CA., April 3, 2023.

[16] Hall, “Steel Pike-I,” 20.

[17] Hearings before the United States House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 83.

[18] Ibid., 9.

[19] Ibid., 50.