The geographically colossal Russian Empire was literally being starved to death by its participation in Napoleon’s Continental System since its decree in 1806. Being denied the ability to sell its grain to a much in need Great Britain, coupled with massive debts from various wars and deeply devalued currency, the Russians under Tsar Alexander I felt that nearly the entirety of their woes stemmed from Napoleon, and they had to rectify that. Coincidently at the same time, Napoleon felt that the failure of his Continental System to strangle the economy of Great Britain and thus force them to the diplomatic table, was the fault of Russia’s and that they were not properly enforcing his edicts as to trade. Both sides began taking steps to prepare for war.

                                                                                                  Napoleon at the Battle of Borodino. Napoleon could never completely crush the Russian army, who lured him further into Russia stretching his supply lines. WikiCommons.

The inevitability of the coming war could strongly be attributed to the year 1810, when the French foreign minister Jean-Baptiste de Nompére de Champagny produced his “Report on Continental Affairs” for Napoleon which “argued that the alliance with Russia had served its purpose and that France should return to its traditional reliance on the Ottoman Empire, Sweden, and Poland to contain the ‘Russian imperial colossus.’”[1] This report served to validate what Napoleon already knew, that Russia’s lack of strict adherence to his Continental System was a detriment to his strategic plans and was directly hurting France (especially economically as French merchants thought they would be able to replace the English in the Russian markets which they were not able to do), therefore he would solve the problem militarily.

Three instances in 1810 were further steps toward the inevitable invasion and subsequent war with Russia. In June 1810, France annexed Holland, followed by new taxes on sugar, tea, pepper, and the like on 5 August and 17 September, followed by the December 1810 annexation of all the territory that ranged from Holland and Hamburg, including the Duchy of Oldenburg.[2] These measures by Napoleon were geopolitical and strategic steps in his planning for a war with Alexander and his Russian Empire.

First it allowed Napoleon to begin transferring and staging men and materials to these new locations in preparations for the invasion, which he knew would require enormous amounts of resources. Second, Napoleon knew that the new tariffs and annexation of Oldenburg in particular (Tsar Alexander’s sister was married to the son of the Duke of Oldenburg) would rankle and incense the Russians (which it did) leading them to retaliate with formal letters of protest (which were outright ignored by the French) and then their own tariffs on all luxury items that were imported from France, on 1 January 1811.[3]

                                                                                                   The French Army was utterly devesatated in Russia, suffering more from the Russian winter and campaign depravations than from combat. WikiCommons.

Further proof that the year 1810 was the red line in the forthcoming invasion with Russia can be found in how Napoleon had ordered his topographic team to secretly begin preparing maps for a Russian campaign. It was during this effort that a colonel of the engineers by the name of Ponthon, openly voiced his concerns about such a campaign when he said to the emperor “’Sire, in the name of the prosperity of France and of your glory, I implore you, abandon this war.’”[4] These direct concerns, which were extremely rare in the presence of the emperor himself, were dismissed and within a few days Napoleon remarked that: “’This war will be short.’”[5]

Therefore, utilizing legal, political, and military means in 1810, Napoleon began European preparations for the massive invasion of Russia that would encompass more men, material, horses, and supplies than had ever been brought to bear in a conflict up to that point.

Notes

[1] Alexander Mikaberidze, The Napoleonic Wars: A Global History (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2020), 529.

[2] “Franco-Russian Diplomacy, 1810-1812,” The Napoleon Series, https://www.napoleon-series.org/research/government/diplomatic/c_rufrdip1.html.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Georges Blond, La Grande Armée (London, UK: Arms and Armour, 1998), 298.

[5] Ibid., 298.

Bibliography 

Blond, Georges. La Grande Armée. London, UK: Arms and Armour, 1998. 

“Franco-Russian Diplomacy, 1810-1812.” The Napoleon Series. https://www.napoleon-series.org/research/government/diplomatic/c_rufrdip1.html.

Mikaberidze, Alexander. The Napoleonic Wars: A Global History. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2020.