"Vive l'Empereur!: The Rise and Fall of Napoleon's Military Maxims" (Part 4 of a Series of 4)

Two years later between 16-18 June of 1815 the ultimate folly would be that which has become synonymous with defeat and failure, Waterloo. The French army was reconstituted after the death knell that was the Russian Campaign of 1812, but it would never again be the Grande Armée of old, nor would its master. Failing to stem the inexorable tide of the over 300,000 troops of the Coalition armies of Austria, Prussia, Sweden, and Russia at the mammoth Battle of Leipzig from 16-19 October 1813, Napoleon was forced into what would become his first exile in May of 1814 to the tiny island of Elba off from the Tuscan coast.[1] 

This was a time of reflection for Napoleon, where he self-assessed some of his military choices such as the Russian invasion and push to Moscow (which he came to lament) and his assessment of the Arthur Wellesley, Duke of Wellington (1769-1852), the newly appointed British Ambassador to France as “a brave man.”[2] A degree of defeatism and boredom took hold of the Emperor during his exile until word reached him of the displeasure of the French people at the returned Bourbon monarchy. The unrest was an opportunity to return and give his people their Emperor back, which he swiftly took advantage, landing back on French soil on 1 March 1815. It must be noted that Napoleon’s health was suffering, the aftereffects of an attempted suicide gone wrong before his forced abdication in 1814. Persistent coughing and trouble breathing, in conjunction with his corpulent stature and being in his mid-40s presented a very different Napoleon than the one of the glories of 1796 or the early 1800s. This Napoleon was easily fatigued, had lost more than a few steps with his mental sharpness, and most tellingly, would suffer the consequences of failing to live by his own martial Maxims at Waterloo. 

Right: In this painting from before 1931, Napoleon is using a field spyglass to survey the ground before him. Napoleon expended great energy on trying to predict the movements of his enemy's and in turn, utilize his maxims to exact a favorable outcome. WikiCommons. 

Having secured a semblance of control over the government and having all overtures of peace rebuffed by the British and Prussians, Napoleon pulled together an army of 125,000 with which to confront the Anglo-Prussian total force of 230,000 (roughly 110,000 British and 120,000 Prussians).[3] His strategy was to conquer and divide; defeat Wellington and British first then turn and hammer the Prussians. A proverbially game of cat-and-mouse and one which worked AGAINST Napoleon. After securing some minor victories on 16 June over the British at Quatre Bras and part of the Prussian army at Ligny, Napoleon grossly contradicted or outright ignored one of his most stalwart tenants of war, force concentration. Maxim XXIX clearly states “When you have resolved to fight a battle, collect your whole force. Dispense with nothing. A single battalion sometimes decides the day.”[4] By sending off a large contingent of troops (over 30,000) to literally chase after the main Prussian army after Ligny, Napoleon had grievously deprived himself of valuable men and in the face of superior odds, which would prove fatal.[5]

The actual battle itself was marked by poor tactical decisions of Napoleon and his officers with one of the most egregious and costly being indicative of the lack of operational control (and battlefield judgement) that Napoleon exercised that day. The frontal assault by Jean-Baptiste Drouet, Comte d’Erlon (1765-1844) and his entire corps against Wellington’s center left in an attempt to roll up his line, was done without the support of other arms, such as cavalry. This requirement is contained in Maxim XLVII where “Infantry, cavalry, and artillery are nothing without each other,” which proved true, as without the needed French cavalry and artillery support, and combined with an unusual tactical formation that exposed his men to marauding artillery fire, d’Erlon and men were mauled and sent retreating. [6]

The high-water mark of the entire battle and the effective last gasp of the French at Waterloo were the massed cavalry charges. Marshal Michel Ney (1769-1815), misreading the movements of the British and with Napoleon being distracted by the arrival of the Prussians (who eluded their 30,000 strong French pursuers), took effective command of the battle and charged the British positions. Thousands upon thousands of cuirassiers, lancers, and chasseurs repeatedly charged British defensive squares, but without the support of infantry, were cut to pieces. Napoleon’s Maxim L, “Charges of cavalry are equally useful at the beginning, the middle, and the end of a battle. They should be made always, if possible, on the flanks of the infantry, especially when this last is engaged in front,” was ignored with Ney’s direct assault and without the support of arms of the infantry, proved futile, while awarding victory to the Allies.[7]

Ironically, Waterloo was in many ways a successful application of Napoleon’s Maxims, just by his enemies. Wellington and the stalwart Prussian Gebhard Leberecht von Blücher (1742-1819) had learned hard lessons from Napoleon and used them against him to victory at Waterloo, from doing the unexpected (such as Wellington having his men lay down in the field to avoid French artillery fire) to the rapid movement of troops (Blücher and the Prussians arriving earlier than anticipated which guaranteed victory).

Napoleon Bonaparte’s Military Maxims would be a double-edged sword. His martial career would see him both use them to their highest glory (such as at Austerlitz) as well as seemingly ignore them to his own peril (Waterloo). The concepts that would become Napoleon’s Military Maxims were never written down by Napoleon himself but were collected and pulled together from discussions with him and writings that he did make, especially during his time in final exile on Elba. The viability of any maxim relies on their execution which ultimately comes down to the person doing so. Napoleon with all of his prodigious talents from near limitless energy for work, a remarkable memory for recalling details, and fully grasping the big picture, was still a man and all men age and have faults. As such, as time passed, Napoleon aged in both mind and body, losing his edge over time, though his old brilliance flared up again from time to time.

Napoleon never divulged his full plans, strategies, or methods to any one person, as he wanted to foster and protect his persona of tactical brilliance. Ever the student of history, he would turn to the great captains of military history as both inspiration and guidance for himself and those around him during his prolific martial life. His final Maxim, LXXVIII is the most telling, as it both reflects his personal belief and his advice to the ages: 

Peruse again and again the campaigns of Alexander, Hannibal, Caesar, Gustavus Adolphus, Turenne, Eugene and Frederick. Model yourself upon them. This is the only means of becoming a great captain, and of acquiring the secret of the art of war. Your own genius will be enlightened and improve by this study, and you will learn to reject all maxims foreign to the principles of these great commanders.[8]

Notes

[1] Bonaparte, The Military Maxims of Napoleon, 82.

[2] Bonaparte, The Military Maxims of Napoleon, 73.

[3] Bonaparte, The Military Maxims of Napoleon, 64.

[4] Chandler, The Campaigns of Napoleon, 1059.

[5] Bonaparte, The Military Maxims of Napoleon, 72.

[6] Robert, Napoleon: A Life, 729.

[7] Connelly, Blundering To Glory - Napoleons Military Campaigns, 216.

[8] Schom, Napoleon Bonaparte, 678.

Bibliography

Primary Sources

Bonaparte, Napoleon. “Napoleon Bonaparte Letters.” Archives & Special Collections, University of Nebraska-Lincoln. https://libarchives.unl.edu/project/29072/.

Chandler, David. The Military Maxims of Napoleon. London, UK: Greenhill Books, 1994. 

“Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man and Citizen, Constitution of the Year III (1795).” Liberty, Equality, Fraternity: Exploring the French Revolution. https://chnm.gmu.edu/revolution/d/298/.

Dicey, T. and W. Sutton. The Northampton Mercury (UK) , January 18, 1806.

Dickman, Thomas. Hampshire Federalist Springfield (MA), September 21, 1809.

“In Search of Glory: Bonaparte’s Bulletins.” Liberty, Equality, Fraternity: Exploring the French Revolution. https://revolution.chnm.org/d/613.

“Napoleon as an Ambitious Young General in 1796-97.” Liberty, Equality, Fraternity: Exploring the French Revolution.https://revolution.chnm.org/d/501.

Secondary Sources

Bruce, Robert B., Iain Dickie, Kevin Kiley, Michael F. Pavkovic, and Frederick C. Schneid. Fighting Techniques of the Napoleonic Age 1792-1815: Equipment, Combat Skills, and Tactics. New York, NY: Thomas Dunne, 2008. 

Chandler, David. The Campaigns of Napoleon. New York, NY: Macmillan Company, 1966. 

Connelly, Owen S. Blundering To Glory - Napoleons Military Campaigns. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006. 

Dwyer, Philip G. Citizen Emperor: Napoleon In Power. London, UK: Bloomsbury, 2014. 

Elting, John R. Swords Around A Throne: Napoleon’s Grande Armée. London, UK: Phoenix Giant, 1988. 

Holmes, Richard. The Napoleonic Wars. London, UK: Carlton Books, 2015. 

Ludwig, Emil. Napoleon. Translated by Eden Paul and Cedar Paul. Garden City , NY: Garden City Publishing, 1926. 

Mikaberidze, Alexander. The Napoleonic Wars: A Global History. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2020. 

Roberts, Andrew. Napoleon: A Life. New York, NY: Penguin Books, 2014. 

Schom, Alan. Napoleon Bonaparte. New York, NY: HarperCollins, 1998.