Napoleon's Continental System: A Double-Edged Sword

Napoleon held the whole of Russia in contempt from its highest official, Tsar Alexander I down to the lowest peasant. Herein lies the rub by 1810: keep his alliance with Russia as a lackluster participant in his Continental System or turn his back on them? This disdain in many ways helped drive Napoleon to invade Russia, as he could not bear the embarrassment of them knowingly and willingly disobeying his edict as to the parameters of the Continental System. Even when presented with various reports and statements from his recalled ambassador to Russia as to their preparations, resolve, and improvements since their defeat at Friedland, Napoleon contemptuously replied “’One good battle will put an end to all your friend Alexander’s excellent resolutions, and to all his fortifications built on sand.’”[1] Therefore it was beyond Napoleon’s disposition to not beginning war preparations in 1810, even though allowing the Russians to remain status quo as they were at the time, would have been…

Read more…

Collaborators, Traitors, and Propaganda: Implementing Napoleon’s Occupation of Spain (1808–9)

Collaborators, Traitors, and Propaganda: Implementing Napoleon’s Occupation of Spain (1808–9) Historians of the Napoleonic War in Spain (1808–14) – also known as the Peninsular War or Spanish War of Independence – have highlighted its conventional and nonconventional nature – employing the term ‘hybrid warfare’ to describe the convergence of insurgent and traditional methods in conflict. While various forms of military resistance used in Spain were key to breaking the power of the First French Empire’s occupation army, the ways in which Napoleon relied on propaganda and collaborators to implement authority over a country deeply hostile to foreign rule were likewise factors in the regime’s persistence. Fighting behind enemy lines by disrupting communications, logistics, and acting against provincial authorities – insurgents eventually wore down the French through attrition in conjunction with British operations emanating from Portugal. However, Napoleon could not have successfully…

Read more…

Napoleon's Taking Leave of the French in Egypt: Abandonment or Justified?

Napoleon was very much an astute opportunist, be it political or military. This, combined with voluminous amounts of self-confidence, led Napoleon in his decision to return to the European mainland and therefore, leave his force in Egypt. This was justified for several important reasons.First, the military situation in Egypt was well in hand at the time with the victory at Fort Aboukir over Mustafa Pasha and his Turkish forces on 25 July 1799.[1] General Kléber was a seasoned soldier with ample resources for the task at hand, especially after the succession of French victories throughout Egypt and Syria. Napoleon had confidence that Egypt would “get along all right under Kléber” and he had accomplished what he was tasked to in Egypt to “found a colony” and to beat the Turks.[2]Above: Napoleon, depicted here by the French painter Maurice Orange, inspecting a discovered mummy. The future emperor knew that his destiny lay back in France and not in the desert seas of Egypt so when the…

Read more…

Napoleon's Police: Control by Other Means

(The following article first appeared in the October-November 2022 newsletter of The Napoleonic Historical Society. I am presenting it here to in an effort to reach as many readers as possible for this little discussed topic.) The safety and security of a people is the bedrock of any successful society. To achieve this, structured governments establish laws to guide the society along with measures of policing to ensure that said laws are obeyed, be they the Constables of England to the police officers of the United States. French policing under Napoleon Bonaparte (1769-1821) utilized various forces to not only maintain the peace and to enforce its laws, but to ensure compliance with edicts and proclamations. Policing and security in Napoleonic France and its territories was an evolved extension of governmental control to suppress and eliminate political dissent while enforcing Napoleon’s mandates. In the years preceding Napoleon’s political ascendency, law and order was maintained by…

Read more…

"Vive l'Empereur!: The Rise and Fall of Napoleon's Military Maxims" (Part 4 of a Series of 4)

"Vive l'Empereur!: The Rise and Fall of Napoleon's Military Maxims" (Part 4 of a Series of 4) Two years later between 16-18 June of 1815 the ultimate folly would be that which has become synonymous with defeat and failure, Waterloo. The French army was reconstituted after the death knell that was the Russian Campaign of 1812, but it would never again be the Grande Armée of old, nor would its master. Failing to stem the inexorable tide of the over 300,000 troops of the Coalition armies of Austria, Prussia, Sweden, and Russia at the mammoth Battle of Leipzig from 16-19 October 1813, Napoleon was forced into what would become his first exile in May of 1814 to the tiny island of Elba off from the Tuscan coast.[1]  This was a time of reflection for Napoleon, where he self-assessed some of his military choices such as the Russian invasion and push to Moscow (which he came to lament) and his assessment of the Arthur Wellesley, Duke of Wellington (1769-1852), the newly appointed British…

Read more…

"Vive l'Empereur!: The Rise and Fall of Napoleon's Military Maxims" (Part 3 of a Series 4)

Victories would follow the pinnacle that was Austerlitz; the smashing of a resurgent Prussia during the Jena Campaign of 6-12 October 1806, the long-awaited defeat of the Russians at Friedland on 14 June1807 that would cost them over 30,000 casualties, the collective victories over the still combative Austrians during the Austrian War (Wagram Campaign) of 1809 and more. Though victories were there for Napoleon post-Austerlitz, so were the signs of declining military acumen and lapses in adhering to his own maxims.The frozen winter Battle of Eylau on 7-8 February 1807 is one such an example. The desire to catch and beat the Russian army, under the command of the Hanoverian-born Levin August von Bennigsen (1745-1826), drove Napoleon to seemingly ignore several of his Maxims beginning with unit support. Just a year prior in 1806 Napoleon has espoused that “The art of placing troops is the great art de guerre. Always place your troops in such a way that, whatever the enemy does, they can…

Read more…

"Vive l'Empereur!: The Rise and Fall of Napoleon's Military Maxims" (Part 2 of a Series 4)

Beginning with the saving of The Directory on 5 October 1795 with a “whiff of grapeshot,” followed by swift tightly interwoven military and political victories, Bonaparte was taking inspiration from one of historical influences, Julius Caesar as to his ascendency and his role of governance in France. “In such a state of affairs these deliberative assemblies could no longer govern; the person of Caesar was therefore the guarantee of the supremacy of Rome in the universe, and of the security of citizens of all parties. His authority was therefore legitimate.” Much like Caesar, Bonaparte saw his role as a literal savior of France, with its fortunes being inextricably melded with his own, thus making them one in the same in his mind.Having secured his position as First Consul, Napoleon resumed his military operations in 1800 with an audacious plan to defeat the Austrians in Italy that would culminate in a French victory at Marengo on 14 June of the same year. Speed of maneuver in…

Read more…

"Vive l'Empereur!: The Rise and Fall of Napoleon's Military Maxims" (Part 1 of a Series 4)

The late eighteenth and early nineteenth century bore witness to the rise and fall of Napoleon Bonaparte (1769-1821) and his Military Maxims. The Corsican born, artillery trained military acolyte, experienced a meteoric rise in political and military fortunes during the tumult of the late Revolutionary period of France. His battlefield successes during the age, often against numerically larger forces, would become the basis for his methodology of warfare. This methodology, along with Napoleon’s thoughts on such matters, would coalesce and become known as his Military Maxims.The development of Napoleon’s Maxims are closely interwoven in the man himself. The earliest indications of the fire and defiance against the traditional establishments of the day, were evidenced early in his burgeoning career. Having been sent to the Royal School of Brienne at the age of nine on 23 April 1779, Napoleon struggled to fit in with the other more cultured cadets, being smaller of build, easy to anger,…

Read more…

The Weather at Eylau: Auguereau's Misery

The weather at Eylau was the most incessant and formidable of opponents for all the belligerents and its impact was significant throughout the field of battlefield. The numerous streams and ponds were so frozen, and snow covered that French artillery and troops were able to move across them thus affording additional tactical deployment opportunities that otherwise might not have been possible. These cold, frozen conditions were measured by the Imperial Guard surgeon, Dominque-Jean Larrey to that of 14° Fahrenheit the night of 7 February and again in the early morning of 8 February when it had dropped even further to 2° Fahrenheit. The artic and piercing cold greatly impacted the triage and efforts of the surgeons to treat the wounded of the battle as well. In this instance, the cold proved to be a double-edged sword. The catastrophic cold took many lives, be they French or Russian that literally froze to death, while others, such as Larrey would note, were saved by the cold. This was…

Read more…

Napoleon and Russia: Fated for War?

ABOVE: Napoleon witnessing the burning of Moscow after he and the Grande Armée finally reached the Russian capital on 14 September 1812. Russia's failure to adhere to Napoleon's Continental System made his invasion of them nearly inevitable. WikiCommons.   Napoleon generally held the whole of Russia in contempt from its highest official, Tsar Alexander I (1777-1825) down to the lowest peasant. Herein lies the rub. This disdain in many ways helped drive Napoleon to invade Russia, as he could not bear the embarrassment of them knowingly and willingly disobeying his edict as to the parameters of the Continental System. Even when presented with various reports and statements from his recalled ambassador to Russia as to their preparations, resolve, and improvements since their defeat at Friedland, Napoleon contemptuously replied “One good battle will put an end to all your friend Alexander’s excellent resolutions, and to all his fortifications built on sand.”[1]Therefore it was beyond…

Read more…