The Battle of Okinawa took place from 1 April to 22 June 1945 and had a profound impact on the outcome of World War II. The island of Okinawa, situated around 350 miles from Japan's home islands, was a strategic location for the United States and the site of the largest land, air, and sea battle in history, as well as the longest in the Pacific War. The United States' goal was to secure the island, as its airfields and waters were essential staging areas for the planned invasion of Japan, known as Operations Olympic and Coronet. Winning the battle meant the potential deployment of an estimated one million troops authorized by President Harry S. Truman, further increasing the urgency and intensity of the fighting.

The scale of the conflict was immense, and the battle resulted in significant losses for both sides. The Japanese lost more soldiers and sailors at the Battle of Okinawa than in any other battle of the Second World War, and the civilian population suffered alongside them. More than one-third of the entire Okinawan population lost their lives during the 82 days of war, with many perishing at the hands of American firepower, and tens of thousands more by the Japanese Army. Still, others died fighting as conscripts to the Japanese effort, and tragically, many took their own lives due to Japanese propaganda that the American troops would rape, torture and kill. American marines, soldiers, and sailors had the added responsibility of caring for displaced Okinawans, but this was often relegated to secondary status by the demands and brutality of war.

The conflict also impacted the United States in profound ways. Despite boasting the largest war fleet ever to sail, the US Navy suffered more losses at Okinawa than in any previous battle, with over 60 ships being either sunk or damaged beyond repair. Japanese kamikaze pilots were responsible for many of these losses, with Japan deploying more suicide pilots at Okinawa than at any other Pacific landing or naval battle, except for the battle for the Philippines. The Japanese even planned to run their elite warship, the Yamato, aground at the island's shoreline, to provide additional firepower in support of the Japanese Army. However, the ship was sunk by US Navy and Marine Corps pilots on 7 April 1945, north of Okinawa.

The Japanese forces on Okinawa recognized that they were outnumbered and worked to implement a "defense in depth" strategy, which was a lesson learned from the numerous island battles that preceded Okinawa. The Japanese army relied heavily on the island's elaborate cave network to gain temporary relief and sanctuary from bombardment from US Navy destroyers and aviators and US Army and Marine Corps artillery and mortars. Despite their best efforts, the Japanese Navy and Air Force were unable to mount an effective counterattack, leaving the Japanese defenders vulnerable and unable to withstand the onslaught from the US forces.

The Japanese Emperor, Hirohito, became more engaged with the Supreme War Council and the direction of the war as the situation on Okinawa deteriorated. He removed his cabinet members and took steps to install a new government under retired Admiral Suzuki Kantaro, but there was no indication or movement to change the government's policy towards peace until after the loss on Okinawa. It was only at this point that Hirohito signaled his desire for peace with the United States and her allies and began looking for ways to end the conflict.

Top photo: Okinawa USMC Photo 17-2. "Marines firing on Japs with light machine gun." From the Eric Bonin Collection (COLL/5320), Marine Corps Archives & Special Collections, Quantico, Virginia. Official USMC photograph. Click to enlarge.

Middle photo: Okinawa USMC Photo 16-10. "6th Division flame thrower team blast Jap cave." From the Eric Bonin Collection (COLL/5320), Marine Corps Archives & Special Collections, Quantico, Virginia. Official USMC photograph. Click to enlarge.

Bottom photo: Okinawa USMC Photo 17-6. "1st Division Marine works on Japs with Tommy-Gun." From the Eric Bonin Collection (COLL/5320), Marine Corps Archives & Special Collections, Quantico, Virginia. Official USMC photograph. Click to enlarge.

Photo Albums: Archives Branch, Marine Corps History Division:  Okinawa: GySgt. Claude Canup Collection  |  Okinawa Operations 1945  |  Okinawa: Veterans Photo Pack

Robert Pape's article "Why Japan Surrendered" provides insight into the reasons behind Japan's decision to surrender without an invasion of the home islands during World War II. Pape scrutinizes three conventional explanations for Japan's surrender and discredits them with compelling analyses. These three conventional explanations include the continued atomic bombing, strategic conventional bombing, and America's guarantee to retain the emperor of Japan. He reasons that earlier strategic bombing campaigns had already inflicted more death and destruction on Japan than the atomic attacks. Thus, the atomic bombings could not have been the primary impetus for Japan's surrender. Additionally, Japan's population did not pressure their leadership to surrender as a result of bombing campaigns, nor did the Japanese Army lose discipline.

Pape argues that military vulnerability and not civilian vulnerability motivated the Supreme War Council to surrender. He affirms that Japan's strategy was unsustainable as the Allied sea blockade had cut off all outside sources of supply, crippling the key economic and military pillars supporting Japan's strategy. Further, the fall of Okinawa in June allowed American tactical airpower to penetrate Kyushu, the southernmost home island. The rapid collapse of the Japanese armies in Manchuria under Soviet attack also gave the Japanese leadership further proof of the futility of continuing the war against the Americans. Pape suggests that the defeat of Japan's elite division on Okinawa proved that saving the "best for last" on the home island was an ineffective strategy.

Pape notes that before the atomic bombings, strategic firebombing campaigns had already led to the loss of 58% of the population in Japanese cities with over 100,000 people and 66% of the population in cities with over one million citizens. This further supports Pape's argument that the atomic bombings alone were not the primary impetus for Japan's surrender. Additionally, Pape posits that the US could have avoided the invasion of Iwo Jima and Luzon, which was costly in terms of lives, and, instead, directly targeted Okinawa due to its proximity to the home islands.

Pape suggests that strategic air power is limited not by the capabilities of the attacker but by the vulnerabilities of the target. He argues that naval power, tactical air power, and land power were the decisive components that led to the ultimate defeat of Japan. The US used these components effectively at Okinawa, employing greater naval power, aircraft, and the largest amphibious invasion force of the war, ultimately culminating in the end of World War II in the Pacific.

The Battle for Okinawa: A Japanese Officer’s Account of the Last Great Campaign of World War II by Colonel Hiromichi Yahara is a captivating narrative that provides unparalleled insights into the Battle of Okinawa from the Japanese perspective. As the third in-command to Japanese Lieutenant General Ushijima, Colonel Hiromichi Yahara played a vital role in the strategic planning of the Okinawa campaign. Despite the failed Japanese effort to defend and win the campaign, Yahara survived and wrote an honest account of the events that took place in the battle.

Yahara's story is a tale of sacrifice, loss, and inevitability. His firsthand account of the battle reveals the truth about Japan's doomed strategy and their desperate attempt to resist the invading American forces. The Colonel's realization that defeat was inevitable on Okinawa is a testament to his unwavering commitment to the truth. He openly admits that Japan's emphasis on air power, which had failed them in earlier Pacific battles, was destined to fail them again during the Okinawa campaign.

However, it is Yahara's critical analysis of the failed Japanese battle plan that reveals the most valuable insights into the campaign. According to the original battle plans developed by Imperial Headquarters, the Japanese air force was to destroy the invading American armada before a full-scale amphibious landing. The 32nd Army garrisoned ashore was to play a minor role. However, Yahara's plan called for a massive troop buildup on Okinawa, a strategy that was later dismissed by Ushijima.

Yahara's detailed account of the Okinawa campaign is a firsthand testimony to the tragic consequences of Japan's ill-prepared strategy. His observations on the deployment of insufficient numbers of ground troops at the last minute and the failure to defend landing strips built all over the Pacific are of significant historical importance. His criticism of the last-minute decision to pull the 9th Division and other forces to the Philippines and Taiwan offers further insights into the strategic blunders that doomed the Japanese effort to defend Okinawa.

Moreover, Yahara's account reveals the Emperor's understanding of the implications of the campaign's victory or defeat on the future of Japan. The intimation and discussion that the Okinawa campaign became an excuse to end the war is also evident in his story. It is noteworthy that the Japanese Imperial Headquarters replied to the question of why the island's forces were reduced to an ineffective defensive fighting strength before the American invasion, saying that Okinawa was merely a front-line action. This remarkable piece of information adds a new layer of complexity to the controversy surrounding Japan's surrender and the war's end.

Bibliography

Appleman, Roy, James M. Burns, Russell A. Gugeler, and John Stevens. Okinawa: The Last Battle. New York, NY: Skyhorse Publishing, 2011. First published 1948 by the Historical Division, Dept. of the Army.

Feifer, George. The Battle of Okinawa: The Blood and the Bomb. Guilford, CT: Lyons Press, 2001. First published as Tennozoan: The Battle of Okinawa and the Atomic Bomb by Houghton Mifflin, 1992.

Pape, Robert A. “Why Japan Surrendered,” International Security 18, No. 2 (Autumn 1993): 154-201, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2539100 [accessed December 2, 2012]

Sarantakes, Nicholas Evan. Seven Stars: The Okinawa Battle Diaries of Simon Bolivar Buckner, Jr., and Joseph Stilwell. College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2004. Kindle Edition.

Spector, Ronald H. Eagle Against the Sun: The American War with Japan. New York: Vintage Books, 1985.

Toland, John. The Rising Sun: The Decline and Fall of the Japanese Empire, 1936-1945. New York: The Modern Library, 2003.

Wheeler, Richard. A Special Valor: The U.S. Marines and the Pacific War. Annapolis: Bluejacket Books, 2006.

Yahara, Hiromichi Colonel. The Battle for Okinawa: A Japanese Officer’s Eyewitness Account of the Last Great Campaign of World War II. Translated by Roger Pineau and Masatoshi Uehara. New York, NY: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1995.